%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : E---3.5.1
% Problem : SWV015+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_E /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% Computer : n008.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Sep 24 02:53:30 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Satisfiable 0.15s 0.45s
% Output : Saturation 0.15s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : ERROR: Analysing output (Could not find formula named c_0_66ERROR: Could not build tree for root c_0_80ERROR: MakeTreeStats fails)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(c_0_33,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X4)
| ~ t_holds(key(X7,X3))
| ~ t_holds(key(X6,X1))
| ~ message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X2,encrypt(triple(X3,X4,X5),X6))))
| message(sent(t,X3,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X4,generate_key(X4),X5),X7),encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X4),X5),X6),X2))) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_30]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_34,plain,
t_holds(key(bt,b)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_bt_for_b]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_36,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1)))
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_31]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_37,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_38,plain,
fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_39,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_32]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_40,plain,
party_of_protocol(b),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_is_party_of_protocol]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_42,plain,
t_holds(key(at,a)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_at_for_a]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_43,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))
| b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_31]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_44,plain,
( ~ message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X5,encrypt(triple(b,X2,X3),X4))))
| ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
| ~ a_nonce(X2)
| message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),X5))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_33,c_0_34]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_46,plain,
( ~ message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
| intruder_message(X3) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_35]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_47,plain,
message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36,c_0_37]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_48,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36,c_0_39]),c_0_40])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_49,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_41]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_51,plain,
( ~ message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X5,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4))))
| ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
| ~ a_nonce(X2)
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),X5))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_33,c_0_42]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_53,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
| b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_43,c_0_39]),c_0_40])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_54,plain,
( ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt))))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_34]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_55,plain,
party_of_protocol(t),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_is_party_of_protocol]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_57,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_45]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_58,plain,
intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_47]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_59,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_49]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_60,plain,
( ~ a_stored(pair(X1,X5))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3)))
| message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4)))) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_50]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_61,plain,
a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_stored_message_i]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_62,plain,
( ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_51,c_0_34]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_63,plain,
a_nonce(an_a_nonce),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_64,plain,
( ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X3))
| ~ a_key(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X2))))
| b_holds(key(X2,X1)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_52]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_65,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_49]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_69,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt)))
| message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_39]),c_0_55]),c_0_40])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_70,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_56]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_71,plain,
intruder_message(b),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57,c_0_58]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_72,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_45]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_73,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_59]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_74,plain,
( ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2)))
| message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_60,c_0_61]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_75,plain,
party_of_protocol(a),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_is_party_of_protocol]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_76,plain,
message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_47]),c_0_63])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_77,plain,
b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_43,c_0_37]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_78,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt)))
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_39]),c_0_55]),c_0_40])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_79,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))))
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_65]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_80,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_66]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_81,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_67]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_82,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_68]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_83,plain,
intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_37]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_84,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt))
| message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_69,c_0_70]),c_0_71])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_85,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_73]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_86,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2))
| message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3)))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_39]),c_0_75]),c_0_55])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_87,plain,
intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_76]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_88,plain,
( ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))))
| ~ a_key(X1)
| b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_77]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_89,plain,
message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_76]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_90,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_78,c_0_70]),c_0_71])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_91,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_58]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_92,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_39]),c_0_40])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_94,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_59]),c_0_71]),c_0_40])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_95,plain,
intruder_message(a),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_82,c_0_83]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_96,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_85]),c_0_71]),c_0_40])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_97,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at))
| message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_86,c_0_70]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_98,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57,c_0_87]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_99,plain,
( ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))
| b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_88,c_0_39]),c_0_40]),c_0_75])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_100,plain,
( ~ a_stored(pair(X2,X3))
| ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4),at),X5,X6)))
| a_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_50]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_101,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_68]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_102,plain,
intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_89]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_104,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_90,c_0_91]),c_0_63])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_105,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_92,c_0_49]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_106,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_93,c_0_40]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_107,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_94]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_108,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_62,c_0_59]),c_0_95]),c_0_75])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_109,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_45]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_110,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_96]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_111,plain,
( ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at))))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_51,c_0_42]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_112,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_97,c_0_98]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_113,plain,
( ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at))))
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_44,c_0_42]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_114,plain,
( ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_99,c_0_49]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_115,plain,
( ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at),X3,X4)))
| a_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_100,c_0_61]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_116,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_101,c_0_102]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_117,plain,
intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_101,c_0_83]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_118,plain,
a_key(generate_key(X1)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_103]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_119,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_104]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_120,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X3))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105,c_0_106]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_121,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_72,c_0_107]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_122,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_108]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_124,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at)))
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_111,c_0_39]),c_0_55]),c_0_75])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_125,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| intruder_message(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_112]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_126,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_109,c_0_73]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_127,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at)))
| message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_113,c_0_39]),c_0_55]),c_0_75])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_128,plain,
intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_109,c_0_58]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_130,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at),X3,X4))
| a_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_115,c_0_39]),c_0_75]),c_0_55])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_132,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105,c_0_116]),c_0_117]),c_0_118]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_133,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_119]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_134,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_90,c_0_85]),c_0_95]),c_0_75])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_135,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_120,c_0_121]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_136,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_109,c_0_122]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_137,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_123,c_0_87]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_139,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at))
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_124,c_0_70]),c_0_95])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_140,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
| b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_92,c_0_125]),c_0_118])]),c_0_126]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_142,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at))
| message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_127,c_0_70]),c_0_95])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_143,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X4)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_120,c_0_126]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_144,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_120,c_0_128]),c_0_117]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_145,plain,
( ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_129,c_0_128])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_146,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at))
| a_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_130,c_0_70]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_154,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_133]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_155,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_102]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_156,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_134]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_157,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_46,c_0_104]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_158,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_133]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_159,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57,c_0_122]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_160,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
| b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_135,c_0_136]),c_0_95]),c_0_118]),c_0_75])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_161,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)))
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_135,c_0_106]),c_0_109]),c_0_57]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_162,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
| b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),b)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_135,c_0_137]),c_0_71]),c_0_118]),c_0_40])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_163,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_138,c_0_87]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_164,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_48,c_0_125]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_165,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36,c_0_112]),c_0_95])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_166,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(at)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_139,c_0_106]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_167,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X2)))
| b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_140,c_0_106]),c_0_57]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_168,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(generate_key(an_a_nonce))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(generate_key(an_a_nonce))
| b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_140,c_0_85]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_169,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_125]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_170,plain,
( ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_43,c_0_112]),c_0_95])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_171,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_141,c_0_87]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_172,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
| ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
| b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_102]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_173,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))
| b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_132,c_0_106]),c_0_57]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_174,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
| message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_90,c_0_106]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_175,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(at)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
| message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_142,c_0_106]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_176,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
| message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_106]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_177,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X4)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)))
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_143,c_0_106]),c_0_109]),c_0_57]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_178,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_143,c_0_85]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_179,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
| ~ a_key(an_a_nonce)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,X1)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_144,c_0_85]),c_0_117]),c_0_38])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_180,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(at)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4))
| message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_97,c_0_106]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_181,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
| ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))
| b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_144,c_0_106]),c_0_109]),c_0_57]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_182,plain,
( ~ a_key(X1)
| ~ intruder_message(bt)
| ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))
| b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_145,c_0_106]),c_0_109]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_183,plain,
( ~ a_key(an_a_nonce)
| b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_145,c_0_91]),c_0_117])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_184,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(at)
| ~ intruder_message(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2))
| a_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_146,c_0_106]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_185,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(X4)
| ~ intruder_message(X3)
| ~ intruder_message(X2)
| ~ intruder_message(X1)
| intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_147]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_186,plain,
( ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
| ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
| ~ intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
| intruder_message(X2) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_148]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_187,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_188,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_189,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_190,plain,
( ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1))
| intruder_message(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_149]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_191,plain,
( ~ a_nonce(X1)
| ~ a_key(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_150]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_192,plain,
~ a_nonce(generate_key(X1)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_151]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_193,plain,
b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_152,c_0_87]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_194,plain,
intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_82,c_0_102]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_195,plain,
b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a)),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_89]),c_0_117]),c_0_95]),c_0_118]),c_0_38]),c_0_75])]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_196,plain,
a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b)),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_115,c_0_76]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_197,plain,
b_holds(key(bt,t)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_hold_key_bt_for_t]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_198,plain,
a_holds(key(at,t)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_holds_key_at_for_t]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_199,plain,
a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_153]),
[final] ).
cnf(c_0_200,plain,
a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_153]),
[final] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03 % Problem : SWV015+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.05 % Command : run_E /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% 0.10/0.37 % Computer : n008.cluster.edu
% 0.10/0.37 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.10/0.37 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.10/0.37 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.10/0.37 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.10/0.37 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.10/0.37 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.10/0.37 % DateTime : Mon Sep 21 08:27:39 UTC 2026
% 0.10/0.37 % CPUTime :
% 0.10/0.37 Running run_E /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% 0.15/0.42 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.15/0.42 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/eprover --delete-bad-limit=2000000000 --definitional-cnf=24 -s --print-statistics -R --print-version --proof-object --auto-schedule=8 --cpu-limit=300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.15/0.45 % Version: 3.5.1
% 0.15/0.45 % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.15/0.45 % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting new_bool_1 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting sh5l with 300s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with pid 582141 completed with status 1
% 0.15/0.45 % Result found by G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN
% 0.15/0.45 % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.15/0.45 % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % (lift_lambdas = 1, lambda_to_forall = 1,unroll_only_formulas = 1, sine = Auto)
% 0.15/0.45 % No SInE strategy applied
% 0.15/0.45 % Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.15/0.45 % Scheduled 7 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting SubtermCWHack with 136s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 151s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting G-E--_207_C18_F1_AE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S3S with 136s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting new_bool_3 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting new_bool_1 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % new_bool_1 with pid 582153 completed with status 1
% 0.15/0.45 % Result found by new_bool_1
% 0.15/0.45 % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.15/0.45 % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % (lift_lambdas = 1, lambda_to_forall = 1,unroll_only_formulas = 1, sine = Auto)
% 0.15/0.45 % No SInE strategy applied
% 0.15/0.45 % Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.15/0.45 % Scheduled 7 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting SubtermCWHack with 136s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 151s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting G-E--_207_C18_F1_AE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S3S with 136s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting new_bool_3 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Starting new_bool_1 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.15/0.45 % Preprocessing time : 0.001 s
% 0.15/0.45 % Presaturation interreduction done
% 0.15/0.45
% 0.15/0.45 % No proof found!
% 0.15/0.45 % SZS status Satisfiable
% 0.15/0.45 % SZS output start Saturation
% See solution above
% 0.15/0.45 % Parsed axioms : 30
% 0.15/0.45 % Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Initial clauses : 39
% 0.15/0.45 % Removed in clause preprocessing : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Initial clauses in saturation : 39
% 0.15/0.45 % Processed clauses : 218
% 0.15/0.45 % ...of these trivial : 3
% 0.15/0.45 % ...subsumed : 23
% 0.15/0.45 % ...remaining for further processing : 192
% 0.15/0.45 % Other redundant clauses eliminated : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Clauses deleted for lack of memory : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Backward-subsumed : 7
% 0.15/0.45 % Backward-rewritten : 1
% 0.15/0.45 % Generated clauses : 263
% 0.15/0.45 % ...of the previous two non-redundant : 204
% 0.15/0.45 % ...aggressively subsumed : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Contextual simplify-reflections : 10
% 0.15/0.45 % Paramodulations : 263
% 0.15/0.45 % Factorizations : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % NegExts : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Equation resolutions : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Disequality decompositions : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Total rewrite steps : 282
% 0.15/0.45 % ...of those cached : 262
% 0.15/0.45 % Propositional unsat checks : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Propositional check models : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Propositional check unsatisfiable : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Propositional clauses : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Propositional clauses after purity: 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Propositional unsat core size : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Propositional preprocessing time : 0.000
% 0.15/0.45 % Propositional encoding time : 0.000
% 0.15/0.45 % Propositional solver time : 0.000
% 0.15/0.45 % Success case prop preproc time : 0.000
% 0.15/0.45 % Success case prop encoding time : 0.000
% 0.15/0.45 % Success case prop solver time : 0.000
% 0.15/0.45 % Current number of processed clauses : 145
% 0.15/0.45 % Positive orientable unit clauses : 33
% 0.15/0.45 % Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Negative unit clauses : 1
% 0.15/0.45 % Non-unit-clauses : 111
% 0.15/0.45 % Current number of unprocessed clauses: 0
% 0.15/0.45 % ...number of literals in the above : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Current number of archived formulas : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Current number of archived clauses : 47
% 0.15/0.45 % Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 3592
% 0.15/0.45 % Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 1088
% 0.15/0.45 % Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions : 35
% 0.15/0.45 % Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 6
% 0.15/0.45 % Rewrite failures with RHS unbound : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % BW rewrite match attempts : 26
% 0.15/0.45 % BW rewrite match successes : 2
% 0.15/0.45 % Condensation attempts : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Condensation successes : 0
% 0.15/0.45 % Termbank termtop insertions : 10710
% 0.15/0.45 % Search garbage collected termcells : 388
% 0.15/0.45
% 0.15/0.45 % -------------------------------------------------
% 0.15/0.45 % User time : 0.013 s
% 0.15/0.45 % System time : 0.004 s
% 0.15/0.45 % Total time : 0.017 s
% 0.15/0.45 % Maximum resident set size: 3672 pages
% 0.15/0.45
% 0.15/0.45 % -------------------------------------------------
% 0.15/0.45 % User time : 0.069 s
% 0.15/0.45 % System time : 0.017 s
% 0.15/0.45 % Total time : 0.087 s
% 0.15/0.45 % Maximum resident set size: 4608 pages
% 0.15/0.45 % E exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------