%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Zipperpin---2.1.9999
% Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v9.2.0. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : python3 /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/portfolio.lams.parallel.py %s %d /export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/tmp.ie5p84LshB true
% Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8042.1875MB
% OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Oct 2 04:59:53 PM UTC 2025
% Result : Unsatisfiable 0.32s 1.05s
% Output : Refutation 0.32s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : -
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----WARNING: Could not form TPTP format derivation
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.06/0.26 % Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v9.2.0. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.06/0.27 % Command : python3 /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/portfolio.lams.parallel.py %s %d /export/starexec/sandbox/tmp/tmp.ie5p84LshB true
% 0.12/0.48 % Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% 0.12/0.48 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.12/0.48 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.12/0.48 % Memory : 8042.1875MB
% 0.12/0.48 % OS : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.12/0.48 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.12/0.48 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.12/0.48 % DateTime : Wed Oct 1 12:27:53 EDT 2025
% 0.12/0.49 % CPUTime :
% 0.12/0.49 % Running portfolio for 300 s
% 0.12/0.49 % File : /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.12/0.49 % Number of cores: 8
% 0.12/0.49 % Python version: Python 3.6.8
% 0.18/0.49 % Running in FO mode
% 0.31/0.81 % Total configuration time : 435
% 0.31/0.81 % Estimated wc time : 1092
% 0.31/0.81 % Estimated cpu time (7 cpus) : 156.0
% 0.32/0.95 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo6_bce.sh running for 75s
% 0.32/1.02 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo7.sh running for 63s
% 0.32/1.02 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo3_bce.sh running for 75s
% 0.32/1.02 % /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/fo/fo1_av.sh running for 75s
% 0.32/1.05 % Solved by fo/fo6_bce.sh.
% 0.32/1.05 % BCE start: 34
% 0.32/1.05 % BCE eliminated: 0
% 0.32/1.05 % PE start: 34
% 0.32/1.05 logic: neq
% 0.32/1.05 % PE eliminated: 7
% 0.32/1.05 % done 38 iterations in 0.027s
% 0.32/1.05 % SZS status Theorem for '/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p'
% 0.32/1.05 % SZS output start Refutation
% 0.32/1.05 thf(a_type, type, a: $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(b_stored_type, type, b_stored: $i > $o).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(intruder_message_type, type, intruder_message: $i > $o).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(b_holds_type, type, b_holds: $i > $o).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(pair_type, type, pair: $i > $i > $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(party_of_protocol_type, type, party_of_protocol: $i > $o).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(fresh_to_b_type, type, fresh_to_b: $i > $o).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(message_type, type, message: $i > $o).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(generate_b_nonce_type, type, generate_b_nonce: $i > $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(key_type, type, key: $i > $i > $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(intruder_holds_type, type, intruder_holds: $i > $o).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(generate_expiration_time_type, type, generate_expiration_time: $i > $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(bt_type, type, bt: $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(triple_type, type, triple: $i > $i > $i > $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(an_a_nonce_type, type, an_a_nonce: $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(sent_type, type, sent: $i > $i > $i > $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(b_type, type, b: $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(t_type, type, t: $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(encrypt_type, type, encrypt: $i > $i > $i).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(a_sent_message_i_to_b_3, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (message @ ( sent @ a @ b @ ( pair @ a @ an_a_nonce ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl1, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 ( (message @ (sent @ a @ b @ (pair @ a @ an_a_nonce)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [a_sent_message_i_to_b_3])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9, axiom, (fresh_to_b @ an_a_nonce)).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl5, plain, ( (fresh_to_b @ an_a_nonce)),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (( message @
% 0.32/1.05 ( sent @
% 0.32/1.05 b @ t @
% 0.32/1.05 ( triple @
% 0.32/1.05 b @ ( generate_b_nonce @ B ) @
% 0.32/1.05 ( encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 ( triple @ A @ B @ ( generate_expiration_time @ B ) ) @ bt ) ) ) ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( fresh_to_b @ B ) ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( message @ ( sent @ A @ b @ ( pair @ A @ B ) ) ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl6, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (message @
% 0.32/1.05 (sent @ b @ t @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ b @ (generate_b_nonce @ X0) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ X1 @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ X0)) @ bt))))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (fresh_to_b @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (message @ (sent @ X1 @ b @ (pair @ X1 @ X0))))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl37, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (message @ (sent @ X0 @ b @ (pair @ X0 @ an_a_nonce)))
% 0.32/1.05 | (message @
% 0.32/1.05 (sent @ b @ t @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ b @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ X0 @ an_a_nonce @
% 0.32/1.05 (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @
% 0.32/1.05 bt)))))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('dp-resolution', [status(thm)],
% 0.32/1.05 [zip_derived_cl5, zip_derived_cl6])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl66, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 ( (message @
% 0.32/1.05 (sent @ b @ t @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ b @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ an_a_nonce @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @
% 0.32/1.05 bt))))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup-', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl1, zip_derived_cl37])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(intruder_can_record_17, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (( intruder_message @ C ) | ( ~( message @ ( sent @ A @ B @ C ) ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl13, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i, X2 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @ X0) | ~ (message @ (sent @ X1 @ X2 @ X0)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_can_record_17])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl68, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ b @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ an_a_nonce @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @
% 0.32/1.05 bt)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup-', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl66, zip_derived_cl13])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(intruder_decomposes_triples_22, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (( intruder_message @ C ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( intruder_message @ ( triple @ A @ B @ C ) ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl18, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i, X2 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ (triple @ X1 @ X2 @ X0)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_decomposes_triples_22])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl73, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ an_a_nonce @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @
% 0.32/1.05 bt))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup-', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl68, zip_derived_cl18])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(intruder_holds_key_32, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (( intruder_holds @ ( key @ A @ B ) ) | ( ~( intruder_message @ A ) ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( party_of_protocol @ B ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl28, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_holds @ (key @ X0 @ X1))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (party_of_protocol @ X1))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_holds_key_32])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(intruder_key_encrypts_33, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (( intruder_message @ ( encrypt @ A @ B ) ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( intruder_holds @ ( key @ B @ C ) ) ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( intruder_message @ A ) ) | ( ~( party_of_protocol @ C ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl29, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i, X2 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @ (encrypt @ X0 @ X1))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_holds @ (key @ X1 @ X2))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (party_of_protocol @ X2))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_key_encrypts_33])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl43, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i, X2 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (party_of_protocol @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X2)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (party_of_protocol @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X1)
% 0.32/1.05 | (intruder_message @ (encrypt @ X1 @ X2)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('dp-resolution', [status(thm)],
% 0.32/1.05 [zip_derived_cl28, zip_derived_cl29])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl58, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i, X2 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @ (encrypt @ X1 @ X2))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X1)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X2)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (party_of_protocol @ X0))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('simplify', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl43])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(intruder_composes_pairs_27, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (( intruder_message @ ( pair @ A @ B ) ) | ( ~( intruder_message @ B ) ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( intruder_message @ A ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl23, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @ (pair @ X0 @ X1))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X1)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_composes_pairs_27])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(intruder_message_sent_31, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (( message @ ( sent @ B @ C @ A ) ) | ( ~( intruder_message @ A ) ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( party_of_protocol @ C ) ) | ( ~( party_of_protocol @ B ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl27, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i, X2 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (message @ (sent @ X0 @ X1 @ X2))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X2)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (party_of_protocol @ X1)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (party_of_protocol @ X0))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_message_sent_31])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl28, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_holds @ (key @ X0 @ X1))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (party_of_protocol @ X1))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_holds_key_32])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl5, plain, ( (fresh_to_b @ an_a_nonce)),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (( b_stored @ ( pair @ A @ B ) ) | ( ~( fresh_to_b @ B ) ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( message @ ( sent @ A @ b @ ( pair @ A @ B ) ) ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl7, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (b_stored @ (pair @ X0 @ X1))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (fresh_to_b @ X1)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (message @ (sent @ X0 @ b @ (pair @ X0 @ X1))))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(b_accepts_secure_session_key_12, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (( b_holds @ ( key @ B @ A ) ) | ( ~( b_stored @ ( pair @ A @ C ) ) ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( message @
% 0.32/1.05 ( sent @
% 0.32/1.05 A @ b @
% 0.32/1.05 ( pair @
% 0.32/1.05 ( encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 ( triple @ A @ B @ ( generate_expiration_time @ C ) ) @ bt ) @
% 0.32/1.05 ( encrypt @ ( generate_b_nonce @ C ) @ B ) ) ) ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl8, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i, X2 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (b_holds @ (key @ X0 @ X1))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (b_stored @ (pair @ X1 @ X2))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (message @
% 0.32/1.05 (sent @ X1 @ b @
% 0.32/1.05 (pair @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ X1 @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ X2)) @ bt) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @ (generate_b_nonce @ X2) @ X0)))))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [b_accepts_secure_session_key_12])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(co1_38, conjecture,
% 0.32/1.05 (~( ( ~( intruder_holds @ ( key @ A @ b ) ) ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( b_holds @ ( key @ A @ a ) ) ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zf_stmt_0, negated_conjecture,
% 0.32/1.05 (( ~( intruder_holds @ ( key @ A @ b ) ) ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( b_holds @ ( key @ A @ a ) ) )),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf.neg', [status(esa)], [co1_38])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl33, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (intruder_holds @ (key @ X0 @ b)) | ~ (b_holds @ (key @ X0 @ a)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [zf_stmt_0])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl35, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (message @
% 0.32/1.05 (sent @ a @ b @
% 0.32/1.05 (pair @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ X1)) @ bt) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @ (generate_b_nonce @ X1) @ X0))))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (b_stored @ (pair @ a @ X1))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_holds @ (key @ X0 @ b)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('dp-resolution', [status(thm)],
% 0.32/1.05 [zip_derived_cl8, zip_derived_cl33])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl36, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (message @ (sent @ a @ b @ (pair @ a @ X1)))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (fresh_to_b @ X1)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_holds @ (key @ X0 @ b))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (message @
% 0.32/1.05 (sent @ a @ b @
% 0.32/1.05 (pair @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ X1)) @ bt) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @ (generate_b_nonce @ X1) @ X0)))))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('dp-resolution', [status(thm)],
% 0.32/1.05 [zip_derived_cl7, zip_derived_cl35])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl38, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (message @
% 0.32/1.05 (sent @ a @ b @
% 0.32/1.05 (pair @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @
% 0.32/1.05 bt) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce) @ X0))))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_holds @ (key @ X0 @ b))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (message @ (sent @ a @ b @ (pair @ a @ an_a_nonce))))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('dp-resolution', [status(thm)],
% 0.32/1.05 [zip_derived_cl5, zip_derived_cl36])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl44, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (party_of_protocol @ b)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (message @ (sent @ a @ b @ (pair @ a @ an_a_nonce)))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (message @
% 0.32/1.05 (sent @ a @ b @
% 0.32/1.05 (pair @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @
% 0.32/1.05 bt) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce) @ X0)))))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('dp-resolution', [status(thm)],
% 0.32/1.05 [zip_derived_cl28, zip_derived_cl38])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(b_is_party_of_protocol_8, axiom, (party_of_protocol @ b)).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl4, plain, ( (party_of_protocol @ b)),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [b_is_party_of_protocol_8])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl1, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 ( (message @ (sent @ a @ b @ (pair @ a @ an_a_nonce)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [a_sent_message_i_to_b_3])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl50, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (intruder_message @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (message @
% 0.32/1.05 (sent @ a @ b @
% 0.32/1.05 (pair @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @
% 0.32/1.05 bt) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce) @ X0)))))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('demod', [status(thm)],
% 0.32/1.05 [zip_derived_cl44, zip_derived_cl4, zip_derived_cl1])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl55, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (party_of_protocol @ a)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (party_of_protocol @ b)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @
% 0.32/1.05 (pair @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @
% 0.32/1.05 bt) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce) @ X0)))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup-', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl27, zip_derived_cl50])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(a_is_party_of_protocol_2, axiom, (party_of_protocol @ a)).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl0, plain, ( (party_of_protocol @ a)),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [a_is_party_of_protocol_2])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl4, plain, ( (party_of_protocol @ b)),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [b_is_party_of_protocol_8])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl56, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (intruder_message @
% 0.32/1.05 (pair @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @ bt) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce) @ X0)))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('demod', [status(thm)],
% 0.32/1.05 [zip_derived_cl55, zip_derived_cl0, zip_derived_cl4])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl57, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (intruder_message @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @ bt))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce) @ X0))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup-', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl23, zip_derived_cl56])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl59, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (party_of_protocol @ X1)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @
% 0.32/1.05 bt))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup-', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl58, zip_derived_cl57])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl60, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (intruder_message @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @ bt))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (party_of_protocol @ X1))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('simplify', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl59])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl68, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ b @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce) @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ an_a_nonce @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @
% 0.32/1.05 bt)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup-', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl66, zip_derived_cl13])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(intruder_decomposes_triples_21, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (( intruder_message @ B ) |
% 0.32/1.05 ( ~( intruder_message @ ( triple @ A @ B @ C ) ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl17, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i, X2 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ (triple @ X1 @ X0 @ X2)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_decomposes_triples_21])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl72, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @ (generate_b_nonce @ an_a_nonce))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup-', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl68, zip_derived_cl17])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl74, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (intruder_message @
% 0.32/1.05 (encrypt @
% 0.32/1.05 (triple @ a @ X0 @ (generate_expiration_time @ an_a_nonce)) @ bt))
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (intruder_message @ X0)
% 0.32/1.05 | ~ (party_of_protocol @ X1))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('demod', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl60, zip_derived_cl72])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl80, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 (~ (intruder_message @ an_a_nonce) | ~ (party_of_protocol @ X0))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup-', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl73, zip_derived_cl74])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl1, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 ( (message @ (sent @ a @ b @ (pair @ a @ an_a_nonce)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [a_sent_message_i_to_b_3])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl13, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i, X2 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @ X0) | ~ (message @ (sent @ X1 @ X2 @ X0)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_can_record_17])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl45, plain, ( (intruder_message @ (pair @ a @ an_a_nonce))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup-', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl1, zip_derived_cl13])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(intruder_decomposes_pairs_19, axiom,
% 0.32/1.05 (( intruder_message @ B ) | ( ~( intruder_message @ ( pair @ A @ B ) ) ))).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl15, plain,
% 0.32/1.05 (![X0 : $i, X1 : $i]:
% 0.32/1.05 ( (intruder_message @ X0) | ~ (intruder_message @ (pair @ X1 @ X0)))),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [intruder_decomposes_pairs_19])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl47, plain, ( (intruder_message @ an_a_nonce)),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup-', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl45, zip_derived_cl15])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl81, plain, (![X0 : $i]: ~ (party_of_protocol @ X0)),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('demod', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl80, zip_derived_cl47])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl0, plain, ( (party_of_protocol @ a)),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('cnf', [status(esa)], [a_is_party_of_protocol_2])).
% 0.32/1.05 thf(zip_derived_cl82, plain, ($false),
% 0.32/1.05 inference('s_sup+', [status(thm)], [zip_derived_cl81, zip_derived_cl0])).
% 0.32/1.05
% 0.32/1.05 % SZS output end Refutation
% 0.32/1.05
% 0.32/1.05
% 0.32/1.05 % Terminating...
% 0.32/1.14 % Runner terminated.
% 0.32/1.15 % Zipperpin 1.5 exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------