%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : E---3.5.1
% Problem : SWV233+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_E /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% Computer : n012.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Sep 24 02:54:01 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 0.06s 0.35s
% Output : CNFRefutation 0.06s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 23
% Number of leaves : 14
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 94 ( 40 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 252 ( 38 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 21 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 287 ( 129 ~; 121 |; 30 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 7 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 13 ( 4 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 8 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 3 ( 1 usr; 1 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 22 ( 22 usr; 9 con; 0-2 aty)
% Number of variables : 145 ( 36 sgn 50 !; 0 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(protocol,axiom,
! [X7,X8,X9,X10,X11] :
( ( ( second(extract(X9,X8)) = X8
& knows(X9)
& knows(X8)
& knows(X7) )
=> knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X8),concatenate(X7,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X8),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) )
& ( ( second(extract(decrypt(X10,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X11,k_ca)))) = n
& first(extract(X11,k_ca)) = s
& knows(X11)
& knows(X10) )
=> knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,first(extract(decrypt(X10,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X11,k_ca)))))) )
& knows(concatenate(n,concatenate(k_c,sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c))))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',protocol) ).
fof(second_axiom,axiom,
! [X5] : second(X5) = head(tail(X5)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',second_axiom) ).
fof(sign_axiom,axiom,
! [X3,X4] : extract(sign(X3,inverse(X4)),X4) = X3,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',sign_axiom) ).
fof(tail_axiom,axiom,
! [X5,X6] : tail(concatenate(X5,X6)) = X6,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',tail_axiom) ).
fof(construct_message_2,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( knows(concatenate(X1,X2))
=> ( knows(X2)
& knows(X1) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',construct_message_2) ).
fof(head_axiom,axiom,
! [X5,X6] : head(concatenate(X5,X6)) = X5,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',head_axiom) ).
fof(first_axiom,axiom,
! [X5] : first(X5) = head(X5),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',first_axiom) ).
fof(construct_message_1,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( knows(X2)
& knows(X1) )
=> ( knows(sign(X1,X2))
& knows(extract(X1,X2))
& knows(symmetric_decrypt(X1,X2))
& knows(decrypt(X1,X2))
& knows(symmetric_encrypt(X1,X2))
& knows(encrypt(X1,X2))
& knows(concatenate(X1,X2)) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',construct_message_1) ).
fof(decrypt_axiom,axiom,
! [X3,X4] : decrypt(encrypt(X3,X4),inverse(X4)) = X3,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',decrypt_axiom) ).
fof(previous_knowledge,axiom,
( knows(k_a)
& knows(inverse(k_a))
& knows(k_ca) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',previous_knowledge) ).
fof(encrypt_equation,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( knows(inverse(X2))
& knows(encrypt(X1,X2)) )
=> knows(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',encrypt_equation) ).
fof(sign_equation,axiom,
! [X3,X4] :
( ( knows(X4)
& knows(sign(X3,inverse(X4))) )
=> knows(X3) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',sign_equation) ).
fof(attack,conjecture,
knows(secret),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',attack) ).
fof(symmetric_encrypt_equation,axiom,
! [X1,X2] :
( ( knows(X2)
& knows(symmetric_encrypt(X1,X2)) )
=> knows(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',symmetric_encrypt_equation) ).
fof(c_0_14,plain,
! [X39,X40,X41,X42,X43] :
( ( knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X40),concatenate(X39,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X40),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))))
| second(extract(X41,X40)) != X40
| ~ knows(X41)
| ~ knows(X40)
| ~ knows(X39) )
& ( knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,first(extract(decrypt(X42,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X43,k_ca))))))
| second(extract(decrypt(X42,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X43,k_ca)))) != n
| first(extract(X43,k_ca)) != s
| ~ knows(X43)
| ~ knows(X42) )
& knows(concatenate(n,concatenate(k_c,sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c))))) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[protocol])])]) ).
fof(c_0_15,plain,
! [X34] : second(X34) = head(tail(X34)),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[second_axiom]) ).
cnf(c_0_16,plain,
( second(extract(X3,X2)) != X2
| ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X2),concatenate(X1,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X2),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14]) ).
cnf(c_0_17,plain,
second(X1) = head(tail(X1)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_15]) ).
fof(c_0_18,plain,
! [X27,X28] : extract(sign(X27,inverse(X28)),X28) = X27,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[sign_axiom]) ).
cnf(c_0_19,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X3)
| head(tail(extract(X3,X2))) != X2
| knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X2),concatenate(X1,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X2),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_16,c_0_17]) ).
cnf(c_0_20,plain,
extract(sign(X1,inverse(X2)),X2) = X1,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_18]) ).
fof(c_0_21,plain,
! [X31,X32] : tail(concatenate(X31,X32)) = X32,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[tail_axiom]) ).
fof(c_0_22,plain,
! [X20,X21] :
( ( ~ knows(concatenate(X20,X21))
| knows(X21) )
& ( ~ knows(concatenate(X20,X21))
| knows(X20) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[construct_message_2])])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_23,plain,
( ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(head(tail(X1)))
| ~ knows(sign(X1,inverse(head(tail(X1)))))
| knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(tail(X1))),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),head(tail(X1))),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ),
inference(er,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_19,c_0_20])]) ).
cnf(c_0_24,plain,
tail(concatenate(X1,X2)) = X2,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_21]) ).
fof(c_0_25,plain,
! [X29,X30] : head(concatenate(X29,X30)) = X29,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[head_axiom]) ).
cnf(c_0_26,plain,
( ~ knows(concatenate(X2,X1))
| knows(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_22]) ).
cnf(c_0_27,plain,
knows(concatenate(n,concatenate(k_c,sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c))))),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14]) ).
fof(c_0_28,plain,
! [X33] : first(X33) = head(X33),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[first_axiom]) ).
cnf(c_0_29,plain,
( ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(head(X1))
| ~ knows(sign(concatenate(X3,X1),inverse(head(X1))))
| knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),head(X1)),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_23,c_0_24]) ).
cnf(c_0_30,plain,
head(concatenate(X1,X2)) = X1,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_25]) ).
cnf(c_0_31,plain,
knows(concatenate(k_c,sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c)))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26,c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_32,plain,
( ~ knows(concatenate(X1,X2))
| knows(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_22]) ).
cnf(c_0_33,plain,
( second(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X2,k_ca)))) != n
| first(extract(X2,k_ca)) != s
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,first(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),second(extract(X2,k_ca)))))) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_14]) ).
cnf(c_0_34,plain,
first(X1) = head(X1),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_28]) ).
cnf(c_0_35,plain,
( ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(sign(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X1,X4)),inverse(X1)))
| knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_29,c_0_30]) ).
cnf(c_0_36,plain,
knows(sign(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol)),inverse(k_c))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26,c_0_31]) ).
cnf(c_0_37,plain,
knows(k_c),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_31]) ).
cnf(c_0_38,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(X2)
| head(tail(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca)))))) != n
| head(extract(X2,k_ca)) != s
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(extract(X2,k_ca))))))) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[c_0_33,c_0_34]),c_0_34]),c_0_17]),c_0_17]),c_0_17]) ).
cnf(c_0_39,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(k_c),concatenate(X1,eol)),inverse(k_s)),k_c),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_35,c_0_36]),c_0_37])]) ).
cnf(c_0_40,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(sign(X2,inverse(k_ca)))
| head(X2) != s
| head(tail(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(X2))))) != n
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(tail(X2)))))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_38,c_0_20]) ).
cnf(c_0_41,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| knows(sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26,c_0_39]) ).
fof(c_0_42,plain,
! [X18,X19] :
( ( ~ knows(X19)
| ~ knows(X18)
| knows(sign(X18,X19)) )
& ( ~ knows(X19)
| ~ knows(X18)
| knows(extract(X18,X19)) )
& ( ~ knows(X19)
| ~ knows(X18)
| knows(symmetric_decrypt(X18,X19)) )
& ( ~ knows(X19)
| ~ knows(X18)
| knows(decrypt(X18,X19)) )
& ( ~ knows(X19)
| ~ knows(X18)
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(X18,X19)) )
& ( ~ knows(X19)
| ~ knows(X18)
| knows(encrypt(X18,X19)) )
& ( ~ knows(X19)
| ~ knows(X18)
| knows(concatenate(X18,X19)) ) ),
inference(distribute,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[construct_message_1])])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_43,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(sign(concatenate(s,X2),inverse(k_ca)))
| head(tail(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(X2)))) != n
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),head(X2))))) ),
inference(er,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_40,c_0_30]),c_0_24]),c_0_24])]) ).
cnf(c_0_44,plain,
knows(sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_41,c_0_31]) ).
fof(c_0_45,plain,
! [X23,X24] : decrypt(encrypt(X23,X24),inverse(X24)) = X23,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[decrypt_axiom]) ).
cnf(c_0_46,plain,
( ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| knows(sign(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_42]) ).
cnf(c_0_47,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| head(tail(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),k_s))) != n
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse(k_c)),k_s)))) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_43,c_0_44]),c_0_30]),c_0_30]) ).
cnf(c_0_48,plain,
decrypt(encrypt(X1,X2),inverse(X2)) = X1,
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_45]) ).
cnf(c_0_49,plain,
( ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(inverse(X1))
| ~ knows(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X1,X4)))
| knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse(k_s)),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_35,c_0_46]) ).
cnf(c_0_50,plain,
knows(inverse(k_a)),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[previous_knowledge]) ).
cnf(c_0_51,plain,
knows(k_a),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[previous_knowledge]) ).
cnf(c_0_52,plain,
( ~ knows(encrypt(X1,k_c))
| head(tail(extract(X1,k_s))) != n
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(X1,k_s)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_47,c_0_48]) ).
cnf(c_0_53,plain,
( ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| knows(encrypt(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_42]) ).
cnf(c_0_54,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(concatenate(X2,concatenate(k_a,X3)))
| knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(k_a),concatenate(X1,eol)),inverse(k_s)),k_a),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_49,c_0_50]),c_0_51])]) ).
cnf(c_0_55,plain,
( ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| knows(concatenate(X1,X2)) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_42]) ).
cnf(c_0_56,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| head(tail(extract(X1,k_s))) != n
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(extract(X1,k_s)))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_52,c_0_53]),c_0_37])]) ).
fof(c_0_57,plain,
! [X12,X13] :
( knows(X12)
| ~ knows(inverse(X13))
| ~ knows(encrypt(X12,X13)) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[encrypt_equation])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_58,plain,
( ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X1)
| ~ knows(concatenate(k_a,X2))
| knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(k_a),concatenate(X1,eol)),inverse(k_s)),k_a),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_54,c_0_55]) ).
fof(c_0_59,plain,
! [X16,X17] :
( knows(X16)
| ~ knows(X17)
| ~ knows(sign(X16,inverse(X17))) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[sign_equation])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_60,plain,
( ~ knows(sign(X1,inverse(k_s)))
| head(tail(X1)) != n
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,head(X1))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_56,c_0_20]) ).
cnf(c_0_61,plain,
( ~ knows(inverse(X2))
| ~ knows(encrypt(X1,X2))
| knows(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_57]) ).
cnf(c_0_62,plain,
( ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(k_a),concatenate(X1,eol)),inverse(k_s)),k_a),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol)),inverse(k_ca)))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_58,c_0_55]),c_0_51])]) ).
cnf(c_0_63,plain,
( ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(sign(X1,inverse(X2)))
| knows(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_59]) ).
cnf(c_0_64,plain,
knows(k_ca),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[previous_knowledge]) ).
cnf(c_0_65,plain,
( ~ knows(sign(concatenate(X1,X2),inverse(k_s)))
| head(X2) != n
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,X1)) ),
inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_60,c_0_24]),c_0_30]) ).
cnf(c_0_66,plain,
( ~ knows(encrypt(X1,k_a))
| knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_61,c_0_50]) ).
cnf(c_0_67,plain,
( ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| knows(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(k_a),concatenate(X1,eol)),inverse(k_s)),k_a)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_62]) ).
cnf(c_0_68,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| knows(concatenate(s,concatenate(k_s,eol))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_63,c_0_41]),c_0_64])]) ).
cnf(c_0_69,plain,
knows(concatenate(c,concatenate(k_c,eol))),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_63,c_0_36]),c_0_37])]) ).
cnf(c_0_70,plain,
( ~ knows(sign(concatenate(X1,concatenate(n,X2)),inverse(k_s)))
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,X1)) ),
inference(er,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_65,c_0_30])]) ).
cnf(c_0_71,plain,
( ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| knows(sign(concatenate(kgen(k_a),concatenate(X1,eol)),inverse(k_s))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_66,c_0_67]) ).
cnf(c_0_72,plain,
knows(n),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_27]) ).
fof(c_0_73,negated_conjecture,
~ knows(secret),
inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[attack]) ).
cnf(c_0_74,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| knows(concatenate(k_s,eol)) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_26,c_0_68]) ).
cnf(c_0_75,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| knows(s) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_68]) ).
cnf(c_0_76,plain,
knows(c),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_69]) ).
cnf(c_0_77,plain,
( ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,kgen(k_a))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_70,c_0_71]),c_0_72])]) ).
fof(c_0_78,negated_conjecture,
~ knows(secret),
inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[c_0_73]) ).
cnf(c_0_79,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| knows(k_s) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_74]) ).
cnf(c_0_80,plain,
knows(s),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_75,c_0_76]) ).
fof(c_0_81,plain,
! [X14,X15] :
( knows(X14)
| ~ knows(X15)
| ~ knows(symmetric_encrypt(X14,X15)) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[symmetric_encrypt_equation])])]) ).
cnf(c_0_82,plain,
( ~ knows(X1)
| knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,kgen(k_a))) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_77,c_0_27]) ).
fof(c_0_83,negated_conjecture,
~ knows(secret),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_78]) ).
cnf(c_0_84,plain,
knows(k_s),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_79,c_0_80]) ).
cnf(c_0_85,plain,
( ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(symmetric_encrypt(X1,X2))
| knows(X1) ),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_81]) ).
cnf(c_0_86,plain,
knows(symmetric_encrypt(secret,kgen(k_a))),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_82,c_0_27]) ).
cnf(c_0_87,negated_conjecture,
~ knows(secret),
inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_83]) ).
cnf(c_0_88,plain,
( ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1)
| knows(concatenate(kgen(k_a),concatenate(X1,eol))) ),
inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_63,c_0_71]),c_0_84])]) ).
cnf(c_0_89,plain,
~ knows(kgen(k_a)),
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_85,c_0_86]),c_0_87]) ).
cnf(c_0_90,plain,
( ~ knows(X3)
| ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_32,c_0_88]),c_0_89]) ).
cnf(c_0_91,plain,
( ~ knows(X2)
| ~ knows(X1) ),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_90,c_0_84]) ).
cnf(c_0_92,plain,
~ knows(X1),
inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_91,c_0_84]) ).
cnf(c_0_93,plain,
$false,
inference(sr,[status(thm)],[c_0_64,c_0_92]),
[proof] ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.01 % Problem : SWV233+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v3.2.0.
% 0.00/0.03 % Command : run_E /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% 0.03/0.30 % Computer : n012.cluster.edu
% 0.03/0.30 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.03/0.30 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.03/0.30 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.03/0.30 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.03/0.30 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.03/0.30 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.03/0.30 % DateTime : Mon Sep 21 08:35:07 UTC 2026
% 0.03/0.30 % CPUTime :
% 0.03/0.30 Running run_E /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 THM
% 0.06/0.32 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.06/0.32 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/eprover --delete-bad-limit=2000000000 --definitional-cnf=24 -s --print-statistics -R --print-version --proof-object --auto-schedule=8 --cpu-limit=300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.06/0.35 % Version: 3.5.1
% 0.06/0.35 % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSMSSSNFFN.
% 0.06/0.35 % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting G-E--_207_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S2SI with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting new_bool_3 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting new_bool_1 with 300s (1) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting sh5l with 300s (1) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % G-E--_207_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S2SI with pid 2002205 completed with status 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Result found by G-E--_207_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S2SI
% 0.06/0.35 % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSMSSSNFFN.
% 0.06/0.35 % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting G-E--_207_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S2SI with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % (lift_lambdas = 1, lambda_to_forall = 1,unroll_only_formulas = 1, sine = Auto)
% 0.06/0.35 % No SInE strategy applied
% 0.06/0.35 % Search class: FHUSM-FFMS21-DFFFFFNN
% 0.06/0.35 % partial match(1): FHUSM-FFMS21-SFFFFFNN
% 0.06/0.35 % Scheduled 7 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting SubtermCWHack with 136s (1) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting G-E--_207_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S2SI with 151s (1) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting G-E--_301_C18_F1_URBAN_S0Y with 136s (1) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting new_bool_3 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting new_bool_1 with 136s (1) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % G-E--_207_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S2SI with pid 2002212 completed with status 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Result found by G-E--_207_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S2SI
% 0.06/0.35 % Preprocessing class: FSMSSMSMSSSNFFN.
% 0.06/0.35 % Scheduled 4 strats onto 8 cores with 300 seconds (2400 total)
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting G-E--_207_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S2SI with 1500s (5) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % (lift_lambdas = 1, lambda_to_forall = 1,unroll_only_formulas = 1, sine = Auto)
% 0.06/0.35 % No SInE strategy applied
% 0.06/0.35 % Search class: FHUSM-FFMS21-DFFFFFNN
% 0.06/0.35 % partial match(1): FHUSM-FFMS21-SFFFFFNN
% 0.06/0.35 % Scheduled 7 strats onto 5 cores with 1500 seconds (1500 total)
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting SubtermCWHack with 136s (1) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % Starting G-E--_207_C18_F1_SE_CS_SP_PI_PS_S2SI with 151s (1) cores
% 0.06/0.35 % Preprocessing time : 0.001 s
% 0.06/0.35 % Presaturation interreduction done
% 0.06/0.35
% 0.06/0.35 % Proof found!
% 0.06/0.35 % SZS status Theorem
% 0.06/0.35 % SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 0.06/0.35 % Parsed axioms : 19
% 0.06/0.35 % Removed by relevancy pruning/SinE : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Initial clauses : 32
% 0.06/0.35 % Removed in clause preprocessing : 4
% 0.06/0.35 % Initial clauses in saturation : 28
% 0.06/0.35 % Processed clauses : 124
% 0.06/0.35 % ...of these trivial : 1
% 0.06/0.35 % ...subsumed : 8
% 0.06/0.35 % ...remaining for further processing : 115
% 0.06/0.35 % Other redundant clauses eliminated : 4
% 0.06/0.35 % Clauses deleted for lack of memory : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Backward-subsumed : 62
% 0.06/0.35 % Backward-rewritten : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Generated clauses : 559
% 0.06/0.35 % ...of the previous two non-redundant : 524
% 0.06/0.35 % ...aggressively subsumed : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Contextual simplify-reflections : 1
% 0.06/0.35 % Paramodulations : 536
% 0.06/0.35 % Factorizations : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % NegExts : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Equation resolutions : 4
% 0.06/0.35 % Disequality decompositions : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Total rewrite steps : 33
% 0.06/0.35 % ...of those cached : 15
% 0.06/0.35 % Propositional unsat checks : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Propositional check models : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Propositional check unsatisfiable : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Propositional clauses : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Propositional clauses after purity: 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Propositional unsat core size : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Propositional preprocessing time : 0.000
% 0.06/0.35 % Propositional encoding time : 0.000
% 0.06/0.35 % Propositional solver time : 0.000
% 0.06/0.35 % Success case prop preproc time : 0.000
% 0.06/0.35 % Success case prop encoding time : 0.000
% 0.06/0.35 % Success case prop solver time : 0.000
% 0.06/0.35 % Current number of processed clauses : 6
% 0.06/0.35 % Positive orientable unit clauses : 5
% 0.06/0.35 % Positive unorientable unit clauses: 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Negative unit clauses : 1
% 0.06/0.35 % Non-unit-clauses : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Current number of unprocessed clauses: 303
% 0.06/0.35 % ...number of literals in the above : 1073
% 0.06/0.35 % Current number of archived formulas : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Current number of archived clauses : 113
% 0.06/0.35 % Clause-clause subsumption calls (NU) : 2146
% 0.06/0.35 % Rec. Clause-clause subsumption calls : 1392
% 0.06/0.35 % Non-unit clause-clause subsumptions : 46
% 0.06/0.35 % Unit Clause-clause subsumption calls : 153
% 0.06/0.35 % Rewrite failures with RHS unbound : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % BW rewrite match attempts : 12
% 0.06/0.35 % BW rewrite match successes : 6
% 0.06/0.35 % Condensation attempts : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Condensation successes : 0
% 0.06/0.35 % Termbank termtop insertions : 10600
% 0.06/0.35 % Search garbage collected termcells : 218
% 0.06/0.35
% 0.06/0.35 % -------------------------------------------------
% 0.06/0.35 % User time : 0.010 s
% 0.06/0.35 % System time : 0.003 s
% 0.06/0.35 % Total time : 0.013 s
% 0.06/0.35 % Maximum resident set size: 3668 pages
% 0.06/0.35
% 0.06/0.35 % -------------------------------------------------
% 0.06/0.35 % User time : 0.048 s
% 0.06/0.35 % System time : 0.008 s
% 0.06/0.35 % Total time : 0.056 s
% 0.06/0.35 % Maximum resident set size: 4608 pages
% 0.06/0.35 % E exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------