%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : iProver---3.9.4
% Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% Computer : n005.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Fri Sep 25 03:16:13 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 2.59s 1.24s
% Output : CNFRefutation 2.59s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 18
% Number of leaves : 16
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 95 ( 22 unt; 2 def)
% Number of atoms : 252 ( 2 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 4 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 262 ( 126 ~; 108 |; 19 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 9 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 8 ( 5 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of types : 1 ( 0 usr)
% Number of type conns : 0 ( 0 >; 0 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of predicates : 13 ( 11 usr; 5 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 146 ( 0 sgn 144 !; 2 ?; 53 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f2,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(f3,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b) ).
fof(f7,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol) ).
fof(f8,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b) ).
fof(f9,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( fresh_to_b(X1)
& message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) )
=> ( b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time) ).
fof(f10,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
& message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0)))) )
=> b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key) ).
fof(f15,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( message(sent(X0,X1,X2))
=> intruder_message(X2) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record) ).
fof(f16,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
=> ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs) ).
fof(f17,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
=> ( intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples) ).
fof(f19,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
=> intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs) ).
fof(f23,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X2)
& party_of_protocol(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
=> message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent) ).
fof(f24,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) )
=> intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key) ).
fof(f25,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( party_of_protocol(X2)
& intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
& intruder_message(X0) )
=> intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts) ).
fof(f29,conjecture,
? [X0] :
( b_holds(key(X0,a))
& intruder_holds(key(X0,b)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1) ).
fof(f30,negated_conjecture,
~ ? [X0] :
( b_holds(key(X0,a))
& intruder_holds(key(X0,b)) ),
inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f29]) ).
fof(f35,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ( b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f9]) ).
fof(f36,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ( b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
& message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f35]) ).
fof(f37,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0))))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f10]) ).
fof(f38,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0))))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f37]) ).
fof(f41,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f15]) ).
fof(f42,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ( intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) ) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f16]) ).
fof(f43,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
| ( intruder_message(X2)
& intruder_message(X1)
& intruder_message(X0) ) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f17]) ).
fof(f45,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f19]) ).
fof(f46,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f45]) ).
fof(f53,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f23]) ).
fof(f54,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f53]) ).
fof(f55,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f24]) ).
fof(f56,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f55]) ).
fof(f57,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f25]) ).
fof(f58,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f57]) ).
fof(f59,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f30]) ).
fof(f60,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f2]) ).
fof(f61,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f3]) ).
fof(f65,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f7]) ).
fof(f66,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f8]) ).
fof(f67,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f36]) ).
fof(f68,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f36]) ).
fof(f69,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0))))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f38]) ).
fof(f74,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f41]) ).
fof(f75,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f42]) ).
fof(f77,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f43]) ).
fof(f78,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f43]) ).
fof(f84,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f46]) ).
fof(f88,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| message(sent(X1,X2,X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f54]) ).
fof(f89,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f56]) ).
fof(f90,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f58]) ).
fof(f95,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f59]) ).
tcf(c_49,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f60]) ).
tcf(c_50,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f61]) ).
tcf(c_54,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f65]) ).
tcf(c_55,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f66]) ).
tcf(c_56,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f68]) ).
tcf(c_57,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f67]) ).
tcf(c_58,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( b_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X2))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1)))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f69]) ).
tcf(c_63,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( intruder_message(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f74]) ).
tcf(c_65,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f75]) ).
tcf(c_67,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f78]) ).
tcf(c_68,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f77]) ).
tcf(c_73,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f84]) ).
tcf(c_77,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( message(sent(X1,X0,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f88]) ).
tcf(c_78,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f89]) ).
tcf(c_79,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f90]) ).
tcf(c_84,negated_conjecture,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f95]) ).
tcf(c_273,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ b_stored(pair(a,X1))
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X0)))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_58,c_84]) ).
tcf(c_287,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( b_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_55,c_57]) ).
tcf(c_295,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_55,c_56]) ).
tcf(c_307,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_273,c_287]) ).
tcf(c_309,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))) ),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_307,c_50,c_307]) ).
tcf(c_375,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_78,c_79]) ).
tcf(c_389,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_78,c_309]) ).
tcf(c_391,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0))))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_389,c_54,c_389]) ).
tcf(c_392,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))) ),
inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_391]) ).
tcf(c_577,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ iPr_def_10
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_10])],[c_375]) ).
tcf(c_578,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ iPr_def_11
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_11])],[c_375]) ).
tcf(c_579,plain,
( iPr_def_11
| iPr_def_10 ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[])],[c_375]) ).
tcf(c_580,definition,
iPr_def_12 = generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_12])],[]) ).
tcf(c_581,definition,
iPr_def_13 = generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_13])],[]) ).
tcf(c_582,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,iPr_def_12),bt),encrypt(iPr_def_13,X0)))) ),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c_392,c_581,c_580]) ).
tcf(c_610,plain,
( ~ iPr_def_11
| ~ party_of_protocol(b) ),
inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_578]) ).
tcf(c_1065,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_50,c_63]) ).
tcf(c_1066,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1065,c_65]) ).
tcf(c_1114,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_577,c_54,c_577,c_610,c_579]) ).
tcf(c_1115,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_1114]) ).
tcf(c_1143,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ party_of_protocol(a)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,iPr_def_12),bt),encrypt(iPr_def_13,X0))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_77,c_582]) ).
tcf(c_1144,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,iPr_def_12),bt),encrypt(iPr_def_13,X0))) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1143,c_54,c_49]) ).
tcf(c_1160,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(iPr_def_13,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,iPr_def_12),bt)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_73,c_1144]) ).
tcf(c_1252,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,iPr_def_13,encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,iPr_def_12),bt))))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce))) ),
inference(light_normalisation,[status(thm)],[c_295,c_580,c_581]) ).
tcf(c_1259,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,iPr_def_13,encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,iPr_def_12),bt)))),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_50,c_1252]) ).
tcf(c_1276,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,iPr_def_13,encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,iPr_def_12),bt))),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1259,c_63]) ).
tcf(c_1281,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,iPr_def_12),bt)),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1276,c_68]) ).
tcf(c_1282,plain,
intruder_message(iPr_def_13),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1276,c_67]) ).
tcf(c_1291,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(iPr_def_13,an_a_nonce)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1281,c_1160]) ).
tcf(c_1292,plain,
~ intruder_message(encrypt(iPr_def_13,an_a_nonce)),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1291,c_1066]) ).
tcf(c_1293,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(iPr_def_13)
| ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1115,c_1292]) ).
tcf(c_1294,plain,
$false,
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1293,c_1282,c_1066]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.02 % Problem : SWV014+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.04 % Command : run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% 0.08/0.34 % Computer : n005.cluster.edu
% 0.08/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.08/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.08/0.34 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.08/0.34 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.08/0.34 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.08/0.34 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.08/0.34 % DateTime : Thu Sep 24 18:16:17 UTC 2026
% 0.08/0.34 % CPUTime :
% 0.08/0.34 Running run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% 0.13/0.37 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.13/0.37 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/iproveropt-multi-core.sh -d -n -l tptp -s fof_schedule -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.13/0.38
% 0.13/0.38 % ======== iProver multi-core TPTP/SMT =========
% 0.13/0.38
% 0.13/0.38 % Detected problem language: tptp
% 0.13/0.39 % Proving...
% 2.59/1.24 % SZS status Started for theBenchmark.p
% 2.59/1.24 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 %---------------- iProver v3.9.4 (pre CASC 2026/SMT-COMP 2026) ----------------%
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ iProver source info
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % git: date: 2026-07-19 20:42:38 +0200
% 2.59/1.24 % git: sha1: 804e7d636a263075307957e923b7a22a4035de61
% 2.59/1.24 % git: non_committed_changes: false
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ Parsing...
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ Clausification by vclausify_rel & Parsing by iProver...%
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ Preprocessing... sf_s rm: 2 0s sf_e pe_s pe:1:0s pe:2:0s pe:4:0s pe_e sf_s rm: 0 0s sf_e pe_s pe_e %
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ Preprocessing... gs_s sp: 2 0s gs_e snvd_s sp: 0 0s snvd_e %
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ Preprocessing... sf_s rm: 3 0s sf_e sf_s rm: 0 0s sf_e
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ Proving...
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ Problem Properties
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 %
% 2.59/1.24 % clauses 32
% 2.59/1.24 % conjectures 0
% 2.59/1.24 % EPR 6
% 2.59/1.24 % Horn 31
% 2.59/1.24 % unary 11
% 2.59/1.24 % binary 15
% 2.59/1.24 % lits 66
% 2.59/1.24 % lits eq 2
% 2.59/1.24 % fd_pure 0
% 2.59/1.24 % fd_pseudo 0
% 2.59/1.24 % fd_cond 0
% 2.59/1.24 % fd_pseudo_cond 0
% 2.59/1.24 % AC symbols 0
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ Schedule dynamic 5 is on
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ no conjectures: strip conj schedule
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ Input Options "--resolution_flag false --inst_lit_sel_side none" stripped conjectures Time Limit: 10.
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % ------
% 2.59/1.24 % Current options:
% 2.59/1.24 % ------
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 %
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % ------ Proving...
% 2.59/1.24 %
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
% 2.59/1.24
% 2.59/1.24
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------