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E---3.5.1.SAT-Sat.s

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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : E---3.5.1
% Problem  : SWV017+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : run_E /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM

% Computer : n010.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Sep 24 02:53:31 PM UTC 2026

% Result   : Satisfiable 0.39s 0.47s
% Output   : Saturation 0.39s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : ERROR: Analysing output (Could not find formula named c_0_76ERROR: Could not build tree for root c_0_87ERROR: MakeTreeStats fails)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(c_0_36,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X4)
    | ~ t_holds(key(X7,X3))
    | ~ t_holds(key(X6,X1))
    | ~ message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X2,encrypt(triple(X3,X4,X5),X6))))
    | message(sent(t,X3,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X4,generate_key(X4),X5),X7),encrypt(triple(X3,generate_key(X4),X5),X6),X2))) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_33]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_37,plain,
    t_holds(key(at,a)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_at_for_a]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_39,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(X2,X1)))
    | message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_34]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_40,plain,
    message(sent(a,b,pair(a,an_a_nonce))),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_sent_message_i_to_b]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_41,plain,
    fresh_to_b(an_a_nonce),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[nonce_a_is_fresh_to_b]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_42,plain,
    t_holds(key(bt,b)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_holds_key_bt_for_b]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_43,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | message(sent(X2,X3,X1)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_35]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_44,plain,
    party_of_protocol(b),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_is_party_of_protocol]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_47,plain,
    ( ~ message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X5,encrypt(triple(a,X2,X3),X4))))
    | ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
    | ~ a_nonce(X2)
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),X5))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36,c_0_37]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_49,plain,
    ( ~ message(sent(X1,X2,X3))
    | intruder_message(X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_38]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_50,plain,
    message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)))),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39,c_0_40]),c_0_41])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_51,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(X1,X2)))
    | b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_34]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_52,plain,
    ( ~ message(sent(X1,t,triple(X1,X5,encrypt(triple(b,X2,X3),X4))))
    | ~ t_holds(key(X4,X1))
    | ~ a_nonce(X2)
    | message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X2,generate_key(X2),X3),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X2),X3),X4),X5))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_36,c_0_42]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_53,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))
    | message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39,c_0_43]),c_0_44])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_54,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(pair(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_45]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_55,plain,
    ( ~ a_stored(pair(X1,X5))
    | ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X1,X5,X4,X6),at),X2,X3)))
    | message(sent(a,X1,pair(X2,encrypt(X3,X4)))) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_46]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_56,plain,
    a_stored(pair(b,an_a_nonce)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_stored_message_i]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_57,plain,
    ( ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_47,c_0_42]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_58,plain,
    a_nonce(an_a_nonce),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[an_a_nonce_is_a_nonce]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_59,plain,
    party_of_protocol(t),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[t_is_party_of_protocol]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_61,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3))
    | intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_48]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_62,plain,
    intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_50]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_64,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
    | b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_51,c_0_43]),c_0_44])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_65,plain,
    ( ~ message(sent(b,t,triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt))))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_52,c_0_42]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_66,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_54]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_67,plain,
    ( ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2)))
    | message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_55,c_0_56]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_68,plain,
    party_of_protocol(a),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_is_party_of_protocol]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_69,plain,
    message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57,c_0_50]),c_0_58])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_70,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt)))
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57,c_0_43]),c_0_59]),c_0_44])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_71,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(triple(X1,X2,X3)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_60]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_72,plain,
    intruder_message(b),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61,c_0_62]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_73,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X3,X1))
    | intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_48]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_74,plain,
    ( ~ b_stored(pair(X1,X3))
    | ~ a_key(X2)
    | ~ message(sent(X1,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X2))))
    | b_holds(key(X2,X1)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_63]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_75,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | b_stored(pair(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_54]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_79,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt)))
    | message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_43]),c_0_59]),c_0_44])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_80,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(triple(b,generate_b_nonce(X1),encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_66]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_81,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at),X1,X2))
    | message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3)))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67,c_0_43]),c_0_68]),c_0_59])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_82,plain,
    intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_69]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_83,plain,
    b_stored(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_51,c_0_40]),c_0_41])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_84,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),bt))
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_71]),c_0_72])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_85,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,an_a_nonce,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_73,c_0_62]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_86,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ message(sent(X2,b,pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_75]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_87,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
    | ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_76]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_88,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_77]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_89,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(pair(X1,X2))
    | intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_78]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_90,plain,
    intruder_message(pair(a,an_a_nonce)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_40]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_91,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),bt))
    | message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_71]),c_0_72])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_92,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,X2,generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_73,c_0_80]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_93,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4),at))
    | message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_81,c_0_71]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_94,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61,c_0_82]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_95,plain,
    ( ~ message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))))
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_74,c_0_83]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_96,plain,
    message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67,c_0_69]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_97,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_85]),c_0_58])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_98,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1)))
    | b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_86,c_0_43]),c_0_44])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_100,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_66]),c_0_72]),c_0_44])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_101,plain,
    intruder_message(a),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_89,c_0_90]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_102,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_91,c_0_92]),c_0_72]),c_0_44])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_103,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_93,c_0_94]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_105,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,X3))
    | intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_48]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_106,plain,
    ( ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1)))
    | b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_95,c_0_43]),c_0_44]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_107,plain,
    ( ~ a_stored(pair(X2,X3))
    | ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4),at),X5,X6)))
    | a_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_46]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_108,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(pair(X2,X1))
    | intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_78]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_109,plain,
    intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_96]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_110,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | message(sent(a,b,pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_67,c_0_97]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_111,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(X3),X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_98,c_0_54]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_112,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_99,c_0_44]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_113,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_100]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_114,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1)))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_57,c_0_66]),c_0_101]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_115,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_102]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_116,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | intruder_message(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_103]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_117,plain,
    a_key(generate_key(X1)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_104]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_118,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105,c_0_80]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_119,plain,
    ( ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at))))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_47,c_0_37]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_120,plain,
    ( ~ message(sent(a,t,triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at))))
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_52,c_0_37]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_121,plain,
    ( ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),X1))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_106,c_0_54]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_122,plain,
    ( ~ message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at),X3,X4)))
    | a_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_107,c_0_56]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_123,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108,c_0_109]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_124,plain,
    intruder_message(an_a_nonce),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_108,c_0_90]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_126,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_110]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_127,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X3))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_111,c_0_112]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_128,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(X1)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_73,c_0_113]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_129,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),generate_b_nonce(X1))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_114]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_131,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X2)),bt))
    | b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_98,c_0_116]),c_0_117])]),c_0_118]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_132,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at)))
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_119,c_0_43]),c_0_59]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_133,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X3,encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at)))
    | message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_120,c_0_43]),c_0_59]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_134,plain,
    intruder_message(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105,c_0_62]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_136,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at),X3,X4))
    | a_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_122,c_0_43]),c_0_68]),c_0_59])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_139,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_111,c_0_123]),c_0_124]),c_0_117]),c_0_41])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_140,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_109]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_141,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1)
    | fresh_to_b(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_125]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_142,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_126]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_143,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_92]),c_0_101]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_144,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_127,c_0_128]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_145,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_105,c_0_129]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_146,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_130,c_0_82]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_148,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_126]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_149,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_53,c_0_116]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_150,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_39,c_0_103]),c_0_101])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_151,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_109]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_152,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(generate_key(an_a_nonce))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(generate_key(an_a_nonce))
    | b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_131,c_0_92]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_153,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1)
    | intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_125]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_154,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_116]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_155,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_51,c_0_103]),c_0_101])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_157,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,X2),at))
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_132,c_0_71]),c_0_101])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_158,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(b,X1,X2),at))
    | message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_133,c_0_71]),c_0_101])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_159,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X4)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X4)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)),bt))
    | b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_127,c_0_118]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_160,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_127,c_0_134]),c_0_124]),c_0_41])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_161,plain,
    ( ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_135,c_0_134])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_162,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X4)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2),at))
    | a_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_136,c_0_71]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_166,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1)
    | fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_intruder_nonce(X1)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_137]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_171,plain,
    fresh_intruder_nonce(an_intruder_nonce),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[an_intruder_nonce_is_a_fresh_intruder_nonce]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_172,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_140,c_0_141]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_173,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_142,c_0_141]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_174,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt),X2)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_143]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_175,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),at)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61,c_0_129]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_176,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
    | b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),a)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_144,c_0_145]),c_0_101]),c_0_117]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_177,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)))
    | b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_144,c_0_112]),c_0_105]),c_0_61]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_178,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(generate_key(X1))
    | b_holds(key(generate_key(X1),b)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_144,c_0_146]),c_0_72]),c_0_117]),c_0_44])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_179,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),X1)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_97]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_180,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),generate_expiration_time(X1)),bt)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_147,c_0_82]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_181,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_148,c_0_141]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_182,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(X2,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_149,c_0_141]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_183,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | message(sent(b,t,triple(b,generate_b_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))),encrypt(triple(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)),generate_expiration_time(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))),bt)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_150,c_0_141]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_184,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt))
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | b_stored(pair(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt),encrypt(generate_b_nonce(an_a_nonce),generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_151,c_0_141]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_185,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(X2)))
    | b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_131,c_0_112]),c_0_61]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_186,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(generate_key(an_a_nonce))
    | b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_152,c_0_141]),c_0_153]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_187,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | b_stored(pair(X1,encrypt(X2,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_154,c_0_141]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_188,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))
    | b_stored(pair(a,encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_155,c_0_141]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_189,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(encrypt(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_156,c_0_82]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_190,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(X1,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))
    | b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),X1)) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_139,c_0_112]),c_0_61]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_191,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(at)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_157,c_0_112]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_192,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,X2))
    | message(sent(t,a,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),at),encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_84,c_0_112]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_193,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(at)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
    | message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(a,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),at),X3))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_158,c_0_112]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_194,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(b,X1,X2))
    | message(sent(t,b,triple(encrypt(quadruple(b,X1,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),encrypt(triple(b,generate_key(X1),X2),bt),X3))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_91,c_0_112]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_195,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X4)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X3)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X4)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(X3)))
    | b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_159,c_0_112]),c_0_105]),c_0_61]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_196,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
    | ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ fresh_to_b(X1)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_159,c_0_92]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_197,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X1)
    | ~ a_key(an_a_nonce)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,X1)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_160,c_0_92]),c_0_124]),c_0_41])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_198,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X2)
    | ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(X2,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))
    | b_holds(key(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_160,c_0_112]),c_0_105]),c_0_61]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_199,plain,
    ( ~ a_key(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(bt)
    | ~ intruder_message(triple(a,X1,generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)))
    | b_holds(key(X1,a)) ),
    inference(csr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_161,c_0_112]),c_0_105]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_200,plain,
    ( ~ a_key(an_a_nonce)
    | b_holds(key(an_a_nonce,a)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_161,c_0_85]),c_0_124])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_201,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(at)
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X3,X4))
    | message(sent(a,b,pair(X1,encrypt(X2,X3)))) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_93,c_0_112]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_202,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X4)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(at)
    | ~ intruder_message(quadruple(b,an_a_nonce,X1,X2))
    | a_holds(key(X1,b)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_162,c_0_112]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_203,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(X4)
    | ~ intruder_message(X3)
    | ~ intruder_message(X2)
    | ~ intruder_message(X1)
    | intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_163]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_204,plain,
    ( ~ party_of_protocol(X3)
    | ~ intruder_holds(key(X2,X3))
    | ~ intruder_message(encrypt(X1,X2))
    | intruder_message(X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_164]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_205,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X1,X2,X3,X4))
    | intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_165]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_206,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X1,X3,X4))
    | intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_165]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_207,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X1,X4))
    | intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_165]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_208,plain,
    ( ~ intruder_message(quadruple(X2,X3,X4,X1))
    | intruder_message(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_165]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_209,plain,
    ( ~ fresh_intruder_nonce(X1)
    | intruder_message(generate_intruder_nonce(X1)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_153,c_0_166]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_210,plain,
    ( ~ a_nonce(X1)
    | ~ a_key(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_167]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_211,plain,
    ~ a_nonce(generate_key(X1)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_168]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_212,plain,
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_169,c_0_82]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_213,plain,
    intruder_message(encrypt(triple(a,generate_key(an_a_nonce),generate_expiration_time(an_a_nonce)),bt)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_89,c_0_109]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_214,plain,
    b_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),a)),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_86,c_0_96]),c_0_124]),c_0_101]),c_0_117]),c_0_41]),c_0_68])]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_215,plain,
    a_holds(key(generate_key(an_a_nonce),b)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_122,c_0_69]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_216,plain,
    b_holds(key(bt,t)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[b_hold_key_bt_for_t]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_217,plain,
    a_holds(key(at,t)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[a_holds_key_at_for_t]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_218,plain,
    a_nonce(generate_expiration_time(X1)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_170]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_219,plain,
    intruder_message(an_intruder_nonce),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_153,c_0_171]),
    [final] ).

cnf(c_0_220,plain,
    a_nonce(generate_b_nonce(X1)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_170]),
    [final] ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03  % Problem  : SWV017+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v2.4.0.
% 0.00/0.05  % Command  : run_E /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% 0.10/0.37  % Computer : n010.cluster.edu
% 0.10/0.37  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.10/0.37  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.10/0.37  % Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% 0.10/0.37  % OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.10/0.37  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.10/0.37  % WCLimit  : 300
% 0.10/0.37  % DateTime : Mon Sep 21 08:27:39 UTC 2026
% 0.10/0.37  % CPUTime  : 
% 0.10/0.37  Running run_E /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% 0.10/0.42  Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.10/0.42  Running: /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/eprover --delete-bad-limit=2000000000 --definitional-cnf=24 -s --print-statistics -R --print-version --proof-object --auto-schedule=8 --cpu-limit=300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.39/0.47  % Version: 3.5.1
% 0.39/0.47  % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.39/0.47  % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting new_bool_1 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting sh5l with 300s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % sh5l with pid 476633 completed with status 9
% 0.39/0.47  % new_bool_1 with pid 476632 completed with status 9
% 0.39/0.47  % new_bool_3 with pid 476631 completed with status 9
% 0.39/0.47  % G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with pid 476630 completed with status 1
% 0.39/0.47  % Result found by G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN
% 0.39/0.47  % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.39/0.47  % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % (lift_lambdas = 1, lambda_to_forall = 1,unroll_only_formulas = 1, sine = Auto)
% 0.39/0.47  % No SInE strategy applied
% 0.39/0.47  % Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.39/0.47  % Scheduled 7 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting SubtermCWHack with 136s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 151s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting G-E--_207_C18_F1_AE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S3S with 136s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting new_bool_3 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting new_bool_1 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % new_bool_1 with pid 476654 completed with status 1
% 0.39/0.47  % Result found by new_bool_1
% 0.39/0.47  % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSSSSSNFFN.
% 0.39/0.47  % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % (lift_lambdas = 1, lambda_to_forall = 1,unroll_only_formulas = 1, sine = Auto)
% 0.39/0.47  % No SInE strategy applied
% 0.39/0.47  % Search class: FHHNS-FFMM32-MFFFFFNN
% 0.39/0.47  % Scheduled 7 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting SubtermCWHack with 136s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting G-E--_208_C18_F1_SE_CS_SOS_SP_PS_S5PRR_RG_S04AN with 151s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting G-E--_207_C18_F1_AE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S3S with 136s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting new_bool_3 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Starting new_bool_1 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.39/0.47  % Preprocessing time       : 0.002 s
% 0.39/0.47  % Presaturation interreduction done
% 0.39/0.47  
% 0.39/0.47  % No proof found!
% 0.39/0.47  % SZS status Satisfiable
% 0.39/0.47  % SZS output start Saturation
% See solution above
% 0.39/0.47  % Parsed axioms                        : 33
% 0.39/0.47  % Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE    : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Initial clauses                      : 43
% 0.39/0.47  % Removed in clause preprocessing      : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Initial clauses in saturation        : 43
% 0.39/0.47  % Processed clauses                    : 237
% 0.39/0.47  % ...of these trivial                  : 3
% 0.39/0.47  % ...subsumed                          : 23
% 0.39/0.47  % ...remaining for further processing  : 211
% 0.39/0.47  % Other redundant clauses eliminated   : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Clauses deleted for lack of memory   : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Backward-subsumed                    : 7
% 0.39/0.47  % Backward-rewritten                   : 1
% 0.39/0.47  % Generated clauses                    : 281
% 0.39/0.47  % ...of the previous two non-redundant : 222
% 0.39/0.47  % ...aggressively subsumed             : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Contextual simplify-reflections      : 11
% 0.39/0.47  % Paramodulations                      : 281
% 0.39/0.47  % Factorizations                       : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % NegExts                              : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Equation resolutions                 : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Disequality decompositions           : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Total rewrite steps                  : 282
% 0.39/0.47  % ...of those cached                   : 262
% 0.39/0.47  % Propositional unsat checks           : 0
% 0.39/0.47  %    Propositional check models        : 0
% 0.39/0.47  %    Propositional check unsatisfiable : 0
% 0.39/0.47  %    Propositional clauses             : 0
% 0.39/0.47  %    Propositional clauses after purity: 0
% 0.39/0.47  %    Propositional unsat core size     : 0
% 0.39/0.47  %    Propositional preprocessing time  : 0.000
% 0.39/0.47  %    Propositional encoding time       : 0.000
% 0.39/0.47  %    Propositional solver time         : 0.000
% 0.39/0.47  %    Success case prop preproc time    : 0.000
% 0.39/0.47  %    Success case prop encoding time   : 0.000
% 0.39/0.47  %    Success case prop solver time     : 0.000
% 0.39/0.47  % Current number of processed clauses  : 160
% 0.39/0.47  %    Positive orientable unit clauses  : 35
% 0.39/0.47  %    Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 0.39/0.47  %    Negative unit clauses             : 1
% 0.39/0.47  %    Non-unit-clauses                  : 124
% 0.39/0.47  % Current number of unprocessed clauses: 0
% 0.39/0.47  % ...number of literals in the above   : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Current number of archived formulas  : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Current number of archived clauses   : 51
% 0.39/0.47  % Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 5530
% 0.39/0.47  % Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 1956
% 0.39/0.47  % Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions  : 36
% 0.39/0.47  % Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 17
% 0.39/0.47  % Rewrite failures with RHS unbound    : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % BW rewrite match attempts            : 26
% 0.39/0.47  % BW rewrite match successes           : 2
% 0.39/0.47  % Condensation attempts                : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Condensation successes               : 0
% 0.39/0.47  % Termbank termtop insertions          : 11508
% 0.39/0.47  % Search garbage collected termcells   : 411
% 0.39/0.47  
% 0.39/0.47  % -------------------------------------------------
% 0.39/0.47  % User time                : 0.029 s
% 0.39/0.47  % System time              : 0.004 s
% 0.39/0.47  % Total time               : 0.033 s
% 0.39/0.47  % Maximum resident set size: 3676 pages
% 0.39/0.47  
% 0.39/0.47  % -------------------------------------------------
% 0.39/0.47  % User time                : 0.160 s
% 0.39/0.47  % System time              : 0.058 s
% 0.39/0.47  % Total time               : 0.218 s
% 0.39/0.47  % Maximum resident set size: 4608 pages
% 0.39/0.47  % E exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------