%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Vampire-SAT---5.0.1
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_vampire /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 SAT
% Computer : n018.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Tue Sep 29 01:19:58 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 0.20s 0.27s
% Output : Refutation 0.20s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 16
% Number of leaves : 18
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 94 ( 23 unt; 4 def)
% Number of atoms : 232 ( 0 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 5 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 255 ( 117 ~; 106 |; 19 &)
% ( 4 <=>; 9 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 9 ( 4 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 12 ( 11 usr; 5 prp; 0-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 116 ( 0 sgn 114 !; 2 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f2,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(f3,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b) ).
fof(f7,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(f8,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b) ).
fof(f9,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
& fresh_to_b(X1) )
=> ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
& b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time) ).
fof(f10,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0))))
& b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) )
=> b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key) ).
fof(f15,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( message(sent(X0,X1,X2))
=> intruder_message(X2) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record) ).
fof(f16,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
=> ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X1) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs) ).
fof(f17,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
=> ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X2) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples) ).
fof(f19,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X1) )
=> intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs) ).
fof(f23,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( intruder_message(X0)
& party_of_protocol(X1)
& party_of_protocol(X2) )
=> message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent) ).
fof(f24,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( intruder_message(X0)
& party_of_protocol(X1) )
=> intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key) ).
fof(f25,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
& party_of_protocol(X2) )
=> intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts) ).
fof(f29,conjecture,
? [X0] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
& b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1) ).
fof(f30,negated_conjecture,
~ ? [X0] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
& b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f29]) ).
fof(f35,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
& b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) )
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f9]) ).
fof(f36,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
& b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) )
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f35]) ).
fof(f37,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f10]) ).
fof(f38,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f37]) ).
fof(f41,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f15]) ).
fof(f42,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X1) )
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f16]) ).
fof(f43,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( intruder_message(X0)
& intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X2) )
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f17]) ).
fof(f45,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f19]) ).
fof(f46,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f45]) ).
fof(f53,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( message(sent(X1,X2,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f23]) ).
fof(f54,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( message(sent(X1,X2,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f53]) ).
fof(f55,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f24]) ).
fof(f56,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f55]) ).
fof(f57,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f25]) ).
fof(f58,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f57]) ).
fof(f59,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f30]) ).
fof(f60,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f2]) ).
fof(f61,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f3]) ).
fof(f65,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f7]) ).
fof(f66,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f8]) ).
fof(f67,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f36]) ).
fof(f68,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f36]) ).
fof(f69,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0))))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f38]) ).
fof(f74,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f41]) ).
fof(f75,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f42]) ).
fof(f77,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f43]) ).
fof(f78,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f43]) ).
fof(f84,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f46]) ).
fof(f88,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( message(sent(X1,X2,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f54]) ).
fof(f89,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f56]) ).
fof(f90,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f58]) ).
fof(f95,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f59]) ).
fof(f96,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(resolution,[],[f74,f61]) ).
fof(f98,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(resolution,[],[f96,f75]) ).
fof(f101,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f89,f95]) ).
fof(f102,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f101,f65]) ).
fof(f109,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f90,f89]) ).
fof(f110,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(duplicate_literal_removal,[],[f109]) ).
fof(f112,definition,
( spl0_1
<=> ! [X2] : ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl0_1])],[avatar_definition]) ).
fof(f113,plain,
( ! [X2] : ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ spl0_1 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f112]) ).
fof(f115,definition,
( spl0_2
<=> ! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl0_2])],[avatar_definition]) ).
fof(f116,plain,
( ! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) )
| ~ spl0_2 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f115]) ).
fof(f117,plain,
( spl0_1
| spl0_2 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f110,f115,f112]) ).
fof(f118,plain,
( b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))
| ~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f67,f61]) ).
fof(f121,plain,
b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f118,f66]) ).
fof(f128,plain,
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f68,f61]) ).
fof(f131,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f128,f66]) ).
fof(f132,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(b) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f69,f88]) ).
fof(f133,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f132,f65]) ).
fof(f134,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
inference(resolution,[],[f131,f74]) ).
fof(f139,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(resolution,[],[f134,f78]) ).
fof(f140,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(resolution,[],[f134,f77]) ).
fof(f149,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
| b_holds(key(X2,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X2)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f133,f84]) ).
fof(f166,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ party_of_protocol(a)
| ~ b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f149,f140]) ).
fof(f176,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f166,f60]) ).
fof(f177,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f176,f121]) ).
fof(f179,definition,
( spl0_7
<=> intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl0_7])],[avatar_definition]) ).
fof(f181,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| spl0_7 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f179]) ).
fof(f183,definition,
( spl0_8
<=> b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl0_8])],[avatar_definition]) ).
fof(f185,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ spl0_8 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f183]) ).
fof(f186,plain,
( ~ spl0_7
| spl0_8 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f177,f183,f179]) ).
fof(f200,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))
| ~ spl0_2
| spl0_7 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f181,f116]) ).
fof(f201,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))
| ~ spl0_2
| spl0_7 ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f200,f98]) ).
fof(f202,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl0_2
| spl0_7 ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f201,f139]) ).
fof(f203,plain,
( ~ spl0_2
| spl0_7 ),
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f202]) ).
fof(f208,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ spl0_8 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f185,f102]) ).
fof(f209,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl0_8 ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f208,f98]) ).
fof(f210,plain,
~ spl0_8,
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f209]) ).
fof(f211,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl0_1 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f113,f60]) ).
fof(f216,plain,
~ spl0_1,
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f211]) ).
cnf(s1,plain,
( spl0_1
| spl0_2 ),
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f117]) ).
cnf(s4,plain,
( ~ spl0_7
| spl0_8 ),
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f186]) ).
cnf(s6,plain,
( ~ spl0_2
| spl0_7 ),
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f203]) ).
cnf(s7,plain,
~ spl0_8,
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f210]) ).
cnf(s10,plain,
~ spl0_1,
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f216]) ).
cnf(s11,plain,
~ spl0_7,
inference(rat,[],[s4,s7]) ).
cnf(s12,plain,
~ spl0_2,
inference(rat,[],[s6,s11]) ).
cnf(s13,plain,
$false,
inference(rat,[],[s1,s12,s10]) ).
fof(f217,plain,
$false,
inference(avatar_sat_refutation,[],[s13]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.06 % Command : run_vampire /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 SAT
% 0.11/0.19 % Computer : n018.cluster.edu
% 0.11/0.19 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.11/0.19 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.11/0.19 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.11/0.19 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.11/0.19 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.11/0.19 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.11/0.19 % DateTime : Mon Sep 28 09:44:54 UTC 2026
% 0.11/0.20 % CPUTime :
% 0.11/0.20 Running run_vampire /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 SAT
% 0.11/0.23 Running first-order model finding
% 0.11/0.23 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/vampire-ho --input_syntax tptp --output_axiom_names on --mode casc --intent sat -m 16384 --cores 7 -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265706)Will run a generic schedule for satisfiability detection.
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718)dis+10_1_sil=32000:sp=arity:random_seed=3372198767:i=103:fgj=on_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/103Mi)
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265716)% WARNING: option uhcvi not known.
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265715)fmb+10_1_sas=cadical:bce=on:rp=on:random_seed=2623021488_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/0Mi)
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265717)dis+10_161_sil=256000:plsq=on:plsqr=61199697,1048576:gs=on:alpa=true:sac=on:slsq=on:cn=on:random_seed=669153236:i=88024:add=on:rawr=on_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/88024Mi)
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265716)dis+11_61:31_drc=ordering:lsd=5:bsr=unit_only:rp=on:newcnf=on:random_seed=2493121197:i=135531:add=off:rawr=on_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/135531Mi)
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718) found proof, printing to "/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/vampire-proof-3265706-3265718"...
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265720)ott+1_1_to=lpo:sil=16000:sp=reverse_arity:erd=off:random_seed=1059322190:i=131_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/131Mi)
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718)...printing done.
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718)Refutation found. Thanks to Tanya!
% 0.20/0.27 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark
% 0.20/0.27 % SZS output start Proof for theBenchmark
% See solution above
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718)------------------------------
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718)Version: Vampire 5.0.1 (Release build, commit 5ef7c2677 on 2026-07-16 16:54:09 +0200)
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718)Linked with Z3 4.14.0.0 3c47fd96cf5645d0c42b2c819d9e9a84380aa721 z3-4.8.4-9178-g3c47fd96c
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718)CaDiCaL version: 2.1.3
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718)Termination reason: Refutation
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718)Time elapsed: 0.008 s
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718)Peak memory usage: 12 MB
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265718)Instructions burned: 6 (million)
% 0.20/0.27 % (3265706)Success in time 0.033 s
% 0.20/0.27 % Vampire exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------