%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : LisaST---0.9
% Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% Computer : n013.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Sep 27 09:01:15 AM UTC 2026
% Result : Unsatisfiable 2.51s 12.53s
% Output : CNFRefutation 2.51s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 11
% Number of leaves : 16
% Syntax : Number of clauses : 56 ( 19 unt; 0 nHn; 56 RR)
% Number of literals : 127 ( 0 equ; 76 neg)
% Maximal clause size : 5 ( 2 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 8 ( 7 usr; 1 prp; 0-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 75 ( 16 sgn)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(a_is_party_of_protocol_2,axiom,
'party$uof$uprotocol'(a) ).
cnf(a_sent_message_i_to_b_3,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,'an$ua$unonce'))) ).
cnf(b_is_party_of_protocol_8,axiom,
'party$uof$uprotocol'(b) ).
cnf(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9,axiom,
'fresh$uto$ub'('an$ua$unonce') ).
cnf(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10,axiom,
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ 'fresh$uto$ub'(X0)
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,'generate$ub$unonce'(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,'generate$uexpiration$utime'(X0)),bt)))) ) ).
cnf(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11,axiom,
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ 'fresh$uto$ub'(X1)
| 'b$ustored'(pair(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(b_accepts_secure_session_key_12,axiom,
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,'generate$uexpiration$utime'(X2)),bt),encrypt('generate$ub$unonce'(X2),X0))))
| ~ 'b$ustored'(pair(X1,X2))
| 'b$uholds'(key(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_can_record_17,axiom,
( ~ message(sent(X1,X2,X0))
| 'intruder$umessage'(X0) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_pairs_19,axiom,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(pair(X1,X0))
| 'intruder$umessage'(X0) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_triples_21,axiom,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(triple(X1,X0,X2))
| 'intruder$umessage'(X0) ) ).
cnf(intruder_decomposes_triples_22,axiom,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(triple(X1,X2,X0))
| 'intruder$umessage'(X0) ) ).
cnf(intruder_composes_pairs_27,axiom,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X0)
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X1)
| 'intruder$umessage'(pair(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_message_sent_31,axiom,
( ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X0)
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X1)
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X2)
| message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_holds_key_32,axiom,
( ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X1)
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X0)
| 'intruder$uholds'(key(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(intruder_key_encrypts_33,axiom,
( ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X2)
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X0)
| ~ 'intruder$uholds'(key(X1,X2))
| 'intruder$umessage'(encrypt(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(co1_38,negated_conjecture,
( ~ 'intruder$uholds'(key(X0,b))
| ~ 'b$uholds'(key(X0,a)) ) ).
cnf(c0,plain,
'party$uof$uprotocol'(a),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[a_is_party_of_protocol_2]) ).
cnf(c1,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,'an$ua$unonce'))),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b_3]) ).
cnf(c4,plain,
'party$uof$uprotocol'(b),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[b_is_party_of_protocol_8]) ).
cnf(c5,plain,
'fresh$uto$ub'('an$ua$unonce'),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9]) ).
cnf(c6,plain,
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ 'fresh$uto$ub'(X0)
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,'generate$ub$unonce'(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,'generate$uexpiration$utime'(X0)),bt)))) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10]) ).
cnf(c7,plain,
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ 'fresh$uto$ub'(X1)
| 'b$ustored'(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11]) ).
cnf(c8,plain,
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,'generate$uexpiration$utime'(X2)),bt),encrypt('generate$ub$unonce'(X2),X0))))
| ~ 'b$ustored'(pair(X1,X2))
| 'b$uholds'(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[b_accepts_secure_session_key_12]) ).
cnf(c13,plain,
( ~ message(sent(X1,X2,X0))
| 'intruder$umessage'(X0) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[intruder_can_record_17]) ).
cnf(c15,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(pair(X1,X0))
| 'intruder$umessage'(X0) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[intruder_decomposes_pairs_19]) ).
cnf(c17,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(triple(X1,X0,X2))
| 'intruder$umessage'(X0) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[intruder_decomposes_triples_21]) ).
cnf(c18,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(triple(X1,X2,X0))
| 'intruder$umessage'(X0) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[intruder_decomposes_triples_22]) ).
cnf(c23,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X0)
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X1)
| 'intruder$umessage'(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[intruder_composes_pairs_27]) ).
cnf(c27,plain,
( ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X0)
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X1)
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X2)
| message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[intruder_message_sent_31]) ).
cnf(c28,plain,
( ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X1)
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X0)
| 'intruder$uholds'(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[intruder_holds_key_32]) ).
cnf(c29,plain,
( ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X2)
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X0)
| ~ 'intruder$uholds'(key(X1,X2))
| 'intruder$umessage'(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[intruder_key_encrypts_33]) ).
cnf(c33,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$uholds'(key(X0,b))
| ~ 'b$uholds'(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[co1_38]) ).
cnf(d0,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X0)
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(b)
| ~ 'b$uholds'(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c33,c28]) ).
cnf(d1,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X0)
| ~ 'b$uholds'(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c4,d0]) ).
cnf(d2,plain,
( 'b$uholds'(key(X1,X0))
| ~ 'b$ustored'(pair(X0,X2))
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,'generate$uexpiration$utime'(X2)),bt),encrypt('generate$ub$unonce'(X2),X1)))
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(b)
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c27,c8]) ).
cnf(d3,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,'generate$uexpiration$utime'(X1)),bt),encrypt('generate$ub$unonce'(X1),X2)))
| 'b$uholds'(key(X2,X0))
| ~ 'b$ustored'(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c4,d2]) ).
cnf(d4,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,'generate$uexpiration$utime'(X1)),bt))
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(encrypt('generate$ub$unonce'(X1),X2))
| 'b$uholds'(key(X2,X0))
| ~ 'b$ustored'(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d3,c23]) ).
cnf(d5,plain,
( ~ 'fresh$uto$ub'('an$ua$unonce')
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,'generate$ub$unonce'('an$ua$unonce'),encrypt(triple(a,'an$ua$unonce','generate$uexpiration$utime'('an$ua$unonce')),bt)))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c6,c1]) ).
cnf(d6,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,'generate$ub$unonce'('an$ua$unonce'),encrypt(triple(a,'an$ua$unonce','generate$uexpiration$utime'('an$ua$unonce')),bt)))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c5,d5]) ).
cnf(d7,plain,
'intruder$umessage'(triple(b,'generate$ub$unonce'('an$ua$unonce'),encrypt(triple(a,'an$ua$unonce','generate$uexpiration$utime'('an$ua$unonce')),bt))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d6,c13]) ).
cnf(d8,plain,
'intruder$umessage'(encrypt(triple(a,'an$ua$unonce','generate$uexpiration$utime'('an$ua$unonce')),bt)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d7,c18]) ).
cnf(d9,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(encrypt('generate$ub$unonce'('an$ua$unonce'),'an$ua$unonce'))
| 'b$uholds'(key('an$ua$unonce',a))
| ~ 'b$ustored'(pair(a,'an$ua$unonce'))
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(a) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,d4]) ).
cnf(d10,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(encrypt('generate$ub$unonce'('an$ua$unonce'),'an$ua$unonce'))
| 'b$uholds'(key('an$ua$unonce',a))
| ~ 'b$ustored'(pair(a,'an$ua$unonce')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c0,d9]) ).
cnf(d11,plain,
( 'b$ustored'(pair(a,'an$ua$unonce'))
| ~ 'fresh$uto$ub'('an$ua$unonce') ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c7,c1]) ).
cnf(d12,plain,
'b$ustored'(pair(a,'an$ua$unonce')),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c5,d11]) ).
cnf(d13,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(encrypt('generate$ub$unonce'('an$ua$unonce'),'an$ua$unonce'))
| 'b$uholds'(key('an$ua$unonce',a)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d12,d10]) ).
cnf(d14,plain,
'intruder$umessage'(pair(a,'an$ua$unonce')),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c13,c1]) ).
cnf(d15,plain,
'intruder$umessage'('an$ua$unonce'),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c15,d14]) ).
cnf(d16,plain,
( ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X2)
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X0)
| 'intruder$umessage'(encrypt(X1,X2))
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X1)
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c29,c28]) ).
cnf(d17,plain,
'intruder$umessage'('generate$ub$unonce'('an$ua$unonce')),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d7,c17]) ).
cnf(d18,plain,
( 'intruder$umessage'(encrypt('generate$ub$unonce'('an$ua$unonce'),X1))
| ~ 'intruder$umessage'(X1)
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d17,d16]) ).
cnf(d19,plain,
( 'intruder$umessage'(encrypt('generate$ub$unonce'('an$ua$unonce'),'an$ua$unonce'))
| ~ 'party$uof$uprotocol'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d18,d15]) ).
cnf(d20,plain,
'intruder$umessage'(encrypt('generate$ub$unonce'('an$ua$unonce'),'an$ua$unonce')),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d19,c0]) ).
cnf(d21,plain,
'b$uholds'(key('an$ua$unonce',a)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d20,d13]) ).
cnf(d22,plain,
~ 'intruder$umessage'('an$ua$unonce'),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d21,d1]) ).
cnf(d23,plain,
$false,
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d15,d22]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.02 % Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.03 % Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.09/10.37 % Computer : n013.cluster.edu
% 0.09/10.37 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.09/10.37 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.09/10.37 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.09/10.37 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.09/10.37 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.09/10.37 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.09/10.37 % DateTime : Sat Sep 26 13:05:18 UTC 2026
% 0.09/10.37 % CPUTime :
% 0.09/10.37 Running casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 2.51/12.53 % SZS status Unsatisfiable for theBenchmark.p
% 2.51/12.53 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------