%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Vampire---5.0.1
% Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_vampire /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Tue Sep 29 01:07:54 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Unsatisfiable 0.20s 1.20s
% Output : Refutation 0.20s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 14
% Number of leaves : 20
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 63 ( 15 unt; 4 def)
% Number of atoms : 155 ( 0 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 189 ( 97 ~; 88 |; 0 &)
% ( 4 <=>; 0 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 9 ( 4 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 12 ( 11 usr; 5 prp; 0-1 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 62 ( 0 sgn 62 !; 0 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f1,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol_2) ).
fof(f2,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b_3) ).
fof(f5,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol_8) ).
fof(f6,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9) ).
fof(f7,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10) ).
fof(f8,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11) ).
fof(f9,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key_12) ).
fof(f14,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,X2,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record_17) ).
fof(f16,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs_19) ).
fof(f18,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X0,X2))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples_21) ).
fof(f19,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples_22) ).
fof(f24,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs_27) ).
fof(f28,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( message(sent(X0,X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent_31) ).
fof(f29,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_holds(key(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key_32) ).
fof(f30,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts_33) ).
fof(f34,negated_conjecture,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1_38) ).
fof(f35,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(resolution,[],[f14,f2]) ).
fof(f36,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(resolution,[],[f35,f16]) ).
fof(f40,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f29,f34]) ).
fof(f41,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ b_holds(key(X0,a))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f40,f5]) ).
fof(f48,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f30,f29]) ).
fof(f49,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(duplicate_literal_removal,[],[f48]) ).
fof(f51,definition,
( spl0_1
<=> ! [X2] : ~ party_of_protocol(X2) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl0_1])],[avatar_definition]) ).
fof(f52,plain,
( ! [X2] : ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ spl0_1 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f51]) ).
fof(f54,definition,
( spl0_2
<=> ! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl0_2])],[avatar_definition]) ).
fof(f55,plain,
( ! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) )
| ~ spl0_2 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f54]) ).
fof(f56,plain,
( spl0_1
| spl0_2 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f49,f54,f51]) ).
fof(f65,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f7,f14]) ).
fof(f68,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| b_holds(key(X2,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X2)))
| ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f9,f28]) ).
fof(f69,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X2,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X2)))
| b_holds(key(X2,X0))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f68,f5]) ).
fof(f73,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f65,f19]) ).
fof(f74,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f65,f18]) ).
fof(f83,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f69,f24]) ).
fof(f85,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)
| intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f74,f2]) ).
fof(f88,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f85,f6]) ).
fof(f89,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X1))
| b_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f83,f73]) ).
fof(f98,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X1))
| b_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f89,f8]) ).
fof(f114,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce)
| ~ party_of_protocol(a) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f98,f2]) ).
fof(f120,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ party_of_protocol(a) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f114,f6]) ).
fof(f122,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f120,f1]) ).
fof(f124,definition,
( spl0_9
<=> b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl0_9])],[avatar_definition]) ).
fof(f125,plain,
( b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a))
| ~ spl0_9 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f124]) ).
fof(f127,definition,
( spl0_10
<=> intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce)) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl0_10])],[avatar_definition]) ).
fof(f128,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),an_a_nonce))
| spl0_10 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f127]) ).
fof(f129,plain,
( spl0_9
| ~ spl0_10 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f122,f127,f124]) ).
fof(f157,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))
| ~ spl0_2
| spl0_10 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f128,f55]) ).
fof(f158,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))
| ~ spl0_2
| spl0_10 ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f157,f36]) ).
fof(f159,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl0_2
| spl0_10 ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f158,f88]) ).
fof(f160,plain,
( ~ spl0_2
| spl0_10 ),
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f159]) ).
fof(f163,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ spl0_9 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f125,f41]) ).
fof(f164,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl0_9 ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f163,f36]) ).
fof(f165,plain,
~ spl0_9,
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f164]) ).
fof(f166,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl0_1 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f52,f1]) ).
fof(f171,plain,
~ spl0_1,
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f166]) ).
cnf(s1,plain,
( spl0_1
| spl0_2 ),
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f56]) ).
cnf(s5,plain,
( spl0_9
| ~ spl0_10 ),
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f129]) ).
cnf(s9,plain,
( ~ spl0_2
| spl0_10 ),
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f160]) ).
cnf(s10,plain,
~ spl0_9,
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f165]) ).
cnf(s13,plain,
~ spl0_1,
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f171]) ).
cnf(s14,plain,
~ spl0_10,
inference(rat,[],[s5,s10]) ).
cnf(s15,plain,
~ spl0_2,
inference(rat,[],[s9,s14]) ).
cnf(s17,plain,
$false,
inference(rat,[],[s1,s15,s13]) ).
fof(f172,plain,
$false,
inference(avatar_sat_refutation,[],[s17]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.02 % Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.05 % Command : run_vampire /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% 0.09/0.18 % Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% 0.09/0.18 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.09/0.18 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.09/0.18 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.09/0.18 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.09/0.18 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.09/0.18 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.09/0.18 % DateTime : Mon Sep 28 09:47:33 UTC 2026
% 0.09/0.19 % CPUTime :
% 0.09/0.19 Running run_vampire /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% 0.09/0.22 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.09/0.22 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/vampire --input_syntax tptp --output_axiom_names on --mode casc -m 16384 --cores 7 -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519942)Input is clausal, will run a generic CNF schedule.
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519948)lrs+10_1_ncem=casc2026/models/loop8.pt:sil=128000:npcc=on:urr=on:br=off:random_seed=555909635:i=132376:av=off_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/132376Mi)
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519953)dis-21_1_sil=8000:lcm=predicate:random_seed=684736631:st=5:avsq=on:i=117:avsqr=1,16:sd=3:aac=none:ep=RS:fsr=off:ss=included_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/117Mi)
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)dis-1002_1_to=lpo:sil=16000:fd=off:random_seed=1345840432:st=1.5:i=114:aac=none:ins=7:ss=axioms:fsd=on_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/114Mi)
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519949)lrs+1002_1_ncem=casc2026/models/loop8.pt:sil=128000:tgt=ground:npcc=on:sp=reverse_frequency:spb=intro:random_seed=1233420140:i=137899:s2at=10:gtgl=3:kws=precedence:add=on:bd=preordered:gtg=position_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/137899Mi)
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519947)lrs+10_1_ncem=casc2026/models/loop8.pt:sil=128000:tgt=full:npcc=on:drc=off:sp=weighted_frequency:spb=goal:fd=preordered:foolp=on:random_seed=812544349:i=140167_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/140167Mi)
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519952)dis-1011_1_sil=16000:fde=unused:s2agt=70:random_seed=2448379163:s2a=on:i=180:gtg=position_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/180Mi)
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519950)lrs+10_1_sil=8000:sp=occurrence:random_seed=3545601729:i=107:sd=3:ss=axioms:sgt=8_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/107Mi)
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519950)Also succeeded, but the first one will report.
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)First to succeed.
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519953)Also succeeded, but the first one will report.
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)Solution written to "/export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/vampire-proof-3519942"
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519952)Also succeeded, but the first one will report.
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)Refutation found. Thanks to Tanya!
% 0.20/1.20 % SZS status Unsatisfiable for theBenchmark
% 0.20/1.20 % SZS output start Proof for theBenchmark
% See solution above
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)------------------------------
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)Version: Vampire 5.0.1 (Release build, commit ea8961452 on 2026-07-16 15:14:34 +0200)
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)Linked with Z3 4.14.0.0 3c47fd96cf5645d0c42b2c819d9e9a84380aa721 z3-4.8.4-9178-g3c47fd96c
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)CaDiCaL version: 2.1.3
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)Termination reason: Refutation
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)Time elapsed: 0.005 s
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)Peak memory usage: 89 MB
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)Instructions burned: 5 (million)
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)------------------------------
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519951)------------------------------
% 0.20/1.20 % (3519942)Success in time 0.442 s
% 0.20/1.20 % Vampire exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------