%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : SRASS---0.1
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v5.0.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp
% Command : SRASS -q2 -a 0 10 10 10 -i3 -n60 %s
% Computer : art07.cs.miami.edu
% Model : i686 i686
% CPU : Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 2.80GHz @ 2793MHz
% Memory : 2018MB
% OS : Linux 2.6.26.8-57.fc8
% CPULimit : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Dec 30 08:09:10 EST 2010
% Result : Theorem 0.92s
% Output : Solution 0.92s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : None (Parsing solution fails)
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 0
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ERROR: Could not form TPTP format derivation
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% Reading problem from /tmp/SystemOnTPTP30983/SWV014+1.tptp
% Adding relevance values
% Extracting the conjecture
% Sorting axioms by relevance
% Looking for THM ...
% found
% SZS status THM for /tmp/SystemOnTPTP30983/SWV014+1.tptp
% SZS output start Solution for /tmp/SystemOnTPTP30983/SWV014+1.tptp
% TreeLimitedRun: ----------------------------------------------------------
% TreeLimitedRun: /home/graph/tptp/Systems/EP---1.2/eproof --print-statistics -xAuto -tAuto --cpu-limit=60 --proof-time-unlimited --memory-limit=Auto --tstp-in --tstp-out /tmp/SRASS.s.p
% TreeLimitedRun: CPU time limit is 60s
% TreeLimitedRun: WC time limit is 120s
% TreeLimitedRun: PID is 31079
% TreeLimitedRun: ----------------------------------------------------------
% PrfWatch: 0.00 CPU 0.02 WC
% # Preprocessing time : 0.013 s
% # Problem is unsatisfiable (or provable), constructing proof object
% # SZS status Theorem
% # SZS output start CNFRefutation.
% fof(1, axiom,party_of_protocol(a),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', a_is_party_of_protocol)).
% fof(2, axiom,![X1]:![X2]:((intruder_message(X1)&party_of_protocol(X2))=>intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', intruder_holds_key)).
% fof(3, axiom,party_of_protocol(b),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', b_is_party_of_protocol)).
% fof(8, axiom,![X3]:![X1]:![X2]:(((intruder_message(X3)&intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)))&party_of_protocol(X2))=>intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', intruder_key_encrypts)).
% fof(9, axiom,message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', a_sent_message_i_to_b)).
% fof(10, axiom,![X3]:![X1]:![X2]:(message(sent(X3,X1,X2))=>intruder_message(X2)),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', intruder_can_record)).
% fof(11, axiom,party_of_protocol(t),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', t_is_party_of_protocol)).
% fof(15, axiom,fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b)).
% fof(16, axiom,![X1]:![X4]:![X5]:((message(sent(X4,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X4,X1,generate_expiration_time(X5)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X5),X1))))&b_stored(pair(X4,X5)))=>b_holds(key(X1,X4))),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', b_accepts_secure_session_key)).
% fof(17, axiom,![X3]:![X1]:![X2]:(((intruder_message(X3)&party_of_protocol(X1))&party_of_protocol(X2))=>message(sent(X1,X2,X3))),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', intruder_message_sent)).
% fof(19, axiom,![X3]:![X1]:(intruder_message(pair(X3,X1))=>(intruder_message(X3)&intruder_message(X1))),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', intruder_decomposes_pairs)).
% fof(20, axiom,![X3]:![X1]:![X2]:(intruder_message(triple(X3,X1,X2))=>((intruder_message(X3)&intruder_message(X1))&intruder_message(X2))),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', intruder_decomposes_triples)).
% fof(21, axiom,![X3]:![X1]:((intruder_message(X3)&intruder_message(X1))=>intruder_message(pair(X3,X1))),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', intruder_composes_pairs)).
% fof(27, axiom,![X3]:![X1]:((message(sent(X3,b,pair(X3,X1)))&fresh_to_b(X1))=>(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X3,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))&b_stored(pair(X3,X1)))),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time)).
% fof(29, conjecture,?[X3]:(intruder_holds(key(X3,b))&b_holds(key(X3,a))),file('/tmp/SRASS.s.p', co1)).
% fof(30, negated_conjecture,~(?[X3]:(intruder_holds(key(X3,b))&b_holds(key(X3,a)))),inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[29])).
% cnf(32,plain,(party_of_protocol(a)),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[1])).
% fof(33, plain,![X1]:![X2]:((~(intruder_message(X1))|~(party_of_protocol(X2)))|intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))),inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[2])).
% fof(34, plain,![X3]:![X4]:((~(intruder_message(X3))|~(party_of_protocol(X4)))|intruder_holds(key(X3,X4))),inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[33])).
% cnf(35,plain,(intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[34])).
% cnf(36,plain,(party_of_protocol(b)),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[3])).
% fof(43, plain,![X3]:![X1]:![X2]:(((~(intruder_message(X3))|~(intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))))|~(party_of_protocol(X2)))|intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))),inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[8])).
% fof(44, plain,![X4]:![X5]:![X6]:(((~(intruder_message(X4))|~(intruder_holds(key(X5,X6))))|~(party_of_protocol(X6)))|intruder_message(encrypt(X4,X5))),inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[43])).
% cnf(45,plain,(intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[44])).
% cnf(46,plain,(message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[9])).
% fof(47, plain,![X3]:![X1]:![X2]:(~(message(sent(X3,X1,X2)))|intruder_message(X2)),inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[10])).
% fof(48, plain,![X4]:![X5]:![X6]:(~(message(sent(X4,X5,X6)))|intruder_message(X6)),inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[47])).
% cnf(49,plain,(intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1))),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[48])).
% cnf(50,plain,(party_of_protocol(t)),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[11])).
% cnf(54,plain,(fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[15])).
% fof(55, plain,![X1]:![X4]:![X5]:((~(message(sent(X4,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X4,X1,generate_expiration_time(X5)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X5),X1)))))|~(b_stored(pair(X4,X5))))|b_holds(key(X1,X4))),inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[16])).
% fof(56, plain,![X6]:![X7]:![X8]:((~(message(sent(X7,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X7,X6,generate_expiration_time(X8)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X8),X6)))))|~(b_stored(pair(X7,X8))))|b_holds(key(X6,X7))),inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[55])).
% cnf(57,plain,(b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))))),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[56])).
% fof(58, plain,![X3]:![X1]:![X2]:(((~(intruder_message(X3))|~(party_of_protocol(X1)))|~(party_of_protocol(X2)))|message(sent(X1,X2,X3))),inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[17])).
% fof(59, plain,![X4]:![X5]:![X6]:(((~(intruder_message(X4))|~(party_of_protocol(X5)))|~(party_of_protocol(X6)))|message(sent(X5,X6,X4))),inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[58])).
% cnf(60,plain,(message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1)|~intruder_message(X3)),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[59])).
% fof(64, plain,![X3]:![X1]:(~(intruder_message(pair(X3,X1)))|(intruder_message(X3)&intruder_message(X1))),inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[19])).
% fof(65, plain,![X4]:![X5]:(~(intruder_message(pair(X4,X5)))|(intruder_message(X4)&intruder_message(X5))),inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[64])).
% fof(66, plain,![X4]:![X5]:((intruder_message(X4)|~(intruder_message(pair(X4,X5))))&(intruder_message(X5)|~(intruder_message(pair(X4,X5))))),inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[65])).
% cnf(67,plain,(intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[66])).
% fof(69, plain,![X3]:![X1]:![X2]:(~(intruder_message(triple(X3,X1,X2)))|((intruder_message(X3)&intruder_message(X1))&intruder_message(X2))),inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[20])).
% fof(70, plain,![X4]:![X5]:![X6]:(~(intruder_message(triple(X4,X5,X6)))|((intruder_message(X4)&intruder_message(X5))&intruder_message(X6))),inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[69])).
% fof(71, plain,![X4]:![X5]:![X6]:(((intruder_message(X4)|~(intruder_message(triple(X4,X5,X6))))&(intruder_message(X5)|~(intruder_message(triple(X4,X5,X6)))))&(intruder_message(X6)|~(intruder_message(triple(X4,X5,X6))))),inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[70])).
% cnf(72,plain,(intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[71])).
% cnf(73,plain,(intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[71])).
% fof(75, plain,![X3]:![X1]:((~(intruder_message(X3))|~(intruder_message(X1)))|intruder_message(pair(X3,X1))),inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[21])).
% fof(76, plain,![X4]:![X5]:((~(intruder_message(X4))|~(intruder_message(X5)))|intruder_message(pair(X4,X5))),inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[75])).
% cnf(77,plain,(intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1)),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[76])).
% fof(98, plain,![X3]:![X1]:((~(message(sent(X3,b,pair(X3,X1))))|~(fresh_to_b(X1)))|(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X3,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))&b_stored(pair(X3,X1)))),inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[27])).
% fof(99, plain,![X4]:![X5]:((~(message(sent(X4,b,pair(X4,X5))))|~(fresh_to_b(X5)))|(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X5),encrypt(triple(X4,X5,generate_expiration_time(X5)),bt))))&b_stored(pair(X4,X5)))),inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[98])).
% fof(100, plain,![X4]:![X5]:((message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X5),encrypt(triple(X4,X5,generate_expiration_time(X5)),bt))))|(~(message(sent(X4,b,pair(X4,X5))))|~(fresh_to_b(X5))))&(b_stored(pair(X4,X5))|(~(message(sent(X4,b,pair(X4,X5))))|~(fresh_to_b(X5))))),inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[99])).
% cnf(101,plain,(b_stored(pair(X2,X1))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1)))),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[100])).
% cnf(102,plain,(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1)))),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[100])).
% fof(106, negated_conjecture,![X3]:(~(intruder_holds(key(X3,b)))|~(b_holds(key(X3,a)))),inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[30])).
% fof(107, negated_conjecture,![X4]:(~(intruder_holds(key(X4,b)))|~(b_holds(key(X4,a)))),inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[106])).
% cnf(108,negated_conjecture,(~b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))),inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[107])).
% cnf(109,plain,(intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[49,46,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(116,plain,(intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[45,35,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(122,plain,(b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))|~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[101,46,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(124,plain,(b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))|$false),inference(rw,[status(thm)],[122,54,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(125,plain,(b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))),inference(cn,[status(thm)],[124,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(130,plain,(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[102,46,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(132,plain,(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))|$false),inference(rw,[status(thm)],[130,54,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(133,plain,(message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))),inference(cn,[status(thm)],[132,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(139,plain,(intruder_message(an_a_nonce)),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[67,109,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(140,plain,(b_holds(key(X1,a))|~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))))),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[57,125,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(141,plain,(intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(X2)),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[116,50,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(151,plain,(intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[49,133,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(153,plain,(intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[72,151,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(154,plain,(intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[73,151,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(161,plain,(b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))|~party_of_protocol(b)|~party_of_protocol(a)),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[140,60,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(162,plain,(b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))|$false|~party_of_protocol(a)),inference(rw,[status(thm)],[161,36,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(163,plain,(b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))|$false|$false),inference(rw,[status(thm)],[162,32,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(164,plain,(b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))),inference(cn,[status(thm)],[163,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(165,plain,(b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[164,77,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(166,plain,(b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))|~intruder_message(X1)),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[165,141,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(167,plain,(b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|$false|~intruder_message(X1)),inference(rw,[status(thm)],[166,154,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(168,plain,(b_holds(key(X1,a))|~intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))|~intruder_message(X1)),inference(cn,[status(thm)],[167,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(170,plain,(b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))|~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[168,153,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(171,plain,(b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))|$false),inference(rw,[status(thm)],[170,139,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(172,plain,(b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))),inference(cn,[status(thm)],[171,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(173,negated_conjecture,(~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[108,172,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(178,negated_conjecture,(~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)|~party_of_protocol(b)),inference(spm,[status(thm)],[173,35,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(179,negated_conjecture,($false|~party_of_protocol(b)),inference(rw,[status(thm)],[178,139,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(180,negated_conjecture,($false|$false),inference(rw,[status(thm)],[179,36,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(181,negated_conjecture,($false),inference(cn,[status(thm)],[180,theory(equality)])).
% cnf(182,negated_conjecture,($false),181,['proof']).
% # SZS output end CNFRefutation
% # Processed clauses : 100
% # ...of these trivial : 0
% # ...subsumed : 0
% # ...remaining for further processing: 100
% # Other redundant clauses eliminated : 0
% # Clauses deleted for lack of memory : 0
% # Backward-subsumed : 1
% # Backward-rewritten : 0
% # Generated clauses : 45
% # ...of the previous two non-trivial : 32
% # Contextual simplify-reflections : 0
% # Paramodulations : 45
% # Factorizations : 0
% # Equation resolutions : 0
% # Current number of processed clauses: 61
% # Positive orientable unit clauses: 23
% # Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% # Negative unit clauses : 2
% # Non-unit-clauses : 36
% # Current number of unprocessed clauses: 6
% # ...number of literals in the above : 24
% # Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 73
% # Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 73
% # Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 1
% # Rewrite failures with RHS unbound : 0
% # Indexed BW rewrite attempts : 1
% # Indexed BW rewrite successes : 0
% # Backwards rewriting index: 109 leaves, 1.62+/-1.115 terms/leaf
% # Paramod-from index: 30 leaves, 1.00+/-0.000 terms/leaf
% # Paramod-into index: 82 leaves, 1.38+/-0.727 terms/leaf
% # -------------------------------------------------
% # User time : 0.015 s
% # System time : 0.005 s
% # Total time : 0.020 s
% # Maximum resident set size: 0 pages
% PrfWatch: 0.11 CPU 0.19 WC
% FINAL PrfWatch: 0.11 CPU 0.19 WC
% SZS output end Solution for /tmp/SystemOnTPTP30983/SWV014+1.tptp
%
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------