%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : LEO-II---2.3.1
% Problem : MGT111+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v9.3.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : leo --cores 7 --timeout 300 --proofoutput 1 --foatp e --atp e=/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/eprover /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% Computer : n005.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Wed Oct 7 10:31:53 AM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 0.09s 0.23s
% Output : CNFRefutation 0.09s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 31
% Number of leaves : 7
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 109 ( 31 unt; 0 typ; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 1335 ( 373 equ; 0 cnn)
% Maximal formula atoms : 10 ( 12 avg)
% Number of connectives : 2689 ( 449 ~; 438 |; 40 &;1760 @)
% ( 0 <=>; 2 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 14 ( 6 avg)
% Number of types : 2 ( 0 usr)
% Number of type conns : 0 ( 0 >; 0 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of symbols : 20 ( 17 usr; 6 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 254 ( 0 ^; 240 !; 14 ?; 254 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
thf(tp_act,type,
act: $i > $i > $o ).
thf(tp_action,type,
action: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_activates,type,
activates: $i > $i > $o ).
thf(tp_aee,type,
aee: $i > $i > $o ).
thf(tp_agent,type,
agent: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_bearer,type,
bearer: $i > $i > $o ).
thf(tp_cnt,type,
cnt: $i > $i > $i > $o ).
thf(tp_ensemble,type,
ensemble: $i ).
thf(tp_modify_act,type,
modify_act: $i ).
thf(tp_permission,type,
permission: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_portal,type,
portal: $i ).
thf(tp_proh,type,
proh: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_sK1_L,type,
sK1_L: $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tp_sK2_F,type,
sK2_F: $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tp_sK3_SY9,type,
sK3_SY9: $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(tp_target,type,
target: $i > $o ).
thf(tp_theater_ds,type,
theater_ds: $i ).
thf(1,axiom,
! [X: $i,A: $i,T: $i] :
( ( ( agent @ X )
& ( action @ A )
& ( target @ T )
& ~ ? [F: $i,E: $i] :
( ( proh @ F )
& ( aee @ F @ X )
& ( act @ F @ A )
& ( activates @ E @ F ) ) )
=> ? [L: $i] :
( ( permission @ L )
& ( bearer @ L @ X )
& ( cnt @ L @ A @ T ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',open_world_closure) ).
thf(2,axiom,
~ ? [F: $i,E: $i] :
( ( proh @ F )
& ( aee @ F @ portal )
& ( act @ F @ modify_act )
& ( activates @ E @ F ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',no_proh_modify) ).
thf(3,axiom,
target @ theater_ds,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',target_theater) ).
thf(4,axiom,
action @ modify_act,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',action_modify) ).
thf(5,axiom,
agent @ ensemble,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',agent_ensemble) ).
thf(6,axiom,
agent @ portal,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',agent_portal) ).
thf(7,conjecture,
? [L: $i] :
( ( permission @ L )
& ( bearer @ L @ portal )
& ( cnt @ L @ modify_act @ theater_ds ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',conjecture) ).
thf(8,negated_conjecture,
( ( ? [L: $i] :
( ( permission @ L )
& ( bearer @ L @ portal )
& ( cnt @ L @ modify_act @ theater_ds ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(negate_conjecture,[status(cth)],[7]) ).
thf(9,plain,
( ( ? [L: $i] :
( ( permission @ L )
& ( bearer @ L @ portal )
& ( cnt @ L @ modify_act @ theater_ds ) ) )
= $false ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[8]) ).
thf(10,plain,
( ( ! [X: $i,A: $i,T: $i] :
( ( ( agent @ X )
& ( action @ A )
& ( target @ T )
& ~ ? [F: $i,E: $i] :
( ( proh @ F )
& ( aee @ F @ X )
& ( act @ F @ A )
& ( activates @ E @ F ) ) )
=> ? [L: $i] :
( ( permission @ L )
& ( bearer @ L @ X )
& ( cnt @ L @ A @ T ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[1]) ).
thf(11,plain,
( ( ~ ? [F: $i,E: $i] :
( ( proh @ F )
& ( aee @ F @ portal )
& ( act @ F @ modify_act )
& ( activates @ E @ F ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[2]) ).
thf(12,plain,
( ( target @ theater_ds )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[3]) ).
thf(13,plain,
( ( action @ modify_act )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[4]) ).
thf(14,plain,
( ( agent @ ensemble )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[5]) ).
thf(15,plain,
( ( agent @ portal )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[6]) ).
thf(16,plain,
( ( ~ ? [L: $i] :
( ( permission @ L )
& ( bearer @ L @ portal )
& ( cnt @ L @ modify_act @ theater_ds ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(polarity_switch,[status(thm)],[9]) ).
thf(17,plain,
( ( ! [L: $i] :
( ~ ( bearer @ L @ portal )
| ~ ( permission @ L )
| ~ ( cnt @ L @ modify_act @ theater_ds ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[16]) ).
thf(18,plain,
( ( ! [X: $i,A: $i,T: $i] :
( ~ ( action @ A )
| ~ ( agent @ X )
| ~ ( target @ T )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ T @ A @ X ) @ X )
& ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ T @ A @ X ) )
& ( act @ ( sK2_F @ T @ A @ X ) @ A )
& ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ T @ A @ X ) @ ( sK2_F @ T @ A @ X ) ) )
| ( ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ T @ A @ X ) @ X )
& ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ T @ A @ X ) )
& ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ T @ A @ X ) @ A @ T ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[10]) ).
thf(19,plain,
( ( ! [F: $i] :
( ~ ( aee @ F @ portal )
| ~ ( proh @ F )
| ~ ( act @ F @ modify_act )
| ! [E: $i] :
~ ( activates @ E @ F ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_combined,[status(esa)],[11]) ).
thf(20,plain,
( ( agent @ portal )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[15]) ).
thf(21,plain,
( ( agent @ ensemble )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[14]) ).
thf(22,plain,
( ( action @ modify_act )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[13]) ).
thf(23,plain,
( ( target @ theater_ds )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[12]) ).
thf(24,plain,
( ( ! [F: $i] :
( ~ ( aee @ F @ portal )
| ~ ( proh @ F )
| ~ ( act @ F @ modify_act )
| ! [E: $i] :
~ ( activates @ E @ F ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[19]) ).
thf(25,plain,
( ( ! [X: $i,A: $i,T: $i] :
( ~ ( action @ A )
| ~ ( agent @ X )
| ~ ( target @ T )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ T @ A @ X ) @ X )
& ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ T @ A @ X ) )
& ( act @ ( sK2_F @ T @ A @ X ) @ A )
& ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ T @ A @ X ) @ ( sK2_F @ T @ A @ X ) ) )
| ( ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ T @ A @ X ) @ X )
& ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ T @ A @ X ) )
& ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ T @ A @ X ) @ A @ T ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[18]) ).
thf(26,plain,
( ( ! [L: $i] :
( ~ ( bearer @ L @ portal )
| ~ ( permission @ L )
| ~ ( cnt @ L @ modify_act @ theater_ds ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(copy,[status(thm)],[17]) ).
thf(27,plain,
( ( ! [SX0: $i,SX1: $i,SX2: $i] :
( ~ ( action @ SX1 )
| ~ ( agent @ SX0 )
| ~ ( target @ SX2 )
| ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SX2 @ SX1 @ SX0 ) @ SX0 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SX2 @ SX1 @ SX0 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SX2 @ SX1 @ SX0 ) @ SX1 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SX2 @ SX1 @ SX0 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SX2 @ SX1 @ SX0 ) ) )
| ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SX2 @ SX1 @ SX0 ) @ SX0 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SX2 @ SX1 @ SX0 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SX2 @ SX1 @ SX0 ) @ SX1 @ SX2 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(unfold_def,[status(thm)],[25]) ).
thf(28,plain,
! [SV1: $i] :
( ( ~ ( aee @ SV1 @ portal )
| ~ ( proh @ SV1 )
| ~ ( act @ SV1 @ modify_act )
| ! [SY10: $i] :
~ ( activates @ SY10 @ SV1 ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[24]) ).
thf(29,plain,
! [SV2: $i] :
( ( ~ ( bearer @ SV2 @ portal )
| ~ ( permission @ SV2 )
| ~ ( cnt @ SV2 @ modify_act @ theater_ds ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[26]) ).
thf(30,plain,
! [SV3: $i] :
( ( ! [SY11: $i,SY12: $i] :
( ~ ( action @ SY11 )
| ~ ( agent @ SV3 )
| ~ ( target @ SY12 )
| ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SY12 @ SY11 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SY12 @ SY11 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SY12 @ SY11 @ SV3 ) @ SY11 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SY12 @ SY11 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SY12 @ SY11 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SY12 @ SY11 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SY12 @ SY11 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SY12 @ SY11 @ SV3 ) @ SY11 @ SY12 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[27]) ).
thf(31,plain,
! [SV1: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( aee @ SV1 @ portal )
| ~ ( proh @ SV1 )
| ~ ( act @ SV1 @ modify_act ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ! [SY10: $i] :
~ ( activates @ SY10 @ SV1 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[28]) ).
thf(32,plain,
! [SV2: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( bearer @ SV2 @ portal )
| ~ ( permission @ SV2 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( cnt @ SV2 @ modify_act @ theater_ds ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[29]) ).
thf(33,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i] :
( ( ! [SY13: $i] :
( ~ ( action @ SV4 )
| ~ ( agent @ SV3 )
| ~ ( target @ SY13 )
| ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SY13 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SY13 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SY13 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SY13 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SY13 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SY13 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SY13 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SY13 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SY13 ) ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[30]) ).
thf(34,plain,
! [SV1: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( aee @ SV1 @ portal )
| ~ ( proh @ SV1 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( act @ SV1 @ modify_act ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ! [SY10: $i] :
~ ( activates @ SY10 @ SV1 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[31]) ).
thf(35,plain,
! [SV2: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( bearer @ SV2 @ portal ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( permission @ SV2 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( cnt @ SV2 @ modify_act @ theater_ds ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[32]) ).
thf(36,plain,
! [SV5: $i,SV3: $i,SV4: $i] :
( ( ~ ( action @ SV4 )
| ~ ( agent @ SV3 )
| ~ ( target @ SV5 )
| ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[33]) ).
thf(37,plain,
! [SV1: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( aee @ SV1 @ portal ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( proh @ SV1 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( act @ SV1 @ modify_act ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ! [SY10: $i] :
~ ( activates @ SY10 @ SV1 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[34]) ).
thf(38,plain,
! [SV2: $i] :
( ( ( bearer @ SV2 @ portal )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( permission @ SV2 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( cnt @ SV2 @ modify_act @ theater_ds ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[35]) ).
thf(39,plain,
! [SV5: $i,SV3: $i,SV4: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( action @ SV4 )
| ~ ( agent @ SV3 )
| ~ ( target @ SV5 )
| ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[36]) ).
thf(40,plain,
! [SV1: $i] :
( ( ( aee @ SV1 @ portal )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( proh @ SV1 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( act @ SV1 @ modify_act ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ! [SY10: $i] :
~ ( activates @ SY10 @ SV1 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[37]) ).
thf(41,plain,
! [SV2: $i] :
( ( ( permission @ SV2 )
= $false )
| ( ( bearer @ SV2 @ portal )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( cnt @ SV2 @ modify_act @ theater_ds ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[38]) ).
thf(42,plain,
! [SV5: $i,SV3: $i,SV4: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( action @ SV4 )
| ~ ( agent @ SV3 )
| ~ ( target @ SV5 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[39]) ).
thf(43,plain,
! [SV1: $i] :
( ( ( proh @ SV1 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ SV1 @ portal )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( act @ SV1 @ modify_act ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ! [SY10: $i] :
~ ( activates @ SY10 @ SV1 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[40]) ).
thf(44,plain,
! [SV2: $i] :
( ( ( cnt @ SV2 @ modify_act @ theater_ds )
= $false )
| ( ( bearer @ SV2 @ portal )
= $false )
| ( ( permission @ SV2 )
= $false ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[41]) ).
thf(45,plain,
! [SV5: $i,SV3: $i,SV4: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( action @ SV4 )
| ~ ( agent @ SV3 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( target @ SV5 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[42]) ).
thf(46,plain,
! [SV1: $i] :
( ( ( act @ SV1 @ modify_act )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ SV1 @ portal )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ SV1 )
= $false )
| ( ( ! [SY10: $i] :
~ ( activates @ SY10 @ SV1 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[43]) ).
thf(47,plain,
! [SV5: $i,SV3: $i,SV4: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( action @ SV4 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( agent @ SV3 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( target @ SV5 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_pos,[status(thm)],[45]) ).
thf(48,plain,
! [SV1: $i,SV6: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( activates @ SV6 @ SV1 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( proh @ SV1 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ SV1 @ portal )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ SV1 @ modify_act )
= $false ) ),
inference(extcnf_forall_pos,[status(thm)],[46]) ).
thf(49,plain,
! [SV5: $i,SV3: $i,SV4: $i] :
( ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( agent @ SV3 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( target @ SV5 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[47]) ).
thf(50,plain,
! [SV1: $i,SV6: $i] :
( ( ( activates @ SV6 @ SV1 )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ SV1 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ SV1 @ portal )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ SV1 @ modify_act )
= $false ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[48]) ).
thf(51,plain,
! [SV5: $i,SV4: $i,SV3: $i] :
( ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( target @ SV5 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[49]) ).
thf(52,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[51]) ).
thf(53,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
| ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[52]) ).
thf(54,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[53]) ).
thf(55,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[53]) ).
thf(56,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[54]) ).
thf(57,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[55]) ).
thf(58,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[56]) ).
thf(59,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[57]) ).
thf(60,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[58]) ).
thf(61,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[58]) ).
thf(62,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[59]) ).
thf(63,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[59]) ).
thf(64,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[60]) ).
thf(65,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 )
= $true )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[61]) ).
thf(66,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[62]) ).
thf(67,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[63]) ).
thf(68,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[64]) ).
thf(69,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[65]) ).
thf(70,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[66]) ).
thf(71,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[68]) ).
thf(72,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[68]) ).
thf(73,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[69]) ).
thf(74,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[69]) ).
thf(75,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[70]) ).
thf(76,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[70]) ).
thf(77,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[71]) ).
thf(78,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( ~ ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[72]) ).
thf(79,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[73]) ).
thf(80,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[74]) ).
thf(81,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[75]) ).
thf(82,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( activates @ ( sK3_SY9 @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[76]) ).
thf(83,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[77]) ).
thf(84,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
| ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[78]) ).
thf(85,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[79]) ).
thf(86,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[83]) ).
thf(87,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[83]) ).
thf(88,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[84]) ).
thf(89,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[84]) ).
thf(90,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[85]) ).
thf(91,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[85]) ).
thf(92,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[86]) ).
thf(93,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[87]) ).
thf(94,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) ) )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[88]) ).
thf(95,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( cnt @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 @ SV5 )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[89]) ).
thf(96,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[90]) ).
thf(97,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( act @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV4 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[91]) ).
thf(98,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[92]) ).
thf(99,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
| ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_pos,[status(thm)],[94]) ).
thf(100,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[98]) ).
thf(101,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[98]) ).
thf(102,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[99]) ).
thf(103,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( ~ ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) ) )
= $false )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_or_neg,[status(thm)],[99]) ).
thf(104,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[100]) ).
thf(105,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( aee @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[101]) ).
thf(106,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( bearer @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) @ SV3 )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[102]) ).
thf(107,plain,
! [SV3: $i,SV4: $i,SV5: $i] :
( ( ( permission @ ( sK1_L @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true )
| ( ( target @ SV5 )
= $false )
| ( ( action @ SV4 )
= $false )
| ( ( agent @ SV3 )
= $false )
| ( ( proh @ ( sK2_F @ SV5 @ SV4 @ SV3 ) )
= $true ) ),
inference(extcnf_not_neg,[status(thm)],[103]) ).
thf(108,plain,
$false = $true,
inference(fo_atp_e,[status(thm)],[20,107,106,105,104,97,96,95,93,82,81,80,67,50,44,23,22,21]) ).
thf(109,plain,
$false,
inference(solved_all_splits,[solved_all_splits(join,[])],[108]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03 % Problem : MGT111+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v9.3.0.
% 0.00/0.04 % Command : leo --cores 7 --timeout 300 --proofoutput 1 --foatp e --atp e=/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/eprover /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.09/0.16 % Computer : n005.cluster.edu
% 0.09/0.16 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.09/0.16 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.09/0.16 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.09/0.16 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.09/0.16 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.09/0.16 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.09/0.16 % DateTime : Tue Oct 6 12:44:14 UTC 2026
% 0.09/0.17 % CPUTime :
% 0.09/0.17 Running leo --cores 7 --timeout 300 --proofoutput 1 --foatp e --atp e=/export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/eprover /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.09/0.23
% 0.09/0.23 No.of.Axioms: 6
% 0.09/0.23
% 0.09/0.23 Length.of.Defs: 0
% 0.09/0.23
% 0.09/0.23 Contains.Choice.Funs: false
% 0.09/0.23 ...
% 0.09/0.23
% 0.09/0.23 ********************************
% 0.09/0.23 * All subproblems solved! *
% 0.09/0.23 ********************************
% 0.09/0.23 % SZS status Theorem for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p : (rf:0,axioms:6,ps:3,u:6,ude:true,rLeibEQ:true,rAndEQ:true,use_choice:true,use_extuni:true,use_extcnf_combined:true,expand_extuni:false,foatp:e,atp_timeout:299,atp_calls_frequency:5,ordering:none,proof_output:1,protocol_output:false,clause_count:108,loop_count:0,foatp_calls:1,translation:fof_full)
% 0.09/0.23
% 0.09/0.23 %**** Beginning of derivation protocol ****
% 0.09/0.23 % SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 0.09/0.23
% 0.09/0.23 %**** End of derivation protocol ****
% 0.09/0.23 %**** no. of clauses in derivation: 109 ****
% 0.09/0.23 %**** clause counter: 108 ****
% 0.09/0.23
% 0.09/0.23 % SZS status Theorem for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p : (rf:0,axioms:6,ps:3,u:6,ude:true,rLeibEQ:true,rAndEQ:true,use_choice:true,use_extuni:true,use_extcnf_combined:true,expand_extuni:false,foatp:e,atp_timeout:299,atp_calls_frequency:5,ordering:none,proof_output:1,protocol_output:false,clause_count:108,loop_count:0,foatp_calls:1,translation:fof_full)
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------