%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : E---3.5.1
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_E /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% Computer : n013.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Sep 24 02:53:30 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 0.11s 0.43s
% Output : CNFRefutation 0.11s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 9
% Number of leaves : 14
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 56 ( 18 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 140 ( 0 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 145 ( 61 ~; 57 |; 18 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 9 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 8 ( 4 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 8 ( 7 usr; 1 prp; 0-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 89 ( 8 sgn 47 !; 2 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( fresh_to_b(X2)
& message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))) )
=> ( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X2),encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt)))) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time) ).
fof(b_accepts_secure_session_key,axiom,
! [X2,X4,X5] :
( ( b_stored(pair(X4,X5))
& message(sent(X4,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X4,X2,generate_expiration_time(X5)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X5),X2)))) )
=> b_holds(key(X2,X4)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key) ).
fof(intruder_message_sent,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X3)
& party_of_protocol(X2)
& intruder_message(X1) )
=> message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent) ).
fof(intruder_can_record,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3] :
( message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
=> intruder_message(X3) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record) ).
fof(a_sent_message_i_to_b,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b) ).
fof(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b) ).
fof(b_is_party_of_protocol,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(intruder_composes_pairs,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X1) )
=> intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs) ).
fof(intruder_decomposes_triples,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3] :
( intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))
=> ( intruder_message(X3)
& intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X1) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples) ).
fof(intruder_key_encrypts,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X3)
& intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
& intruder_message(X1) )
=> intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts) ).
fof(intruder_holds_key,axiom,
! [X2,X3] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X3)
& intruder_message(X2) )
=> intruder_holds(key(X2,X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key) ).
fof(intruder_decomposes_pairs,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
=> ( intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X1) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs) ).
fof(co1,conjecture,
? [X1] :
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
& intruder_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1) ).
fof(a_is_party_of_protocol,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(c_0_14,plain,
! [X20,X21] :
( ( ~ fresh_to_b(X21)
| ~ message(sent(X20,b,pair(X20,X21)))
| b_stored(pair(X20,X21)) )
& ( ~ fresh_to_b(X21)
| ~ message(sent(X20,b,pair(X20,X21)))
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X21),encrypt(triple(X20,X21,generate_expiration_time(X21)),bt)))) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time])])])]) ).
fof(c_0_15,plain,
! [X9,X10,X11] :
( b_holds(key(X9,X10))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X10,X11))
| ~ message(sent(X10,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X10,X9,generate_expiration_time(X11)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X11),X9)))) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_accepts_secure_session_key])])]) ).
fof(c_0_16,plain,
! [X29,X30,X31] :
( message(sent(X30,X31,X29))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X31)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X30)
| ~ intruder_message(X29) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_message_sent])])]) ).
fof(c_0_17,plain,
! [X26,X27,X28] :
( intruder_message(X28)
| ~ message(sent(X26,X27,X28)) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_can_record])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_18,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1)))
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14]) ).
cnf(c_0_19,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b]) ).
cnf(c_0_20,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b]) ).
cnf(c_0_21,plain,
( ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X3))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X2))))
| b_holds(key(X2,X1)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_15]) ).
cnf(c_0_22,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_16]) ).
cnf(c_0_23,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_is_party_of_protocol]) ).
fof(c_0_24,plain,
! [X24,X25] :
( intruder_message(pair(X24,X25))
| ~ intruder_message(X25)
| ~ intruder_message(X24) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_composes_pairs])])]) ).
fof(c_0_25,plain,
! [X33,X34,X35] :
( ( ~ intruder_message(triple(X33,X34,X35))
| intruder_message(X35) )
& ( ~ intruder_message(triple(X33,X34,X35))
| intruder_message(X34) )
& ( ~ intruder_message(triple(X33,X34,X35))
| intruder_message(X33) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_triples])])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_26,plain,
( ~ message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
| intruder_message(X3) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_17]) ).
cnf(c_0_27,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_18,c_0_19]),c_0_20])]) ).
fof(c_0_28,plain,
! [X17,X18,X19] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X17,X18))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X19)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X18,X19))
| ~ intruder_message(X17) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_key_encrypts])])]) ).
fof(c_0_29,plain,
! [X15,X16] :
( intruder_holds(key(X15,X16))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X16)
| ~ intruder_message(X15) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_holds_key])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_30,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_21,c_0_22]),c_0_23])]) ).
cnf(c_0_31,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_24]) ).
cnf(c_0_32,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_25]) ).
cnf(c_0_33,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26,c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_34,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))
| b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14]) ).
cnf(c_0_35,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_28]) ).
cnf(c_0_36,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_29]) ).
fof(c_0_37,plain,
! [X22,X23] :
( ( ~ intruder_message(pair(X22,X23))
| intruder_message(X23) )
& ( ~ intruder_message(pair(X22,X23))
| intruder_message(X22) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_pairs])])])]) ).
fof(c_0_38,negated_conjecture,
~ ? [X1] :
( b_holds(key(X1,a))
& intruder_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[co1]) ).
cnf(c_0_39,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_30,c_0_31]) ).
cnf(c_0_40,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_33]) ).
cnf(c_0_41,plain,
b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_34,c_0_19]),c_0_20])]) ).
cnf(c_0_42,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_is_party_of_protocol]) ).
cnf(c_0_43,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_35,c_0_36]) ).
cnf(c_0_44,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_25]) ).
cnf(c_0_45,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_37]) ).
cnf(c_0_46,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26,c_0_19]) ).
fof(c_0_47,negated_conjecture,
! [X8] :
( ~ b_holds(key(X8,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X8,b)) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_38])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_48,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39,c_0_40]),c_0_41]),c_0_42])]) ).
cnf(c_0_49,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_43,c_0_23]) ).
cnf(c_0_50,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_33]) ).
cnf(c_0_51,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_45,c_0_46]) ).
cnf(c_0_52,negated_conjecture,
( ~ b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_47]) ).
cnf(c_0_53,plain,
b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_49]),c_0_50]),c_0_51])]) ).
cnf(c_0_54,negated_conjecture,
~ intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_52,c_0_53]) ).
cnf(c_0_55,negated_conjecture,
$false,
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_36]),c_0_51]),c_0_23])]),
[proof] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.02 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.04 % Command : run_E /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% 0.11/0.37 % Computer : n013.cluster.edu
% 0.11/0.37 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.11/0.37 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.11/0.37 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.11/0.37 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.11/0.37 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.11/0.37 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.11/0.37 % DateTime : Mon Sep 21 08:26:21 UTC 2026
% 0.11/0.37 % CPUTime :
% 0.11/0.37 Running run_E /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% 0.11/0.41 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.11/0.41 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/eprover --delete-bad-limit=2000000000 --definitional-cnf=24 -s --print-statistics -R --print-version --proof-object --auto-schedule=8 --cpu-limit=300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.11/0.43 % Version: 3.5.1
% 0.11/0.43 % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.11/0.43 % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.11/0.43 % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.11/0.43 % Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.11/0.43 % Starting new_bool_1 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.11/0.43 % Starting sh5l with 300s (1) cores
% 0.11/0.43 % new_bool_3 with pid 358721 completed with status 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Result found by new_bool_3
% 0.11/0.43 % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.11/0.43 % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.11/0.43 % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.11/0.43 % Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.11/0.43 % (lift_lambdas = 0, lambda_to_forall = 0,unroll_only_formulas = 0, sine = GSinE(CountFormulas,hypos,1.5,,3,20000,1.0))
% 0.11/0.43 % SinE strategy is GSinE(CountFormulas,hypos,1.5,,3,20000,1.0)
% 0.11/0.43 % Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.11/0.43 % Scheduled 5 strats onto 1 cores with 300 seconds (300 total)
% 0.11/0.43 % Starting SubtermCWHack with 31s (1) cores
% 0.11/0.43 % SubtermCWHack with pid 358724 completed with status 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Result found by SubtermCWHack
% 0.11/0.43 % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.11/0.43 % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.11/0.43 % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.11/0.43 % Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.11/0.43 % (lift_lambdas = 0, lambda_to_forall = 0,unroll_only_formulas = 0, sine = GSinE(CountFormulas,hypos,1.5,,3,20000,1.0))
% 0.11/0.43 % SinE strategy is GSinE(CountFormulas,hypos,1.5,,3,20000,1.0)
% 0.11/0.43 % Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.11/0.43 % Scheduled 5 strats onto 1 cores with 300 seconds (300 total)
% 0.11/0.43 % Starting SubtermCWHack with 31s (1) cores
% 0.11/0.43 % Preprocessing time : 0.002 s
% 0.11/0.43
% 0.11/0.43 % Proof found!
% 0.11/0.43 % SZS status Theorem
% 0.11/0.43 % SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 0.11/0.43 % Parsed axioms : 29
% 0.11/0.43 % Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE : 6
% 0.11/0.43 % Initial clauses : 28
% 0.11/0.43 % Removed in clause preprocessing : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Initial clauses in saturation : 28
% 0.11/0.43 % Processed clauses : 50
% 0.11/0.43 % ...of these trivial : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % ...subsumed : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % ...remaining for further processing : 50
% 0.11/0.43 % Other redundant clauses eliminated : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Clauses deleted for lack of memory : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Backward-subsumed : 2
% 0.11/0.43 % Backward-rewritten : 1
% 0.11/0.43 % Generated clauses : 39
% 0.11/0.43 % ...of the previous two non-redundant : 29
% 0.11/0.43 % ...aggressively subsumed : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Contextual simplify-reflections : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Paramodulations : 39
% 0.11/0.43 % Factorizations : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % NegExts : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Equation resolutions : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Disequality decompositions : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Total rewrite steps : 18
% 0.11/0.43 % ...of those cached : 9
% 0.11/0.43 % Propositional unsat checks : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Propositional check models : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Propositional check unsatisfiable : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Propositional clauses : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Propositional clauses after purity: 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Propositional unsat core size : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Propositional preprocessing time : 0.000
% 0.11/0.43 % Propositional encoding time : 0.000
% 0.11/0.43 % Propositional solver time : 0.000
% 0.11/0.43 % Success case prop preproc time : 0.000
% 0.11/0.43 % Success case prop encoding time : 0.000
% 0.11/0.43 % Success case prop solver time : 0.000
% 0.11/0.43 % Current number of processed clauses : 47
% 0.11/0.43 % Positive orientable unit clauses : 21
% 0.11/0.43 % Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Negative unit clauses : 1
% 0.11/0.43 % Non-unit-clauses : 25
% 0.11/0.43 % Current number of unprocessed clauses: 3
% 0.11/0.43 % ...number of literals in the above : 17
% 0.11/0.43 % Current number of archived formulas : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Current number of archived clauses : 3
% 0.11/0.43 % Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 187
% 0.11/0.43 % Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 103
% 0.11/0.43 % Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions : 2
% 0.11/0.43 % Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 4
% 0.11/0.43 % Rewrite failures with RHS unbound : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % BW rewrite match attempts : 2
% 0.11/0.43 % BW rewrite match successes : 1
% 0.11/0.43 % Condensation attempts : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Condensation successes : 0
% 0.11/0.43 % Termbank termtop insertions : 2824
% 0.11/0.43 % Search garbage collected termcells : 354
% 0.11/0.43
% 0.11/0.43 % -------------------------------------------------
% 0.11/0.43 % User time : 0.006 s
% 0.11/0.43 % System time : 0.004 s
% 0.11/0.43 % Total time : 0.010 s
% 0.11/0.43 % Maximum resident set size: 3672 pages
% 0.11/0.43
% 0.11/0.43 % -------------------------------------------------
% 0.11/0.43 % User time : 0.009 s
% 0.11/0.43 % System time : 0.007 s
% 0.11/0.43 % Total time : 0.016 s
% 0.11/0.43 % Maximum resident set size: 4608 pages
% 0.11/0.43 % E exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------