%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : ET---2.0
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_ET %s %d
% Computer : n005.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 600s
% DateTime : Wed Jul 20 18:14:47 EDT 2022
% Result : Theorem 0.24s 1.43s
% Output : CNFRefutation 0.24s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 9
% Number of leaves : 14
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 56 ( 18 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 140 ( 0 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 145 ( 61 ~; 57 |; 18 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 9 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 8 ( 4 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 8 ( 7 usr; 1 prp; 0-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 89 ( 8 sgn 47 !; 2 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))
& fresh_to_b(X2) )
=> ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X2),encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))))
& b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time) ).
fof(b_accepts_secure_session_key,axiom,
! [X2,X4,X5] :
( ( message(sent(X4,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X4,X2,generate_expiration_time(X5)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X5),X2))))
& b_stored(pair(X4,X5)) )
=> b_holds(key(X2,X4)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',b_accepts_secure_session_key) ).
fof(intruder_message_sent,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& party_of_protocol(X2)
& party_of_protocol(X3) )
=> message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',intruder_message_sent) ).
fof(intruder_can_record,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3] :
( message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
=> intruder_message(X3) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',intruder_can_record) ).
fof(a_sent_message_i_to_b,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',a_sent_message_i_to_b) ).
fof(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b) ).
fof(b_is_party_of_protocol,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',b_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(intruder_composes_pairs,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X2) )
=> intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',intruder_composes_pairs) ).
fof(intruder_decomposes_triples,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3] :
( intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))
=> ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X3) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',intruder_decomposes_triples) ).
fof(intruder_key_encrypts,axiom,
! [X1,X2,X3] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
& party_of_protocol(X3) )
=> intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',intruder_key_encrypts) ).
fof(intruder_holds_key,axiom,
! [X2,X3] :
( ( intruder_message(X2)
& party_of_protocol(X3) )
=> intruder_holds(key(X2,X3)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',intruder_holds_key) ).
fof(intruder_decomposes_pairs,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
=> ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X2) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',intruder_decomposes_pairs) ).
fof(co1,conjecture,
? [X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X1,b))
& b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',co1) ).
fof(a_is_party_of_protocol,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/../tmp/theBenchmark.p.mepo_128.in',a_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(c_0_14,plain,
! [X3,X4] :
( ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X4),encrypt(triple(X3,X4,generate_expiration_time(X4)),bt))))
| ~ message(sent(X3,b,pair(X3,X4)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X4) )
& ( b_stored(pair(X3,X4))
| ~ message(sent(X3,b,pair(X3,X4)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X4) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time])])]) ).
fof(c_0_15,plain,
! [X6,X7,X8] :
( ~ message(sent(X7,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X7,X6,generate_expiration_time(X8)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X8),X6))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X7,X8))
| b_holds(key(X6,X7)) ),
inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[b_accepts_secure_session_key])])])]) ).
fof(c_0_16,plain,
! [X4,X5,X6] :
( ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X5)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X6)
| message(sent(X5,X6,X4)) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_message_sent])]) ).
fof(c_0_17,plain,
! [X4,X5,X6] :
( ~ message(sent(X4,X5,X6))
| intruder_message(X6) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_can_record])]) ).
cnf(c_0_18,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14]) ).
cnf(c_0_19,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b]) ).
cnf(c_0_20,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b]) ).
cnf(c_0_21,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_15]) ).
cnf(c_0_22,plain,
( message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_16]) ).
cnf(c_0_23,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_is_party_of_protocol]) ).
fof(c_0_24,plain,
! [X3,X4] :
( ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X4)
| intruder_message(pair(X3,X4)) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_composes_pairs])]) ).
fof(c_0_25,plain,
! [X4,X5,X6] :
( ( intruder_message(X4)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X4,X5,X6)) )
& ( intruder_message(X5)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X4,X5,X6)) )
& ( intruder_message(X6)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X4,X5,X6)) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_triples])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_26,plain,
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_17]) ).
cnf(c_0_27,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_18,c_0_19]),c_0_20])]) ).
fof(c_0_28,plain,
! [X4,X5,X6] :
( ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X5,X6))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X6)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X4,X5)) ),
inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(shift_quantors,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_key_encrypts])])])]) ).
fof(c_0_29,plain,
! [X4,X5] :
( ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X5)
| intruder_holds(key(X4,X5)) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_holds_key])]) ).
cnf(c_0_30,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_21,c_0_22]),c_0_23])]) ).
cnf(c_0_31,plain,
( intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_24]) ).
cnf(c_0_32,plain,
( intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_25]) ).
cnf(c_0_33,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26,c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_34,plain,
( b_stored(pair(X2,X1))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14]) ).
cnf(c_0_35,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_28]) ).
cnf(c_0_36,plain,
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_29]) ).
fof(c_0_37,plain,
! [X3,X4] :
( ( intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X3,X4)) )
& ( intruder_message(X4)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X3,X4)) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_decomposes_pairs])])]) ).
fof(c_0_38,negated_conjecture,
~ ? [X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X1,b))
& b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[co1]) ).
cnf(c_0_39,plain,
( b_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X2,X3))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_30,c_0_31]) ).
cnf(c_0_40,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_33]) ).
cnf(c_0_41,plain,
b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_34,c_0_19]),c_0_20])]) ).
cnf(c_0_42,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_is_party_of_protocol]) ).
cnf(c_0_43,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X3) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_35,c_0_36]) ).
cnf(c_0_44,plain,
( intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_25]) ).
cnf(c_0_45,plain,
( intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_37]) ).
cnf(c_0_46,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26,c_0_19]) ).
fof(c_0_47,negated_conjecture,
! [X2] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,b))
| ~ b_holds(key(X2,a)) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_38])]) ).
cnf(c_0_48,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39,c_0_40]),c_0_41]),c_0_42])]) ).
cnf(c_0_49,plain,
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_43,c_0_23]) ).
cnf(c_0_50,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_33]) ).
cnf(c_0_51,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_45,c_0_46]) ).
cnf(c_0_52,negated_conjecture,
( ~ b_holds(key(X1,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_47]) ).
cnf(c_0_53,plain,
b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_49]),c_0_50]),c_0_51])]) ).
cnf(c_0_54,negated_conjecture,
~ intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_52,c_0_53]) ).
cnf(c_0_55,negated_conjecture,
$false,
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_36]),c_0_51]),c_0_23])]),
[proof] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.04/0.12 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.04/0.13 % Command : run_ET %s %d
% 0.13/0.34 % Computer : n005.cluster.edu
% 0.13/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.13/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.13/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/0.34 % WCLimit : 600
% 0.13/0.34 % DateTime : Wed Jun 15 09:16:24 EDT 2022
% 0.13/0.35 % CPUTime :
% 0.24/1.43 # Running protocol protocol_eprover_4a02c828a8cc55752123edbcc1ad40e453c11447 for 23 seconds:
% 0.24/1.43 # SinE strategy is GSinE(CountFormulas,hypos,1.4,,04,100,1.0)
% 0.24/1.43 # Preprocessing time : 0.015 s
% 0.24/1.43
% 0.24/1.43 # Failure: Out of unprocessed clauses!
% 0.24/1.43 # OLD status GaveUp
% 0.24/1.43 # Parsed axioms : 29
% 0.24/1.43 # Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE : 12
% 0.24/1.43 # Initial clauses : 19
% 0.24/1.43 # Removed in clause preprocessing : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Initial clauses in saturation : 19
% 0.24/1.43 # Processed clauses : 24
% 0.24/1.43 # ...of these trivial : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # ...subsumed : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # ...remaining for further processing : 24
% 0.24/1.43 # Other redundant clauses eliminated : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Clauses deleted for lack of memory : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Backward-subsumed : 1
% 0.24/1.43 # Backward-rewritten : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Generated clauses : 11
% 0.24/1.43 # ...of the previous two non-trivial : 7
% 0.24/1.43 # Contextual simplify-reflections : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Paramodulations : 11
% 0.24/1.43 # Factorizations : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Equation resolutions : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Current number of processed clauses : 23
% 0.24/1.43 # Positive orientable unit clauses : 13
% 0.24/1.43 # Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Negative unit clauses : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Non-unit-clauses : 10
% 0.24/1.43 # Current number of unprocessed clauses: 0
% 0.24/1.43 # ...number of literals in the above : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Current number of archived formulas : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Current number of archived clauses : 1
% 0.24/1.43 # Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 32
% 0.24/1.43 # Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 21
% 0.24/1.43 # Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions : 1
% 0.24/1.43 # Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Rewrite failures with RHS unbound : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # BW rewrite match attempts : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # BW rewrite match successes : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Condensation attempts : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Condensation successes : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Termbank termtop insertions : 1286
% 0.24/1.43
% 0.24/1.43 # -------------------------------------------------
% 0.24/1.43 # User time : 0.013 s
% 0.24/1.43 # System time : 0.003 s
% 0.24/1.43 # Total time : 0.016 s
% 0.24/1.43 # Maximum resident set size: 2732 pages
% 0.24/1.43 # Running protocol protocol_eprover_f171197f65f27d1ba69648a20c844832c84a5dd7 for 23 seconds:
% 0.24/1.43 # Preprocessing time : 0.016 s
% 0.24/1.43
% 0.24/1.43 # Proof found!
% 0.24/1.43 # SZS status Theorem
% 0.24/1.43 # SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 0.24/1.43 # Proof object total steps : 56
% 0.24/1.43 # Proof object clause steps : 31
% 0.24/1.43 # Proof object formula steps : 25
% 0.24/1.43 # Proof object conjectures : 6
% 0.24/1.43 # Proof object clause conjectures : 3
% 0.24/1.43 # Proof object formula conjectures : 3
% 0.24/1.43 # Proof object initial clauses used : 16
% 0.24/1.43 # Proof object initial formulas used : 14
% 0.24/1.43 # Proof object generating inferences : 15
% 0.24/1.43 # Proof object simplifying inferences : 15
% 0.24/1.43 # Training examples: 0 positive, 0 negative
% 0.24/1.43 # Parsed axioms : 29
% 0.24/1.43 # Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Initial clauses : 38
% 0.24/1.43 # Removed in clause preprocessing : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Initial clauses in saturation : 38
% 0.24/1.43 # Processed clauses : 75
% 0.24/1.43 # ...of these trivial : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # ...subsumed : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # ...remaining for further processing : 75
% 0.24/1.43 # Other redundant clauses eliminated : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Clauses deleted for lack of memory : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Backward-subsumed : 4
% 0.24/1.43 # Backward-rewritten : 1
% 0.24/1.43 # Generated clauses : 107
% 0.24/1.43 # ...of the previous two non-trivial : 89
% 0.24/1.43 # Contextual simplify-reflections : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Paramodulations : 107
% 0.24/1.43 # Factorizations : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Equation resolutions : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Current number of processed clauses : 70
% 0.24/1.43 # Positive orientable unit clauses : 29
% 0.24/1.43 # Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Negative unit clauses : 4
% 0.24/1.43 # Non-unit-clauses : 37
% 0.24/1.43 # Current number of unprocessed clauses: 5
% 0.24/1.43 # ...number of literals in the above : 25
% 0.24/1.43 # Current number of archived formulas : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Current number of archived clauses : 5
% 0.24/1.43 # Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 489
% 0.24/1.43 # Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 173
% 0.24/1.43 # Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions : 4
% 0.24/1.43 # Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 21
% 0.24/1.43 # Rewrite failures with RHS unbound : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # BW rewrite match attempts : 5
% 0.24/1.43 # BW rewrite match successes : 1
% 0.24/1.43 # Condensation attempts : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Condensation successes : 0
% 0.24/1.43 # Termbank termtop insertions : 4382
% 0.24/1.43
% 0.24/1.43 # -------------------------------------------------
% 0.24/1.43 # User time : 0.019 s
% 0.24/1.43 # System time : 0.002 s
% 0.24/1.43 # Total time : 0.021 s
% 0.24/1.43 # Maximum resident set size: 3192 pages
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