%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Drodi-SAT---4.1.1
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : drodi -satmode(on) -timeout(300) /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% Computer : n004.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Sep 24 02:49:56 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 0.26s 0.51s
% Output : Assurance 0s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : -
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----No solution output by system
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.05 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.06 % Command : drodi -satmode(on) -timeout(300) /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.17/0.44 % Computer : n004.cluster.edu
% 0.17/0.44 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.17/0.44 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.17/0.44 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.17/0.44 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.17/0.44 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.17/0.44 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.17/0.44 % DateTime : Mon Sep 21 08:26:50 UTC 2026
% 0.17/0.45 % CPUTime :
% 0.17/0.46 % Drodi V4.1.1
% 0.26/0.51 % Refutation found
% 0.26/0.51 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark: Theorem is valid
% 0.26/0.51 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f2,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 party_of_protocol(a) ),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f3,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))) ),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f7,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 party_of_protocol(b) ),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f8,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) ),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f9,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 (! [U,V] :( ( message(sent(U,b,pair(U,V)))& fresh_to_b(V) )=> ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(V),encrypt(triple(U,V,generate_expiration_time(V)),bt))))& b_stored(pair(U,V)) ) ) )),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f10,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 (! [V,X,Y] :( ( message(sent(X,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X,V,generate_expiration_time(Y)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(Y),V))))& b_stored(pair(X,Y)) )=> b_holds(key(V,X)) ) )),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f13,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 party_of_protocol(t) ),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f15,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 (! [U,V,W] :( message(sent(U,V,W))=> intruder_message(W) ) )),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f16,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 (! [U,V] :( intruder_message(pair(U,V))=> ( intruder_message(U)& intruder_message(V) ) ) )),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f17,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 (! [U,V,W] :( intruder_message(triple(U,V,W))=> ( intruder_message(U)& intruder_message(V)& intruder_message(W) ) ) )),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f19,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 (! [U,V] :( ( intruder_message(U)& intruder_message(V) )=> intruder_message(pair(U,V)) ) )),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f23,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 (! [U,V,W] :( ( intruder_message(U)& party_of_protocol(V)& party_of_protocol(W) )=> message(sent(V,W,U)) ) )),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f24,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 (! [V,W] :( ( intruder_message(V)& party_of_protocol(W) )=> intruder_holds(key(V,W)) ) )),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f25,axiom,(
% 0.26/0.51 (! [U,V,W] :( ( intruder_message(U)& intruder_holds(key(V,W))& party_of_protocol(W) )=> intruder_message(encrypt(U,V)) ) )),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f29,conjecture,(
% 0.26/0.51 (? [U] :( intruder_holds(key(U,b))& b_holds(key(U,a)) ) )),
% 0.26/0.51 file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p')).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f30,negated_conjecture,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~((? [U] :( intruder_holds(key(U,b))& b_holds(key(U,a)) ) ))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f29])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f32,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 party_of_protocol(a)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f2])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f33,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f3])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f40,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 party_of_protocol(b)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f7])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f41,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f8])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f42,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![U,V]: ((~message(sent(U,b,pair(U,V)))|~fresh_to_b(V))|(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(V),encrypt(triple(U,V,generate_expiration_time(V)),bt))))&b_stored(pair(U,V))))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f9])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f43,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1]: (~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f42])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f44,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1]: (~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|b_stored(pair(X0,X1)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f42])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f45,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![V,X,Y]: ((~message(sent(X,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X,V,generate_expiration_time(Y)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(Y),V))))|~b_stored(pair(X,Y)))|b_holds(key(V,X)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f10])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f46,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![V,X]: ((![Y]: (~message(sent(X,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X,V,generate_expiration_time(Y)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(Y),V))))|~b_stored(pair(X,Y))))|b_holds(key(V,X)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f45])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f47,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1,X2]: (~message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1))))|~b_stored(pair(X0,X2))|b_holds(key(X1,X0)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f46])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f50,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 party_of_protocol(t)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f13])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f53,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![U,V,W]: (~message(sent(U,V,W))|intruder_message(W))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f15])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f54,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![W]: ((![U,V]: ~message(sent(U,V,W)))|intruder_message(W))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f53])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f55,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1,X2]: (~message(sent(X0,X1,X2))|intruder_message(X2))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f54])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f56,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![U,V]: (~intruder_message(pair(U,V))|(intruder_message(U)&intruder_message(V)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f16])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f58,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1]: (~intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))|intruder_message(X1))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f56])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f59,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![U,V,W]: (~intruder_message(triple(U,V,W))|((intruder_message(U)&intruder_message(V))&intruder_message(W)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f17])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f60,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1,X2]: (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|intruder_message(X0))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f59])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f61,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1,X2]: (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|intruder_message(X1))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f59])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f62,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1,X2]: (~intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))|intruder_message(X2))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f59])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f68,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![U,V]: ((~intruder_message(U)|~intruder_message(V))|intruder_message(pair(U,V)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f19])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f69,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1]: (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(X1)|intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f68])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f77,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![U,V,W]: (((~intruder_message(U)|~party_of_protocol(V))|~party_of_protocol(W))|message(sent(V,W,U)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f23])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f78,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1,X2]: (~intruder_message(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|message(sent(X1,X2,X0)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f77])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f79,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![V,W]: ((~intruder_message(V)|~party_of_protocol(W))|intruder_holds(key(V,W)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f24])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f80,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1]: (~intruder_message(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f79])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f81,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![U,V,W]: (((~intruder_message(U)|~intruder_holds(key(V,W)))|~party_of_protocol(W))|intruder_message(encrypt(U,V)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f25])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f82,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![U,V]: ((![W]: ((~intruder_message(U)|~intruder_holds(key(V,W)))|~party_of_protocol(W)))|intruder_message(encrypt(U,V)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f81])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f83,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1,X2]: (~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X2)|intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f82])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f89,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 (![U]: (~intruder_holds(key(U,b))|~b_holds(key(U,a))))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(pre_NNF_transformation,[status(thm)],[f30])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f90,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (~intruder_holds(key(X0,b))|~b_holds(key(X0,a)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f89])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f91,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f55,f33])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f92,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 intruder_message(an_a_nonce)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f91,f58])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f115,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f44,f33])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f116,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ2_spl <=> (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ2_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f118,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)|sQ2_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f116])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f119,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ3_spl <=> (b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ3_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f120,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))|~sQ3_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f119])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f122,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~sQ2_spl|sQ3_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(split_clause,[status(thm)],[f115,f116,f119])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f123,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 $false|sQ2_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f118,f41])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f124,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ2_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(contradiction_clause,[status(thm)],[f123])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f129,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X2]: (sQ5_spl <=> (~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X2)))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ5_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f130,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~sQ5_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f129])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f133,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1]: (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))|~fresh_to_b(X0))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f55,f43])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f146,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1]: (~intruder_message(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|message(sent(X1,b,X0)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f78,f40])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f199,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ14_spl <=> (intruder_message(b))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ14_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f201,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~intruder_message(b)|sQ14_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f199])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f202,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ15_spl <=> (intruder_message(an_a_nonce))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ15_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f204,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)|sQ15_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f202])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f206,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 $false|sQ15_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f204,f92])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f207,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ15_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(contradiction_clause,[status(thm)],[f206])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f213,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~sQ5_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(duplicate_literals_removal,[status(thm)],[f130])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f214,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 $false|~sQ5_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f50,f213])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f217,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~sQ5_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(contradiction_clause,[status(thm)],[f214])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f223,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0))))|b_holds(key(X0,a))|~sQ3_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f47,f120])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f256,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|~message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce))))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f133,f41])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f257,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f256,f33])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f258,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|~intruder_message(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))|~party_of_protocol(X0))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f256,f146])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f262,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 intruder_message(b)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f257,f60])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f264,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f257,f62])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f265,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 $false|sQ14_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f262,f201])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f266,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ14_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(contradiction_clause,[status(thm)],[f265])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f294,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~intruder_message(an_a_nonce))),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f258,f69])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f298,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ23_spl <=> (party_of_protocol(a))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ23_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f300,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~party_of_protocol(a)|sQ23_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f298])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f302,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (sQ24_spl <=> (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ24_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f303,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))|~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~sQ24_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f302])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f305,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ24_spl|~sQ15_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(split_clause,[status(thm)],[f294,f302,f202])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f307,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))|~sQ24_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f303,f61])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f309,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (sQ25_spl <=> (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ25_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f310,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (~party_of_protocol(X0)|~intruder_message(X0)|~sQ25_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f309])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f313,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ26_spl <=> (intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ26_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f316,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ25_spl|sQ26_spl|~sQ24_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(split_clause,[status(thm)],[f307,f309,f313,f302])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f318,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~intruder_message(b)|~sQ25_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f310,f40])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f321,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~sQ14_spl|~sQ25_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(split_clause,[status(thm)],[f318,f199,f309])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f328,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (b_holds(key(X0,a))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))|~party_of_protocol(a)|~sQ3_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f223,f146])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f329,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (sQ27_spl <=> (b_holds(key(X0,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(X0)))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ27_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f330,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (b_holds(key(X0,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(X0)|~sQ27_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f329])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f333,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (sQ28_spl <=> (b_holds(key(X0,a))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ28_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f334,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (b_holds(key(X0,a))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))|~sQ28_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f333])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f336,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ28_spl|~sQ23_spl|~sQ3_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(split_clause,[status(thm)],[f328,f333,f298,f119])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f337,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 $false|sQ23_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f300,f32])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f338,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ23_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(contradiction_clause,[status(thm)],[f337])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f346,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ30_spl <=> (party_of_protocol(b))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ30_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f348,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~party_of_protocol(b)|sQ30_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f346])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f357,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0]: (b_holds(key(X0,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0))|~sQ28_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f334,f69])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f358,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1]: (b_holds(key(X0,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))|~intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~sQ28_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f357,f83])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f359,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1]: (sQ32_spl <=> (b_holds(key(X0,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ32_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f360,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1]: (b_holds(key(X0,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~sQ32_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f359])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f362,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ32_spl|~sQ26_spl|~sQ28_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(split_clause,[status(thm)],[f358,f359,f313,f333])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f363,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ![X0,X1]: (b_holds(key(X0,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X0)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~sQ32_spl)),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f360,f80])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f364,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ27_spl|sQ5_spl|~sQ32_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(split_clause,[status(thm)],[f363,f329,f129,f359])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f386,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))|~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)|~sQ27_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f330,f264])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f390,definition,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ33_spl <=> (b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)))),
% 0.26/0.51 introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[sQ33_spl])],[split_symbol_definition])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f391,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))|~sQ33_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(component_clause,[status(thm)],[f390])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f393,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ33_spl|~sQ15_spl|~sQ27_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(split_clause,[status(thm)],[f386,f390,f202,f329])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f407,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~sQ33_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f391,f90])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f408,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)|~party_of_protocol(b)|~sQ33_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f407,f80])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f409,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 ~sQ15_spl|~sQ30_spl|~sQ33_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(split_clause,[status(thm)],[f408,f202,f346,f390])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f410,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 $false|sQ30_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f348,f40])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f411,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 sQ30_spl),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(contradiction_clause,[status(thm)],[f410])).
% 0.26/0.51 fof(f412,plain,(
% 0.26/0.51 $false),
% 0.26/0.51 inference(sat_refutation,[status(thm)],[f122,f124,f207,f217,f266,f305,f316,f321,f336,f338,f362,f364,f393,f409,f411])).
% 0.26/0.51 % SZS output end CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% 0.26/0.55 % Elapsed time: 0.087730 seconds
% 0.26/0.55 % CPU time: 0.325040 seconds
% 0.26/0.55 % Total memory used: 59.775 MB
% 0.26/0.55 % Net memory used: 59.517 MB
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------