%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Drodi---4.1.1
% Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : drodi -timeout(300) /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% Computer : n003.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Sep 24 02:46:26 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Unsatisfiable 0.18s 0.53s
% Output : CNFRefutation 0.18s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 18
% Number of leaves : 17
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 67 ( 15 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 173 ( 0 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 218 ( 112 ~; 106 |; 0 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 0 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 9 ( 5 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 1 avg)
% Number of predicates : 8 ( 7 usr; 1 prp; 0-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 111 ( 111 !; 0 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f1,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f2,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f5,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f6,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f7,axiom,
! [B,A] :
( ~ message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(B)
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(B),encrypt(triple(A,B,generate_expiration_time(B)),bt)))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f8,axiom,
! [A,B] :
( ~ message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(B)
| b_stored(pair(A,B)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f9,axiom,
! [B,A,C] :
( ~ message(sent(A,b,pair(encrypt(triple(A,B,generate_expiration_time(C)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(C),B))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(A,C))
| b_holds(key(B,A)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f12,axiom,
party_of_protocol(t),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f14,axiom,
! [C,A,B] :
( ~ message(sent(A,B,C))
| intruder_message(C) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f16,axiom,
! [B,A] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(A,B))
| intruder_message(B) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f18,axiom,
! [B,A,C] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(A,B,C))
| intruder_message(B) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f19,axiom,
! [C,A,B] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(A,B,C))
| intruder_message(C) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f24,axiom,
! [A,B] :
( ~ intruder_message(A)
| ~ intruder_message(B)
| intruder_message(pair(A,B)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f28,axiom,
! [B,C,A] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(B)
| ~ party_of_protocol(C)
| ~ intruder_message(A)
| message(sent(B,C,A)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f29,axiom,
! [A,B] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(B)
| ~ intruder_message(A)
| intruder_holds(key(A,B)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f30,axiom,
! [A,B,C] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(C)
| ~ intruder_message(A)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(B,C))
| intruder_message(encrypt(A,B)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f34,negated_conjecture,
! [A] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(A,b))
| ~ b_holds(key(A,a)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p') ).
fof(f35,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f1]) ).
fof(f36,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f2]) ).
fof(f40,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f5]) ).
fof(f41,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f6]) ).
fof(f42,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0)
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f7]) ).
fof(f43,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f8]) ).
fof(f44,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f9]) ).
fof(f47,plain,
party_of_protocol(t),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f12]) ).
fof(f50,plain,
! [C] :
( ! [A,B] : ~ message(sent(A,B,C))
| intruder_message(C) ),
inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f14]) ).
fof(f51,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,X2,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f50]) ).
fof(f54,plain,
! [B] :
( ! [A] : ~ intruder_message(pair(A,B))
| intruder_message(B) ),
inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f16]) ).
fof(f55,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f54]) ).
fof(f58,plain,
! [B] :
( ! [A,C] : ~ intruder_message(triple(A,B,C))
| intruder_message(B) ),
inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f18]) ).
fof(f59,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X0,X2))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f58]) ).
fof(f60,plain,
! [C] :
( ! [A,B] : ~ intruder_message(triple(A,B,C))
| intruder_message(C) ),
inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f19]) ).
fof(f61,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f60]) ).
fof(f70,plain,
! [A] :
( ~ intruder_message(A)
| ! [B] :
( ~ intruder_message(B)
| intruder_message(pair(A,B)) ) ),
inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f24]) ).
fof(f71,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f70]) ).
fof(f78,plain,
! [B] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(B)
| ! [C] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(C)
| ! [A] :
( ~ intruder_message(A)
| message(sent(B,C,A)) ) ) ),
inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f28]) ).
fof(f79,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f78]) ).
fof(f80,plain,
! [B] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(B)
| ! [A] :
( ~ intruder_message(A)
| intruder_holds(key(A,B)) ) ),
inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f29]) ).
fof(f81,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f80]) ).
fof(f82,plain,
! [C] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(C)
| ! [A] :
( ~ intruder_message(A)
| ! [B] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(B,C))
| intruder_message(encrypt(A,B)) ) ) ),
inference(miniscoping,[status(thm)],[f30]) ).
fof(f83,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f82]) ).
fof(f87,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[status(thm)],[f34]) ).
fof(f89,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f83,f81]) ).
fof(f90,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
inference(duplicate_literals_removal,[status(thm)],[f89]) ).
fof(f91,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f51,f36]) ).
fof(f92,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f91,f55]) ).
fof(f99,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f42,f51]) ).
fof(f106,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X2))
| b_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f79,f44]) ).
fof(f110,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X2))
| b_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1))) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f106,f40]) ).
fof(f112,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X2))
| b_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f110,f71]) ).
fof(f144,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f99,f61]) ).
fof(f145,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X0))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f99,f59]) ).
fof(f153,plain,
( intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))
| ~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f145,f36]) ).
fof(f156,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f153,f41]) ).
fof(f163,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),X0))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X0))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f144,f112]) ).
fof(f165,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X0),X0))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f163,f43]) ).
fof(f166,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ party_of_protocol(a)
| ~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f165,f36]) ).
fof(f169,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ party_of_protocol(a) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f166,f41]) ).
fof(f173,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f169,f35]) ).
fof(f174,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f173,f90]) ).
fof(f175,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f174,f156]) ).
fof(f188,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f175,f92]) ).
fof(f189,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f188,f87]) ).
fof(f190,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[f189,f81]) ).
fof(f191,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f190,f92]) ).
fof(f193,plain,
! [X0] : ~ party_of_protocol(X0),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f191,f40]) ).
fof(f194,plain,
$false,
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[f47,f193]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.05 % Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.07 % Command : drodi -timeout(300) /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.18/0.46 % Computer : n003.cluster.edu
% 0.18/0.46 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.18/0.46 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.18/0.46 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.18/0.46 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.18/0.46 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.18/0.46 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.18/0.46 % DateTime : Mon Sep 21 08:28:31 UTC 2026
% 0.18/0.47 % CPUTime :
% 0.18/0.49 % Drodi V4.1.1
% 0.18/0.53 % Refutation found
% 0.18/0.53 % SZS status Unsatisfiable for theBenchmark: Theory is unsatisfiable
% 0.18/0.53 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark
% See solution above
% 0.18/0.57 % Elapsed time: 0.087934 seconds
% 0.18/0.57 % CPU time: 0.288119 seconds
% 0.18/0.57 % Total memory used: 33.352 MB
% 0.18/0.57 % Net memory used: 33.189 MB
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------