%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Leo-III---1.8.0
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : java -Xss128m -Xmx2g -Xms1g -jar /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/leo3.jar /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p -t 300 -p --atp eprover=/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/externals/eprover --instantiate 39
% Computer : n010.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Sep 27 08:57:56 AM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 5.40s 2.60s
% Output : Refutation 6.12s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 3
% Number of leaves : 29
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 60 ( 25 unt; 0 typ; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 149 ( 0 equ; 0 cnn)
% Maximal formula atoms : 5 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 547 ( 4 ~; 0 |; 59 &; 454 @)
% ( 0 <=>; 30 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 20 ( 7 avg)
% Number of types : 2 ( 0 usr)
% Number of type conns : 0 ( 0 >; 0 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of symbols : 27 ( 26 usr; 7 con; 0-4 aty)
% Number of variables : 107 ( 0 ^; 104 !; 3 ?; 107 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
thf(intruder_holds_decl,type,
intruder_holds: $i > $o ).
thf(key_decl,type,
key: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(b_decl,type,
b: $i ).
thf(b_holds_decl,type,
b_holds: $i > $o ).
thf(a_decl,type,
a: $i ).
thf(a_nonce_decl,type,
a_nonce: $i > $o ).
thf(an_a_nonce_decl,type,
an_a_nonce: $i ).
thf(intruder_message_decl,type,
intruder_message: $i > $o ).
thf(triple_decl,type,
triple: $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(party_of_protocol_decl,type,
party_of_protocol: $i > $o ).
thf(t_decl,type,
t: $i ).
thf(generate_expiration_time_decl,type,
generate_expiration_time: $i > $i ).
thf(generate_b_nonce_decl,type,
generate_b_nonce: $i > $i ).
thf(generate_key_decl,type,
generate_key: $i > $i ).
thf(quadruple_decl,type,
quadruple: $i > $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(message_decl,type,
message: $i > $o ).
thf(sent_decl,type,
sent: $i > $i > $i > $i ).
thf(fresh_to_b_decl,type,
fresh_to_b: $i > $o ).
thf(pair_decl,type,
pair: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(t_holds_decl,type,
t_holds: $i > $o ).
thf(at_decl,type,
at: $i ).
thf(encrypt_decl,type,
encrypt: $i > $i > $i ).
thf(a_stored_decl,type,
a_stored: $i > $o ).
thf(a_holds_decl,type,
a_holds: $i > $o ).
thf(bt_decl,type,
bt: $i ).
thf(b_stored_decl,type,
b_stored: $i > $o ).
thf(24,axiom,
t @ ( bt @ key ) @ b_holds,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_hold_key_bt_for_t) ).
thf(88,plain,
t @ ( bt @ key ) @ b_holds,
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[24]) ).
thf(11,axiom,
an_a_nonce @ fresh_to_b,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b) ).
thf(56,plain,
an_a_nonce @ fresh_to_b,
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[11]) ).
thf(6,axiom,
! [A: $i] :
( ( A @ generate_b_nonce @ a_nonce )
& ( A @ generate_expiration_time @ a_nonce ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces) ).
thf(37,plain,
! [A: $i] :
( ( A @ generate_b_nonce @ a_nonce )
& ( A @ generate_expiration_time @ a_nonce ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[6]) ).
thf(9,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i] :
( ( ( D @ intruder_message )
& ( C @ intruder_message )
& ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( D @ ( C @ ( B @ ( A @ quadruple ) ) ) @ intruder_message ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_quadruples) ).
thf(52,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i] :
( ( ( D @ intruder_message )
& ( C @ intruder_message )
& ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( D @ ( C @ ( B @ ( A @ quadruple ) ) ) @ intruder_message ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[9]) ).
thf(22,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i] :
( ( ( B @ party_of_protocol )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( B @ ( A @ key ) @ intruder_holds ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key) ).
thf(84,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i] :
( ( ( B @ party_of_protocol )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( B @ ( A @ key ) @ intruder_holds ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[22]) ).
thf(25,axiom,
an_a_nonce @ ( b @ pair ) @ a_stored,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_stored_message_i) ).
thf(89,plain,
an_a_nonce @ ( b @ pair ) @ a_stored,
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[25]) ).
thf(15,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( C @ ( B @ ( A @ triple ) ) @ intruder_message )
=> ( ( C @ intruder_message )
& ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples) ).
thf(65,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( C @ ( B @ ( A @ triple ) ) @ intruder_message )
=> ( ( C @ intruder_message )
& ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[15]) ).
thf(30,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i] :
( ( ( B @ fresh_to_b )
& ( B @ ( A @ pair ) @ ( b @ ( A @ sent ) ) @ message ) )
=> ( ( B @ ( A @ pair ) @ b_stored )
& ( bt @ ( B @ generate_expiration_time @ ( B @ ( A @ triple ) ) @ encrypt ) @ ( B @ generate_b_nonce @ ( b @ triple ) ) @ ( t @ ( b @ sent ) ) @ message ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time) ).
thf(96,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i] :
( ( ( B @ fresh_to_b )
& ( B @ ( A @ pair ) @ ( b @ ( A @ sent ) ) @ message ) )
=> ( ( B @ ( A @ pair ) @ b_stored )
& ( bt @ ( B @ generate_expiration_time @ ( B @ ( A @ triple ) ) @ encrypt ) @ ( B @ generate_b_nonce @ ( b @ triple ) ) @ ( t @ ( b @ sent ) ) @ message ) ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[30]) ).
thf(4,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( ( C @ intruder_message )
& ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( C @ ( B @ ( A @ triple ) ) @ intruder_message ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_triples) ).
thf(34,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( ( C @ intruder_message )
& ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( C @ ( B @ ( A @ triple ) ) @ intruder_message ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[4]) ).
thf(13,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i] :
( ( B @ ( A @ pair ) @ intruder_message )
=> ( ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs) ).
thf(59,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i] :
( ( B @ ( A @ pair ) @ intruder_message )
=> ( ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[13]) ).
thf(18,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( ( C @ ( B @ pair ) @ b_stored )
& ( A @ ( C @ generate_b_nonce @ encrypt ) @ ( bt @ ( C @ generate_expiration_time @ ( A @ ( B @ triple ) ) @ encrypt ) @ pair ) @ ( b @ ( B @ sent ) ) @ message ) )
=> ( B @ ( A @ key ) @ b_holds ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key) ).
thf(76,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( ( C @ ( B @ pair ) @ b_stored )
& ( A @ ( C @ generate_b_nonce @ encrypt ) @ ( bt @ ( C @ generate_expiration_time @ ( A @ ( B @ triple ) ) @ encrypt ) @ pair ) @ ( b @ ( B @ sent ) ) @ message ) )
=> ( B @ ( A @ key ) @ b_holds ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[18]) ).
thf(20,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( ( C @ party_of_protocol )
& ( C @ ( B @ key ) @ intruder_holds )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( B @ ( A @ encrypt ) @ intruder_message ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts) ).
thf(80,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( ( C @ party_of_protocol )
& ( C @ ( B @ key ) @ intruder_holds )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( B @ ( A @ encrypt ) @ intruder_message ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[20]) ).
thf(1,conjecture,
? [A: $i] :
( ( a @ ( A @ key ) @ b_holds )
& ( b @ ( A @ key ) @ intruder_holds ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1) ).
thf(2,negated_conjecture,
~ ? [A: $i] :
( ( a @ ( A @ key ) @ b_holds )
& ( b @ ( A @ key ) @ intruder_holds ) ),
inference(neg_conjecture,[status(cth)],[1]) ).
thf(31,plain,
~ ? [A: $i] :
( ( a @ ( A @ key ) @ b_holds )
& ( b @ ( A @ key ) @ intruder_holds ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[2]) ).
thf(7,axiom,
! [A: $i] :
~ ( A @ generate_key @ a_nonce ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',generated_keys_are_not_nonces) ).
thf(43,plain,
! [A: $i] :
~ ( A @ generate_key @ a_nonce ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[7]) ).
thf(5,axiom,
t @ party_of_protocol,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_is_party_of_protocol) ).
thf(36,plain,
t @ party_of_protocol,
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[5]) ).
thf(8,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i] :
( ( D @ ( C @ ( B @ ( A @ quadruple ) ) ) @ intruder_message )
=> ( ( D @ intruder_message )
& ( C @ intruder_message )
& ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_quadruples) ).
thf(46,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i] :
( ( D @ ( C @ ( B @ ( A @ quadruple ) ) ) @ intruder_message )
=> ( ( D @ intruder_message )
& ( C @ intruder_message )
& ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[8]) ).
thf(27,axiom,
t @ ( at @ key ) @ a_holds,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_holds_key_at_for_t) ).
thf(93,plain,
t @ ( at @ key ) @ a_holds,
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[27]) ).
thf(12,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( ( C @ party_of_protocol )
& ( B @ party_of_protocol )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( A @ ( C @ ( B @ sent ) ) @ message ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent) ).
thf(57,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( ( C @ party_of_protocol )
& ( B @ party_of_protocol )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( A @ ( C @ ( B @ sent ) ) @ message ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[12]) ).
thf(16,axiom,
a @ ( at @ key ) @ t_holds,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_holds_key_at_for_a) ).
thf(70,plain,
a @ ( at @ key ) @ t_holds,
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[16]) ).
thf(3,axiom,
an_a_nonce @ a_nonce,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce) ).
thf(33,plain,
an_a_nonce @ a_nonce,
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[3]) ).
thf(17,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i,E: $i,F: $i] :
( ( ( F @ ( E @ pair ) @ a_stored )
& ( A @ ( D @ ( at @ ( B @ ( C @ ( F @ ( E @ quadruple ) ) ) @ encrypt ) @ triple ) ) @ ( a @ ( t @ sent ) ) @ message ) )
=> ( ( E @ ( C @ key ) @ a_holds )
& ( C @ ( A @ encrypt ) @ ( D @ pair ) @ ( E @ ( a @ sent ) ) @ message ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_forwards_secure) ).
thf(71,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i,E: $i,F: $i] :
( ( ( F @ ( E @ pair ) @ a_stored )
& ( A @ ( D @ ( at @ ( B @ ( C @ ( F @ ( E @ quadruple ) ) ) @ encrypt ) @ triple ) ) @ ( a @ ( t @ sent ) ) @ message ) )
=> ( ( E @ ( C @ key ) @ a_holds )
& ( C @ ( A @ encrypt ) @ ( D @ pair ) @ ( E @ ( a @ sent ) ) @ message ) ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[17]) ).
thf(10,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( C @ ( B @ ( A @ sent ) ) @ message )
=> ( C @ intruder_message ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record) ).
thf(54,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( C @ ( B @ ( A @ sent ) ) @ message )
=> ( C @ intruder_message ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[10]) ).
thf(23,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i,E: $i,F: $i,G: $i] :
( ( ( D @ a_nonce )
& ( C @ ( G @ key ) @ t_holds )
& ( A @ ( F @ key ) @ t_holds )
& ( F @ ( E @ ( D @ ( C @ triple ) ) @ encrypt ) @ ( B @ ( A @ triple ) ) @ ( t @ ( A @ sent ) ) @ message ) )
=> ( B @ ( F @ ( E @ ( D @ generate_key @ ( C @ triple ) ) @ encrypt ) @ ( G @ ( E @ ( D @ generate_key @ ( D @ ( A @ quadruple ) ) ) @ encrypt ) @ triple ) ) @ ( C @ ( t @ sent ) ) @ message ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',server_t_generates_key) ).
thf(86,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i,D: $i,E: $i,F: $i,G: $i] :
( ( ( D @ a_nonce )
& ( C @ ( G @ key ) @ t_holds )
& ( A @ ( F @ key ) @ t_holds )
& ( F @ ( E @ ( D @ ( C @ triple ) ) @ encrypt ) @ ( B @ ( A @ triple ) ) @ ( t @ ( A @ sent ) ) @ message ) )
=> ( B @ ( F @ ( E @ ( D @ generate_key @ ( C @ triple ) ) @ encrypt ) @ ( G @ ( E @ ( D @ generate_key @ ( D @ ( A @ quadruple ) ) ) @ encrypt ) @ triple ) ) @ ( C @ ( t @ sent ) ) @ message ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[23]) ).
thf(14,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i] :
( ( ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( B @ ( A @ pair ) @ intruder_message ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs) ).
thf(63,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i] :
( ( ( B @ intruder_message )
& ( A @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( B @ ( A @ pair ) @ intruder_message ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[14]) ).
thf(29,axiom,
a @ party_of_protocol,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol) ).
thf(95,plain,
a @ party_of_protocol,
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[29]) ).
thf(19,axiom,
b @ ( bt @ key ) @ t_holds,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',t_holds_key_bt_for_b) ).
thf(79,plain,
b @ ( bt @ key ) @ t_holds,
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[19]) ).
thf(28,axiom,
an_a_nonce @ ( a @ pair ) @ ( b @ ( a @ sent ) ) @ message,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b) ).
thf(94,plain,
an_a_nonce @ ( a @ pair ) @ ( b @ ( a @ sent ) ) @ message,
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[28]) ).
thf(26,axiom,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( ( C @ party_of_protocol )
& ( C @ ( B @ key ) @ intruder_holds )
& ( B @ ( A @ encrypt ) @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( B @ intruder_message ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_interception) ).
thf(90,plain,
! [A: $i,B: $i,C: $i] :
( ( ( C @ party_of_protocol )
& ( C @ ( B @ key ) @ intruder_holds )
& ( B @ ( A @ encrypt ) @ intruder_message ) )
=> ( B @ intruder_message ) ),
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[26]) ).
thf(21,axiom,
b @ party_of_protocol,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol) ).
thf(83,plain,
b @ party_of_protocol,
inference(defexp_and_simp_and_etaexpand,[status(thm)],[21]) ).
thf(103,plain,
$false,
inference(e,[status(thm)],[88,56,37,52,84,89,65,96,34,59,76,80,31,43,36,46,93,57,70,33,71,54,86,63,95,79,94,90,83]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.05 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.12 % Command : java -Xss128m -Xmx2g -Xms1g -jar /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/leo3.jar /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p -t 300 -p --atp eprover=/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/externals/eprover --instantiate 39
% 0.22/0.48 % Computer : n010.cluster.edu
% 0.22/0.48 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.22/0.48 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.22/0.48 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.22/0.48 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.22/0.48 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.22/0.48 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.22/0.48 % DateTime : Sat Sep 26 13:05:30 UTC 2026
% 0.22/0.48 % CPUTime :
% 0.22/0.48 Running java -Xss128m -Xmx2g -Xms1g -jar /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/leo3.jar /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p -t 300 -p --atp eprover=/export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/externals/eprover --instantiate 39
% 0.94/0.96 % [INFO] Parsing problem /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p ...
% 1.56/1.15 % [INFO] Parsing done (190ms).
% 1.56/1.16 % [INFO] Running in sequential loop mode.
% 2.45/1.50 % [INFO] eprover registered as external prover.
% 2.45/1.51 % [INFO] Scanning for conjecture ...
% 2.70/1.60 % [INFO] Found a conjecture (or negated_conjecture) and 28 axioms. Running axiom selection ...
% 2.70/1.67 % [INFO] Axiom selection finished. Selected 28 axioms (removed 0 axioms).
% 2.94/1.74 % [INFO] Problem is first-order (TPTP FOF).
% 2.94/1.74 % [INFO] Type checking passed.
% 2.94/1.75 % [CONFIG] Using configuration: timeout(300) with strategy<name(default),share(1.0),primSubst(3),sos(false),unifierCount(4),uniDepth(8),boolExt(true),choice(true),renaming(true),funcspec(false), domConstr(0),specialInstances(39),restrictUniAttempts(true),termOrdering(CPO)>. Searching for refutation ...
% 5.40/2.59 % External prover 'e' found a proof!
% 5.40/2.59 % [INFO] Killing All external provers ...
% 5.40/2.59 % Time passed: 1985ms (effective reasoning time: 1421ms)
% 5.40/2.59 % Solved by strategy<name(default),share(1.0),primSubst(3),sos(false),unifierCount(4),uniDepth(8),boolExt(true),choice(true),renaming(true),funcspec(false), domConstr(0),specialInstances(39),restrictUniAttempts(true),termOrdering(CPO)>
% 5.40/2.59 % Axioms used in derivation (28): intruder_can_record, a_stored_message_i, t_holds_key_at_for_a, b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time, generated_keys_are_not_nonces, intruder_decomposes_pairs, server_t_generates_key, intruder_holds_key, intruder_decomposes_quadruples, intruder_decomposes_triples, an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce, generated_times_and_nonces_are_nonces, intruder_message_sent, a_forwards_secure, a_holds_key_at_for_t, b_is_party_of_protocol, a_is_party_of_protocol, intruder_key_encrypts, t_is_party_of_protocol, b_hold_key_bt_for_t, intruder_composes_triples, t_holds_key_bt_for_b, nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b, a_sent_message_i_to_b, intruder_interception, b_accepts_secure_session_key, intruder_composes_quadruples, intruder_composes_pairs
% 5.40/2.59 % No. of inferences in proof: 60
% 5.40/2.60 % SZS status Theorem for /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p : 1985 ms resp. 1421 ms w/o parsing
% 6.12/2.73 % SZS output start Refutation for /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
% 6.12/2.73 % [INFO] Killing All external provers ...
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