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Satallax---3.5.THM-Prf.s

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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : Satallax---3.5
% Problem  : ITP084^1 : TPTP v9.2.0. Released v7.5.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : satallax -E eprover-ho -P picomus -M modes -p tstp -t %d %s

% Computer : n001.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Oct  9 01:46:55 PM UTC 2025

% Result   : Theorem 28.95s 27.05s
% Output   : Proof 28.95s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :    7
%            Number of leaves      :   13
% Syntax   : Number of formulae    :   41 (  17 unt;   0 typ;   0 def)
%            Number of atoms       :  125 (  10 equ;   0 cnn)
%            Maximal formula atoms :    4 (   3 avg)
%            Number of connectives :  105 (  33   ~;  27   |;   0   &;  42   @)
%                                         (   0 <=>;   1  =>;   2  <=;   0 <~>)
%            Maximal formula depth :    5 (   3 avg)
%            Number of types       :    0 (   0 usr)
%            Number of type conns  :    0 (   0   >;   0   *;   0   +;   0  <<)
%            Number of symbols     :   23 (  21 usr;  22 con; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of variables   :    4 (   0   ^;   4   !;   0   ?;   4   :)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
thf(conj_0,conjecture,
    knowle945212990e_know @ a @ ( secrecy_kKS @ m ) ).

thf(h0,negated_conjecture,
    ~ ( knowle945212990e_know @ a @ ( secrecy_kKS @ m ) ),
    inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[conj_0]) ).

thf(ax1491,axiom,
    ( ~ p8
    | p26 ),
    file('<stdin>',ax1491) ).

thf(ax1461,axiom,
    ( ~ p26
    | p57 ),
    file('<stdin>',ax1461) ).

thf(ax1509,axiom,
    p8,
    file('<stdin>',ax1509) ).

thf(nax110,axiom,
    ( p110
   <= ( fa = fa ) ),
    file('<stdin>',nax110) ).

thf(ax1405,axiom,
    ( ~ p57
    | ~ p104
    | p21 ),
    file('<stdin>',ax1405) ).

thf(ax1496,axiom,
    ~ p21,
    file('<stdin>',ax1496) ).

thf(pax12,axiom,
    ( p12
   => ! [X286: secrecy_Keys] :
        ( ( fsecrec1016742679ession @ ( fsecrecy_kKS @ X286 ) )
        = ( fsecrecy_kE @ X286 ) ) ),
    file('<stdin>',pax12) ).

thf(ax1399,axiom,
    ( ~ p1
    | p104
    | ~ p110
    | ~ p111 ),
    file('<stdin>',ax1399) ).

thf(nax111,axiom,
    ( p111
   <= ( ( fcons_S112077679ession @ ( fsecrecy_kE @ fm ) @ fnil_Se901661471ession )
      = ( fcons_S112077679ession @ ( fsecrec1016742679ession @ ( fsecrecy_kKS @ fm ) ) @ fnil_Se901661471ession ) ) ),
    file('<stdin>',nax111) ).

thf(ax1505,axiom,
    p12,
    file('<stdin>',ax1505) ).

thf(ax1516,axiom,
    p1,
    file('<stdin>',ax1516) ).

thf(c_0_11,plain,
    ( ~ p8
    | p26 ),
    inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax1491]) ).

thf(c_0_12,plain,
    ( ~ p26
    | p57 ),
    inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax1461]) ).

thf(c_0_13,plain,
    ( p26
    | ~ p8 ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_11]) ).

thf(c_0_14,plain,
    p8,
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[ax1509]) ).

thf(c_0_15,plain,
    ( ( fa != fa )
    | p110 ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[nax110])]) ).

thf(c_0_16,plain,
    ( ~ p57
    | ~ p104
    | p21 ),
    inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax1405]) ).

thf(c_0_17,plain,
    ( p57
    | ~ p26 ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_12]) ).

thf(c_0_18,plain,
    p26,
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_13,c_0_14])]) ).

thf(c_0_19,plain,
    ~ p21,
    inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax1496]) ).

thf(c_0_20,plain,
    ! [X706: secrecy_Keys] :
      ( ~ p12
      | ( ( fsecrec1016742679ession @ ( fsecrecy_kKS @ X706 ) )
        = ( fsecrecy_kE @ X706 ) ) ),
    inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[pax12])])]) ).

thf(c_0_21,plain,
    ( ~ p1
    | p104
    | ~ p110
    | ~ p111 ),
    inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[ax1399]) ).

thf(c_0_22,plain,
    ( p110
    | ( fa != fa ) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_15]) ).

thf(c_0_23,plain,
    ( p21
    | ~ p57
    | ~ p104 ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_16]) ).

thf(c_0_24,plain,
    p57,
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_17,c_0_18])]) ).

thf(c_0_25,plain,
    ~ p21,
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_19]) ).

thf(c_0_26,plain,
    ( ( ( fcons_S112077679ession @ ( fsecrecy_kE @ fm ) @ fnil_Se901661471ession )
     != ( fcons_S112077679ession @ ( fsecrec1016742679ession @ ( fsecrecy_kKS @ fm ) ) @ fnil_Se901661471ession ) )
    | p111 ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[nax111])]) ).

thf(c_0_27,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_Keys] :
      ( ( ( fsecrec1016742679ession @ ( fsecrecy_kKS @ X2 ) )
        = ( fsecrecy_kE @ X2 ) )
      | ~ p12 ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_20]) ).

thf(c_0_28,plain,
    p12,
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[ax1505]) ).

thf(c_0_29,plain,
    ( p104
    | ~ p1
    | ~ p110
    | ~ p111 ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_21]) ).

thf(c_0_30,plain,
    p1,
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[ax1516]) ).

thf(c_0_31,plain,
    p110,
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[c_0_22]) ).

thf(c_0_32,plain,
    ~ p104,
    inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_23,c_0_24])]),c_0_25]) ).

thf(c_0_33,plain,
    ( p111
    | ( ( fcons_S112077679ession @ ( fsecrecy_kE @ fm ) @ fnil_Se901661471ession )
     != ( fcons_S112077679ession @ ( fsecrec1016742679ession @ ( fsecrecy_kKS @ fm ) ) @ fnil_Se901661471ession ) ) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_26]) ).

thf(c_0_34,plain,
    ! [X2: secrecy_Keys] :
      ( ( fsecrec1016742679ession @ ( fsecrecy_kKS @ X2 ) )
      = ( fsecrecy_kE @ X2 ) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_27,c_0_28])]) ).

thf(c_0_35,plain,
    ~ p111,
    inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_29,c_0_30]),c_0_31])]),c_0_32]) ).

thf(c_0_36,plain,
    $false,
    inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_33,c_0_34])]),c_0_35]),
    [proof] ).

thf(1,plain,
    $false,
    inference(eprover,[status(thm),assumptions([h0])],[]) ).

thf(0,theorem,
    knowle945212990e_know @ a @ ( secrecy_kKS @ m ),
    inference(contra,[status(thm),contra(discharge,[h0])],[1,h0]) ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.07/0.13  % Problem  : ITP084^1 : TPTP v9.2.0. Released v7.5.0.
% 0.07/0.13  % Command  : satallax -E eprover-ho -P picomus -M modes -p tstp -t %d %s
% 0.13/0.35  % Computer : n001.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.35  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.35  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.35  % Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.35  % OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.35  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.35  % WCLimit  : 300
% 0.13/0.35  % DateTime : Wed Oct  8 18:20:38 EDT 2025
% 0.13/0.35  % CPUTime  : 
% 28.95/27.05  % SZS status Theorem
% 28.95/27.05  % Mode: mode478:USE_SINE=true:SINE_TOLERANCE=2.0:SINE_GENERALITY_THRESHOLD=16:SINE_RANK_LIMIT=1.:SINE_DEPTH=0
% 28.95/27.05  % Inferences: 741
% 28.95/27.05  % SZS output start Proof
% See solution above
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------