%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : iProver---3.9.4
% Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Fri Sep 25 03:16:13 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Unsatisfiable 2.19s 1.28s
% Output : CNFRefutation 2.19s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 15
% Number of leaves : 18
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 64 ( 18 unt; 2 def)
% Number of atoms : 161 ( 2 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 4 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 168 ( 92 ~; 76 |; 0 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 0 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 8 ( 4 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of types : 1 ( 0 usr)
% Number of type conns : 0 ( 0 >; 0 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of predicates : 13 ( 11 usr; 5 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 12 ( 12 usr; 5 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 82 ( 0 sgn 82 !; 0 ?; 53 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f1,axiom,
party_of_protocol(a),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_is_party_of_protocol_2) ).
fof(f2,axiom,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',a_sent_message_i_to_b_3) ).
fof(f5,axiom,
party_of_protocol(b),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_is_party_of_protocol_8) ).
fof(f6,axiom,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b_9) ).
fof(f7,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X0)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X0)
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X0),encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X0)),bt)))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_10) ).
fof(f8,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1)))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| b_stored(pair(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_creates_freash_nonces_in_time_11) ).
fof(f9,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X0,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X0))))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X2))
| b_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',b_accepts_secure_session_key_12) ).
fof(f14,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ message(sent(X1,X2,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_can_record_17) ).
fof(f16,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_pairs_19) ).
fof(f18,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X0,X2))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples_21) ).
fof(f19,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X0))
| intruder_message(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_decomposes_triples_22) ).
fof(f24,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_composes_pairs_27) ).
fof(f28,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X0)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_message_sent_31) ).
fof(f29,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_holds_key_32) ).
fof(f30,axiom,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X1,X2))
| intruder_message(encrypt(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',intruder_key_encrypts_33) ).
fof(f34,negated_conjecture,
! [X0] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co1_38) ).
tcf(c_83,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f1]) ).
tcf(c_84,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f2]) ).
tcf(c_87,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f5]) ).
tcf(c_88,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f6]) ).
tcf(c_89,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f7]) ).
tcf(c_90,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( b_stored(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,X1))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f8]) ).
tcf(c_91,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( b_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ b_stored(pair(X0,X2))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X0,X1,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X2),X1)))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f9]) ).
tcf(c_96,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( intruder_message(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f14]) ).
tcf(c_98,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f16]) ).
tcf(c_100,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f18]) ).
tcf(c_101,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f19]) ).
tcf(c_106,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( intruder_message(pair(X0,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f24]) ).
tcf(c_110,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( message(sent(X0,X1,X2))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f28]) ).
tcf(c_111,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( intruder_holds(key(X1,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f29]) ).
tcf(c_112,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f30]) ).
tcf(c_116,negated_conjecture,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ b_holds(key(X0,a)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f34]) ).
tcf(c_300,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ b_stored(pair(a,X1))
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X1),X0)))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_91,c_116]) ).
tcf(c_314,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( b_stored(pair(X0,an_a_nonce))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_88,c_90]) ).
tcf(c_322,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_88,c_89]) ).
tcf(c_334,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce)))
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_300,c_314]) ).
tcf(c_336,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_holds(key(X0,b))
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))) ),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_334,c_84,c_334]) ).
tcf(c_402,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X2,X1))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_111,c_112]) ).
tcf(c_416,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c_111,c_336]) ).
tcf(c_418,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0))))
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_416,c_87,c_416]) ).
tcf(c_419,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X0)))) ),
inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_418]) ).
tcf(c_604,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ iPr_def_10
| intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_10])],[c_402]) ).
tcf(c_605,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ iPr_def_11
| ~ party_of_protocol(X0) ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_11])],[c_402]) ).
tcf(c_606,plain,
( iPr_def_11
| iPr_def_10 ),
inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[])],[c_402]) ).
tcf(c_607,definition,
iPr_def_12 = generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_12])],[]) ).
tcf(c_608,definition,
iPr_def_13 = generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_13])],[]) ).
tcf(c_609,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,iPr_def_12),bt),encrypt(iPr_def_13,X0)))) ),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c_419,c_608,c_607]) ).
tcf(c_637,plain,
( ~ iPr_def_11
| ~ party_of_protocol(b) ),
inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_605]) ).
tcf(c_1092,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_84,c_96]) ).
tcf(c_1093,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1092,c_98]) ).
tcf(c_1141,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X0)) ),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_604,c_87,c_604,c_637,c_606]) ).
tcf(c_1142,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X0) ),
inference(renaming,[status(thm)],[c_1141]) ).
tcf(c_1170,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ party_of_protocol(b)
| ~ party_of_protocol(a)
| ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,iPr_def_12),bt),encrypt(iPr_def_13,X0))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_110,c_609]) ).
tcf(c_1171,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X0,iPr_def_12),bt),encrypt(iPr_def_13,X0))) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1170,c_87,c_83]) ).
tcf(c_1187,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( ~ intruder_message(X0)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(iPr_def_13,X0))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X0,iPr_def_12),bt)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_106,c_1171]) ).
tcf(c_1279,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( message(sent(b,t,triple(b,iPr_def_13,encrypt(triple(X0,an_a_nonce,iPr_def_12),bt))))
| ~ message(sent(X0,b,pair(X0,an_a_nonce))) ),
inference(light_normalisation,[status(thm)],[c_322,c_607,c_608]) ).
tcf(c_1286,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,iPr_def_13,encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,iPr_def_12),bt)))),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_84,c_1279]) ).
tcf(c_1303,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,iPr_def_13,encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,iPr_def_12),bt))),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1286,c_96]) ).
tcf(c_1308,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,iPr_def_12),bt)),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1303,c_101]) ).
tcf(c_1309,plain,
intruder_message(iPr_def_13),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1303,c_100]) ).
tcf(c_1318,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(iPr_def_13,an_a_nonce)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1308,c_1187]) ).
tcf(c_1319,plain,
~ intruder_message(encrypt(iPr_def_13,an_a_nonce)),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1318,c_1093]) ).
tcf(c_1320,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(iPr_def_13)
| ~ intruder_message(an_a_nonce) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1142,c_1319]) ).
tcf(c_1321,plain,
$false,
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_1320,c_1309,c_1093]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03 % Problem : SWV014-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.04 % Command : run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% 0.09/0.36 % Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% 0.09/0.36 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.09/0.36 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.09/0.36 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.09/0.36 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.09/0.36 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.09/0.36 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.09/0.36 % DateTime : Thu Sep 24 18:21:12 UTC 2026
% 0.09/0.37 % CPUTime :
% 0.09/0.37 Running run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% 0.09/0.40 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.09/0.40 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/iproveropt-multi-core.sh -d -n -l tptp -s fof_schedule -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.09/0.42
% 0.09/0.42 % ======== iProver multi-core TPTP/SMT =========
% 0.09/0.42
% 0.09/0.42 % Detected problem language: tptp
% 0.09/0.43 % Proving...
% 2.19/1.28 % SZS status Started for theBenchmark.p
% 2.19/1.28 % SZS status Unsatisfiable for theBenchmark.p
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 %---------------- iProver v3.9.4 (pre CASC 2026/SMT-COMP 2026) ----------------%
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ iProver source info
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % git: date: 2026-07-19 20:42:38 +0200
% 2.19/1.28 % git: sha1: 804e7d636a263075307957e923b7a22a4035de61
% 2.19/1.28 % git: non_committed_changes: false
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ Parsing...% successful
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ Clausification by vclausify_rel & Parsing by iProver...%
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ Preprocessing... sf_s rm: 0 0s sf_e pe_s pe:1:0s pe:2:0s pe:4:0s pe_e sf_s rm: 0 0s sf_e pe_s pe_e %
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ Preprocessing... gs_s sp: 2 0s gs_e snvd_s sp: 0 0s snvd_e %
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ Preprocessing... sf_s rm: 3 0s sf_e sf_s rm: 0 0s sf_e
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ Proving...
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ Problem Properties
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 %
% 2.19/1.28 % clauses 32
% 2.19/1.28 % conjectures 0
% 2.19/1.28 % EPR 6
% 2.19/1.28 % Horn 31
% 2.19/1.28 % unary 11
% 2.19/1.28 % binary 15
% 2.19/1.28 % lits 66
% 2.19/1.28 % lits eq 2
% 2.19/1.28 % fd_pure 0
% 2.19/1.28 % fd_pseudo 0
% 2.19/1.28 % fd_cond 0
% 2.19/1.28 % fd_pseudo_cond 0
% 2.19/1.28 % AC symbols 0
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ Schedule dynamic 5 is on
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ no conjectures: strip conj schedule
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ Input Options "--resolution_flag false --inst_lit_sel_side none" stripped conjectures Time Limit: 10.
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % ------
% 2.19/1.28 % Current options:
% 2.19/1.28 % ------
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 %
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % ------ Proving...
% 2.19/1.28 %
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % SZS status Unsatisfiable for theBenchmark.p
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
% 2.19/1.28
% 2.19/1.28
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------