%------------------------------------------------------------------------------ % File : Etableau---0.67 % Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0. % Transfm : none % Format : tptp:raw % Command : etableau --auto --tsmdo --quicksat=10000 --tableau=1 --tableau-saturation=1 -s -p --tableau-cores=8 --cpu-limit=%d %s % Computer : n021.cluster.edu % Model : x86_64 x86_64 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz % Memory : 8042.1875MB % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64 % CPULimit : 300s % WCLimit : 600s % DateTime : Wed Jul 20 18:18:56 EDT 2022 % Result : Unsatisfiable 0.20s 0.40s % Output : CNFRefutation 0.20s % Verified : % SZS Type : - % Comments : %------------------------------------------------------------------------------ %----WARNING: Could not form TPTP format derivation %------------------------------------------------------------------------------ %----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT % 0.07/0.13 % Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0. % 0.07/0.14 % Command : etableau --auto --tsmdo --quicksat=10000 --tableau=1 --tableau-saturation=1 -s -p --tableau-cores=8 --cpu-limit=%d %s % 0.13/0.35 % Computer : n021.cluster.edu % 0.13/0.35 % Model : x86_64 x86_64 % 0.13/0.35 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz % 0.13/0.35 % Memory : 8042.1875MB % 0.13/0.35 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64 % 0.13/0.35 % CPULimit : 300 % 0.13/0.35 % WCLimit : 600 % 0.13/0.35 % DateTime : Wed Jun 15 20:10:29 EDT 2022 % 0.13/0.35 % CPUTime : % 0.13/0.38 # No SInE strategy applied % 0.13/0.38 # Auto-Mode selected heuristic G_E___208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PS_S5PRR_S4d % 0.13/0.38 # and selection function SelectCQIPrecWNTNp. % 0.13/0.38 # % 0.13/0.38 # Presaturation interreduction done % 0.13/0.38 # Number of axioms: 34 Number of unprocessed: 34 % 0.13/0.38 # Tableaux proof search. % 0.13/0.38 # APR header successfully linked. % 0.13/0.38 # Hello from C++ % 0.13/0.39 # The folding up rule is enabled... % 0.13/0.39 # Local unification is enabled... % 0.13/0.39 # Any saturation attempts will use folding labels... % 0.13/0.39 # 34 beginning clauses after preprocessing and clausification % 0.13/0.39 # Creating start rules for all 1 conjectures. % 0.13/0.39 # There are 1 start rule candidates: % 0.13/0.39 # Found 11 unit axioms. % 0.13/0.39 # 1 start rule tableaux created. % 0.13/0.39 # 23 extension rule candidate clauses % 0.13/0.39 # 11 unit axiom clauses % 0.13/0.39 % 0.13/0.39 # Requested 8, 32 cores available to the main process. % 0.13/0.39 # There are not enough tableaux to fork, creating more from the initial 1 % 0.13/0.39 # Returning from population with 14 new_tableaux and 0 remaining starting tableaux. % 0.13/0.39 # We now have 14 tableaux to operate on % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 total branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 of these attempts blocked. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 free duplicated saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 total successful branch saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 total branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 of these attempts blocked. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 free duplicated saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 total successful branch saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 total branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 of these attempts blocked. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 free duplicated saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 total successful branch saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # Begin clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 % 0.20/0.40 # End clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))). % 0.20/0.40 # End listing active clauses. There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification! % 0.20/0.40 # Begin printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # Found 15 steps % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_pr# There were 2 total branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 of these attempts blocked. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 free duplicated saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 total successful branch saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # Begin clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 % 0.20/0.40 # End clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))). % 0.20/0.40 # End listing active clauses. There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification! % 0.20/0.40 # Begin printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # Found 15 steps % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_protocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_56])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_464, plain, (~intruder_message(quadruple(X7,X8,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)),X9))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_464, ...])). % 0.20/0.40 # End printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output end % 0.20/0.40 # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s" % 0.20/0.40 # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # Begin clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 % 0.20/0.40 # End clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))). % 0.20/0.40 # End listing active clauses. There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification! % 0.20/0.40 # Begin printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # Found 15 steps % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_protocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_54])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_468, plain, (~intruder_message(quadruple(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)),X7,X8,X9))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_468, ...])). % 0.20/0.40 # End printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output end % 0.20/0.40 # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s" % 0.20/0.40 # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # Begin clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 % 0.20/0.40 # End clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))). % 0.20/0.40 # End listing active clauses. There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification! % 0.20/0.40 # Begin printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # Found 15 steps % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_protocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_57])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_462, plain, (~intruder_message(quadruple(X7,X8,X9,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_462, ...])). % 0.20/0.40 # End printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output end % 0.20/0.40 # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s" % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 total branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 of these attempts blocked. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 free duplicated saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 total successful branch saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # Begin clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 % 0.20/0.40 # End clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))). % 0.20/0.40 # End listing active clauses. There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification! % 0.20/0.40 # Begin printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # Found 15 steps % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_protocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_51])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_460, plain, (~intruder_message(triple(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)),X7,X8))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_460, ...])). % 0.20/0.40 # End printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output end % 0.20/0.40 # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s" % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 total branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 of these attempts blocked. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 deferred branch saturation attempts. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 free duplicated saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 total successful branch saturations. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations in interreduction. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 0 successful branch saturations on the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # There were 2 successful branch saturations after the branch. % 0.20/0.40 # SZS status Unsatisfiable for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output start for /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p % 0.20/0.40 # Begin clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 % 0.20/0.40 # End clausification derivation % 0.20/0.40 # Begin listing active clauses obtained from FOF to CNF conversion % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_35, plain, (party_of_protocol(a))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_39, plain, (party_of_protocol(b))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_46, plain, (party_of_protocol(t))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_40, plain, (fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_65, plain, (a_nonce(an_a_nonce))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_67, plain, (a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_66, plain, (a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_44, plain, (t_holds(key(at,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_45, plain, (t_holds(key(bt,b)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_37, plain, (a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_36, plain, (message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(X1,b))|~b_holds(key(X1,a)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_50, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X2,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_49, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_48, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~message(sent(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_63, plain, (intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_58, plain, (intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_53, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_52, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_51, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_57, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_56, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_55, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_54, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_61, plain, (intruder_message(X1)|~intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))|~intruder_message(encrypt(X3,X1))|~party_of_protocol(X2))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_64, plain, (intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))|~intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X1)|~party_of_protocol(X3))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_62, plain, (message(sent(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~party_of_protocol(X2)|~party_of_protocol(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_59, plain, (intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_60, plain, (intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))|~intruder_message(X4)|~intruder_message(X3)|~intruder_message(X2)|~intruder_message(X1))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_42, plain, (b_stored(pair(X1,X2))|~fresh_to_b(X2)|~message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_43, plain, (b_holds(key(X1,X2))|~b_stored(pair(X2,X3))|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_38, plain, (message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4))))|~a_stored(pair(X1,X5))|~message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_41, plain, (message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))|~fresh_to_b(X1)|~message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1))))). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_47, plain, (message(sent(t,X1,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,generate_key(X3),X4),X5),encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(X3),X4),X6),X7)))|~a_nonce(X3)|~t_holds(key(X6,X2))|~t_holds(key(X5,X1))|~message(sent(X2,t,triple(X2,X7,encrypt(triple(X1,X3,X4),X6)))))). % 0.20/0.40 # End listing active clauses. There is an equivalent clause to each of these in the clausification! % 0.20/0.40 # Begin printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # Found 15 steps % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_68, negated_conjecture, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))|~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(start_rule)). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_70, plain, (~b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_43])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_189, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_62])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_305, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_306, plain, (~party_of_protocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_52])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_458, plain, (~intruder_message(triple(X7,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)),X8))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_458, ...])). % 0.20/0.40 # End printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output end % 0.20/0.40 # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s" % 0.20/0.40 # Child (30429) has found a proof. % 0.20/0.40 % 0.20/0.40 otocol(a)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_35])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_304, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_55])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_188, plain, (~b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_42])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_557, plain, (~fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_40])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_558, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_69, plain, (~intruder_holds(key(an_a_nonce,b))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_63])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_567, plain, (~party_of_protocol(b)), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_39])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_566, plain, (~intruder_message(an_a_nonce)), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_50])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_569, plain, (~intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce))), inference(extension_rule, [i_0_48])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_573, plain, (~message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))), inference(closure_rule, [i_0_36])). % 0.20/0.40 cnf(i_0_466, plain, (~intruder_message(quadruple(X7,pair(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)),X8,X9))), inference(etableau_closure_rule, [i_0_466, ...])). % 0.20/0.40 # End printing tableau % 0.20/0.40 # SZS output end % 0.20/0.40 # Branches closed with saturation will be marked with an "s" % 0.20/0.41 # Proof search is over... % 0.20/0.41 # Freeing feature tree %------------------------------------------------------------------------------