%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : CSE_E---1.7
% Problem : SWV010+1 : TPTP v9.2.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lemma_parallel_prover %s --lemma-prover /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/cse --final-prover /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/eprover --proof-time %d --global-time-limit %d
% Computer : n024.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Tue May 5 05:20:35 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Satisfiable 1.10s 1.61s
% Output : Saturation 1.10s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : ERROR: Analysing output (MakeTreeStats fails)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))
& fresh_to_b(X2) )
=> ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X2),encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))))
& b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time) ).
fof(server_t_generates_key,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3,X4,X5,X6,X7] :
( ( message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X2,encrypt(triple(X3,X4,X5),X6))))
& t_holds(key(X6,X1))
& t_holds(key(X7,X3)) )
=> message(sent(t,X3,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X4,generate_key(X4),X5),X7),encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X4),X5),X6),X2))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',server_t_generates_key) ).
fof(a_sent_message_i_to_b,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b) ).
fof(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b) ).
fof(a_forwards_secure,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3,X4,X5,X6] :
( ( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X5,X6,X3,X2),at),X4,X1)))
& a_stored(pair(X5,X6)) )
=> ( message(sent(a,X5,pair(X4,encrypt(X1,X3))))
& a_holds(key(X3,X5)) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_forwards_secure) ).
fof(t_holds_key_bt_for_b,axiom,
t_holds(key(bt,b)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_holds_key_bt_for_b) ).
fof(b_accepts_secure_session_key,axiom,
! [X2,X4,X5] :
( ( message(sent(X4,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X4,X2,generate_expiration_time(X5)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X5),X2))))
& b_stored(pair(X4,X5)) )
=> b_holds(key(X2,X4)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key) ).
fof(a_stored_message_i,axiom,
a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_stored_message_i) ).
fof(t_holds_key_at_for_a,axiom,
t_holds(key(at,a)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_holds_key_at_for_a) ).
fof(b_hold_key_bt_for_t,axiom,
b_holds(key(bt,t)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_hold_key_bt_for_t) ).
fof(a_holds_key_at_for_t,axiom,
a_holds(key(at,t)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_holds_key_at_for_t) ).
fof(b_is_party_of_protocol,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(a_is_party_of_protocol,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(t_is_party_of_protocol,axiom,
party_of_protocol(t),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(c_0_14,plain,
! [X32,X33] :
( ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X33),encrypt(triple(X32,X33,generate_expiration_time(X33)),bt))))
| ~ message(sent(X32,b,pair(X32,X33)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X33) )
& ( b_stored(pair(X32,X33))
| ~ message(sent(X32,b,pair(X32,X33)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X33) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time])])]) ).
fof(c_0_15,plain,
! [X37,X38,X39,X40,X41,X42,X43] :
( ~ message(sent(X37,t,triple(X37,X38,encrypt(triple(X39,X40,X41),X42))))
| ~ t_holds(key(X42,X37))
| ~ t_holds(key(X43,X39))
| message(sent(t,X39,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X37,X40,generate_key(X40),X41),X43),encrypt(triple(X39,generate_key(X40),X41),X42),X38))) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[server_t_generates_key])]) ).
cnf(c_0_16,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_17,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_18,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b]),
[final] ).
fof(c_0_19,plain,
! [X26,X27,X28,X29,X30,X31] :
( ( message(sent(a,X30,pair(X29,encrypt(X26,X28))))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X30,X31,X28,X27),at),X29,X26)))
| ~ a_stored(pair(X30,X31)) )
& ( a_holds(key(X28,X30))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X30,X31,X28,X27),at),X29,X26)))
| ~ a_stored(pair(X30,X31)) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[a_forwards_secure])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_20,plain,
( message(sent(t,X3,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X4,generate_key(X4),X5),X7),encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X4),X5),X6),X2)))
| ~ message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X2,encrypt(triple(X3,X4,X5),X6))))
| ~ t_holds(key(X6,X1))
| ~ t_holds(key(X7,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_15]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_21,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_16,c_0_17]),c_0_18])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_22,plain,
t_holds(key(bt,b)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_bt_for_b]),
[final] ).
fof(c_0_23,plain,
! [X34,X35,X36] :
( ~ message(sent(X35,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X35,X34,generate_expiration_time(X36)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X36),X34))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X35,X36))
| b_holds(key(X34,X35)) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_accepts_secure_session_key])]) ).
cnf(c_0_24,plain,
( message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3)))
| ~ a_stored(pair(X1,X5)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_19]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_25,plain,
( message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),X1),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))))
| ~ t_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_20,c_0_21]),c_0_22])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_26,plain,
a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_stored_message_i]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_27,plain,
t_holds(key(at,a)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_at_for_a]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_28,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_29,plain,
( b_holds(key(X2,X1))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X2))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_23]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_30,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_24,c_0_25]),c_0_26]),c_0_27])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_31,plain,
b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_28,c_0_17]),c_0_18])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_32,plain,
( a_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4),at),X5,X6)))
| ~ a_stored(pair(X2,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_19]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_33,plain,
b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_29,c_0_30]),c_0_31])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_34,plain,
a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_25]),c_0_26]),c_0_27])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_35,plain,
b_holds(key(bt,t)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_hold_key_bt_for_t]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_36,plain,
a_holds(key(at,t)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_holds_key_at_for_t]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_37,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_is_party_of_protocol]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_38,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_is_party_of_protocol]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_39,plain,
party_of_protocol(t),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_is_party_of_protocol]),
[final] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.06 % Problem : SWV010+1 : TPTP v9.2.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.06 % Command : /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lemma_parallel_prover %s --lemma-prover /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/cse --final-prover /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/eprover --proof-time %d --global-time-limit %d
% 0.08/0.24 % Computer : n024.cluster.edu
% 0.08/0.24 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.08/0.24 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.08/0.24 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.08/0.24 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.08/0.24 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.08/0.24 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.08/0.24 % DateTime : Mon May 4 23:53:26 EDT 2026
% 0.08/0.24 % CPUTime :
% 0.08/0.25 % start to proof: theBenchmark
% 1.10/1.61 % Version : CSE_E---1.7
% 1.10/1.61 % Problem : theBenchmark.p
% 1.10/1.61 % SZS status Satisfiable for theBenchmark.p
% 1.10/1.61 % SZS output start Saturation
% See solution above
% 1.10/1.61 % Total time : 1.362s
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------