%------------------------------------------------------------------------------ % File : Otter---3.3 % Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0. % Transfm : none % Format : tptp:raw % Command : otter-tptp-script %s % Computer : n025.cluster.edu % Model : x86_64 x86_64 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz % Memory : 8042.1875MB % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64 % CPULimit : 300s % WCLimit : 300s % DateTime : Wed Jul 27 13:19:41 EDT 2022 % Result : Timeout 299.81s 300.05s % Output : None % Verified : % SZS Type : - % Comments : %------------------------------------------------------------------------------ %----No solution output by system %------------------------------------------------------------------------------ %----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT % 0.07/0.12 % Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v8.1.0. Released v2.4.0. % 0.07/0.13 % Command : otter-tptp-script %s % 0.13/0.34 % Computer : n025.cluster.edu % 0.13/0.34 % Model : x86_64 x86_64 % 0.13/0.34 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz % 0.13/0.34 % Memory : 8042.1875MB % 0.13/0.34 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64 % 0.13/0.34 % CPULimit : 300 % 0.13/0.34 % WCLimit : 300 % 0.13/0.34 % DateTime : Wed Jul 27 06:22:45 EDT 2022 % 0.13/0.34 % CPUTime : % 2.00/2.18 ----- Otter 3.3f, August 2004 ----- % 2.00/2.18 The process was started by sandbox on n025.cluster.edu, % 2.00/2.18 Wed Jul 27 06:22:45 2022 % 2.00/2.18 The command was "./otter". The process ID is 18533. % 2.00/2.18 % 2.00/2.18 set(prolog_style_variables). % 2.00/2.18 set(auto). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: set(auto1). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: set(process_input). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: clear(print_kept). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: clear(print_new_demod). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: clear(print_back_demod). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: clear(print_back_sub). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: set(control_memory). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: assign(max_mem, 12000). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: assign(pick_given_ratio, 4). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: assign(stats_level, 1). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: assign(max_seconds, 10800). % 2.00/2.18 clear(print_given). % 2.00/2.18 % 2.00/2.18 list(usable). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] party_of_protocol(a). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] message(sent(a,A,pair(E,encrypt(F,C))))| -a_stored(pair(A,B))| -message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,B,C,D),at),E,F))). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] party_of_protocol(b). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(B),encrypt(triple(A,B,generate_expiration_time(B)),bt))))| -fresh_to_b(B)| -message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B))). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] b_stored(pair(A,B))| -fresh_to_b(B)| -message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B))). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] b_holds(key(B,A))| -b_stored(pair(A,C))| -message(sent(A,b,pair(encrypt(triple(A,B,generate_expiration_time(C)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(C),B)))). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] t_holds(key(at,a)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] t_holds(key(bt,b)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] party_of_protocol(t). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] message(sent(t,C,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,D,generate_key(D),E),G),encrypt(triple(C,generate_key(D),E),F),B)))| -a_nonce(D)| -message(sent(A,t,triple(A,B,encrypt(triple(C,D,E),F))))| -t_holds(key(G,C))| -t_holds(key(F,A)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(C)| -message(sent(A,B,C)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(A)| -intruder_message(pair(A,B)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(pair(A,B)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(A)| -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(C)| -intruder_message(triple(A,B,C)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(A)| -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(C)| -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(D)| -intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(pair(A,B))| -intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(A). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(triple(A,B,C))| -intruder_message(C)| -intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(A). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(quadruple(A,B,C,D))| -intruder_message(D)| -intruder_message(C)| -intruder_message(B)| -intruder_message(A). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(B)| -intruder_holds(key(B,C))| -intruder_message(encrypt(A,B))| -party_of_protocol(C). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] message(sent(B,C,A))| -intruder_message(A)| -party_of_protocol(C)| -party_of_protocol(B). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_holds(key(A,B))| -intruder_message(A)| -party_of_protocol(B). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] intruder_message(encrypt(A,B))| -intruder_holds(key(B,C))| -intruder_message(A)| -party_of_protocol(C). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] a_nonce(an_a_nonce). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(A)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(A)). % 2.00/2.18 0 [] -b_holds(key(A,a))| -intruder_holds(key(A,b)). % 2.00/2.18 end_of_list. % 2.00/2.18 % 2.00/2.18 SCAN INPUT: prop=0, horn=1, equality=0, symmetry=0, max_lits=5. % 2.00/2.18 % 2.00/2.18 This is a Horn set without equality. The strategy will % 2.00/2.18 be hyperresolution, with satellites in sos and nuclei % 2.00/2.18 in usable. % 2.00/2.18 % 2.00/2.18 dependent: set(hyper_res). % 2.00/2.18 dependent: clear(order_hyper). % 2.00/2.18 % 2.00/2.18 ------------> process usable: % 2.00/2.18 ** KEPT (pick-wt=27): 1 [] message(sent(a,A,pair(B,encrypt(C,D))))| -a_stored(pair(A,E))| -message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(A,E,D,F),at),B,C))). % 2.00/2.18 ** KEPT (pick-wt=24): 2 [] message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(A),encrypt(triple(B,A,generate_expiration_time(A)),bt))))| -fresh_to_b(A)| -message(sent(B,b,pair(B,A))). % 2.00/2.18 ** KEPT (pick-wt=13): 3 [] b_stored(pair(A,B))| -fresh_to_b(B)| -message(sent(A,b,pair(A,B))). % 2.00/2.18 ** KEPT (pick-wt=24): 4 [] b_holds(key(A,B))| -b_stored(pair(B,C))| -message(sent(B,b,pair(encrypt(triple(B,A,generate_expiration_time(C)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(C),A)))). % 2.00/2.18 ** KEPT (pick-wt=44): 5 [] message(sent(t,A,triple(encrypt(quadruple(B,C,generate_key(C),D),E),encrypt(triAlarm clock % 299.81/300.05 Otter interrupted % 299.81/300.05 PROOF NOT FOUND %------------------------------------------------------------------------------