%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : LisaST---0.9
% Problem : SWV233+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% Computer : n009.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Sep 27 09:01:42 AM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 35.03s 8.32s
% Output : CNFRefutation 35.03s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : -
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----WARNING: Could not form TPTP format derivation
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.05 % Problem : SWV233+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v3.2.0.
% 0.00/0.07 % Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.19/0.45 % Computer : n009.cluster.edu
% 0.19/0.45 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.19/0.45 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.19/0.45 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.19/0.45 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.19/0.45 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.19/0.45 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.19/0.45 % DateTime : Sat Sep 26 13:21:00 UTC 2026
% 0.19/0.45 % CPUTime :
% 0.19/0.45 Running casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 35.03/8.32 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 35.03/8.32 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% 35.03/8.32 fof(encrypt_equation, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (((knows(encrypt(X0,X1)) & knows(inverse(X1))) => knows(X0)))).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(symmetric_encrypt_equation, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (((knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(X0,X1)) & knows(X1)) => knows(X0)))).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(sign_equation, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (((knows(sign(X0,inverse(X1))) & knows(X1)) => knows(X0)))).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(construct_message_1, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : (((knows(X0) & knows(X1)) => (knows(concatenate(X0,X1)) & (knows(encrypt(X0,X1)) & (knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(X0,X1)) & (knows(decrypt(X0,X1)) & (knows('symmetric$udecrypt'(X0,X1)) & (knows(extract(X0,X1)) & knows(sign(X0,X1))))))))))).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(construct_message_2, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ((knows(concatenate(X0,X1)) => (knows(X0) & knows(X1))))).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(construct_message_3, axiom, ! [X0] : ((knows(X0) => (knows(head(X0)) & (knows(tail(X0)) & knows(hash(X0))))))).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(decrypt_axiom, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : decrypt(encrypt(X0,X1),inverse(X1)) = X0).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(sign_axiom, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : extract(sign(X0,inverse(X1)),X1) = X0).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(head_axiom, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : head(concatenate(X0,X1)) = X0).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(tail_axiom, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : tail(concatenate(X0,X1)) = X1).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(first_axiom, axiom, ! [X0] : first(X0) = head(X0)).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(second_axiom, axiom, ! [X0] : second(X0) = head(tail(X0))).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(third_axiom, axiom, ! [X0] : third(X0) = head(tail(tail(X0)))).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(previous_knowledge, axiom, (knows('k$uca') & (knows(inverse('k$ua')) & knows('k$ua')))).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(protocol, axiom, ! [X0] : ! [X1] : ! [X2] : ! [X3] : ! [X4] : ((knows(concatenate(n,concatenate('k$uc',sign(concatenate(c,concatenate('k$uc',eol)),inverse('k$uc'))))) & (((knows(X3) & (knows(X4) & (first(extract(X4,'k$uca')) = s & second(extract(decrypt(X3,inverse('k$uc')),second(extract(X4,'k$uca')))) = n))) => knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,first(extract(decrypt(X3,inverse('k$uc')),second(extract(X4,'k$uca'))))))) & ((knows(X0) & (knows(X1) & (knows(X2) & second(extract(X2,X1)) = X1))) => knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X0,eol)),inverse('k$us')),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca'))))))))).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(attack, conjecture, knows(secret)).
% 35.03/8.32 fof(negated_conjecture, negated_conjecture, ~knows(secret), inference(negate_conjecture, [status(cth)], [attack])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c0, plain, ~knows(encrypt(X0,X1)) | ~knows(inverse(X1)) | knows(X0), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [encrypt_equation])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c1, plain, ~knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(X0,X1)) | ~knows(X1) | knows(X0), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [symmetric_encrypt_equation])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c2, plain, ~knows(sign(X0,inverse(X1))) | ~knows(X1) | knows(X0), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [sign_equation])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c3, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | X2(X0,X1), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [construct_message_1])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c4, plain, ~X0(X1,X2) | knows(concatenate(X1,X2)), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [construct_message_1])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c5, plain, ~X0(X1,X2) | knows(encrypt(X1,X2)), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [construct_message_1])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c10, plain, ~X0(X1,X2) | knows(sign(X1,X2)), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [construct_message_1])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c11, plain, ~knows(concatenate(X0,X1)) | knows(X0), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [construct_message_2])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c12, plain, ~knows(concatenate(X0,X1)) | knows(X1), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [construct_message_2])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c13, plain, ~knows(X0) | knows(head(X0)), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [construct_message_3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c14, plain, ~knows(X0) | knows(tail(X0)), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [construct_message_3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c16, plain, decrypt(encrypt(X0,X1),inverse(X1)) = X0, inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [decrypt_axiom])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c18, plain, extract(sign(X0,inverse(X1)),X1) = X0, inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [sign_axiom])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c19, plain, head(concatenate(X0,X1)) = X0, inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [head_axiom])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c20, plain, tail(concatenate(X0,X1)) = X1, inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [tail_axiom])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c21, plain, first(X0) = head(X0), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [first_axiom])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c22, plain, second(X0) = head(tail(X0)), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [second_axiom])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c23, plain, third(X0) = head(tail(tail(X0))), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [third_axiom])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c26, plain, knows('k$uca'), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [previous_knowledge])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c27, plain, knows(inverse('k$ua')), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [previous_knowledge])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c28, plain, knows('k$ua'), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [previous_knowledge])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c29, plain, knows(concatenate(n,concatenate('k$uc',sign(concatenate(c,concatenate('k$uc',eol)),inverse('k$uc'))))), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [protocol])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c30, plain, ~knows(X0) | second(extract(decrypt(X0,inverse('k$uc')),second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))) != n | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,first(extract(decrypt(X0,inverse('k$uc')),second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))))) | ~knows(X1) | first(extract(X1,'k$uca')) != s, inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [protocol])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c31, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | second(extract(X2,X0)) != X0 | ~knows(X2) | knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X0),concatenate(X1,eol)),inverse('k$us')),X0),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca')))), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [protocol])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(c32, plain, ~knows(secret), inference(clausification, [status(esa)], [negated_conjecture])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d0, plain, knows(second(X0)) | ~knows(tail(X0)), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c22,c13])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d1, plain, knows(second(X0)) | ~knows(X0), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d0,c14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d2, plain, third(X0) = second(tail(X0)), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [c23,c22])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d3, plain, knows(third(X0)) | ~knows(tail(X0)), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [d2,d1])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d4, plain, knows(third(X0)) | ~knows(X0), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d3,c14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d5, plain, third(concatenate(X0,X1)) = second(X1), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c20,d2])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d6, plain, knows(second(X1)) | ~knows(concatenate(X0,X1)), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [d5,d4])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d7, plain, knows(concatenate('k$uc',sign(concatenate(c,concatenate('k$uc',eol)),inverse('k$uc')))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c29,c12])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d8, plain, knows(sign(concatenate(c,concatenate('k$uc',eol)),inverse('k$uc'))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d7,c12])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d9, plain, ~knows('k$uc') | knows(concatenate(c,concatenate('k$uc',eol))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d8,c2])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d10, plain, knows('k$uc'), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d7,c11])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d11, plain, knows(concatenate(c,concatenate('k$uc',eol))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d10,d9])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d12, plain, knows(concatenate('k$uc',eol)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d11,c12])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d13, plain, knows(second(eol)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d12,d6])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d14, plain, second(concatenate(X0,X1)) = head(X1), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c20,c22])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d15, plain, second(X0) != X1 | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(sign(X0,inverse(X1))) | knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X1),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse('k$us')),X1),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca')))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c18,c31])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d16, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(second(X1)) | ~knows(sign(X1,inverse(second(X1)))) | knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(second(X1)),concatenate(X0,eol)),inverse('k$us')),second(X1)),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca')))), inference(equality_resolution, [status(thm)], [d15])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d17, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(sign(X1,inverse(second(X1)))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | knows(sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca'))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d16,c12])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d18, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(sign(X1,inverse(second(X1)))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | ~knows('k$uca') | knows(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d17,c2])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d19, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(sign(X1,inverse(second(X1)))) | knows(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol))) | ~knows(second(X1)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c26,d18])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d20, plain, ~knows(X0) | knows(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | ~'Ts6'(X1,inverse(second(X1))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d19,c10])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d21, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(second(X1)) | ~'Ts6'(X1,inverse(second(X1))) | knows(s), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d20,c11])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d22, plain, ~'Ts6'(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse(head(X1))) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(second(concatenate(X0,X1))) | knows(s), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [d14,d21])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d23, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(head(X1)) | knows(s) | ~'Ts6'(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse(head(X1))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d22,d14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d24, plain, ~'Ts6'(concatenate(X2,concatenate(X0,X1)),inverse(X0)) | ~knows(X3) | ~knows(head(concatenate(X0,X1))) | knows(s), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c19,d23])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d25, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(X0) | knows(s) | ~'Ts6'(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X0,X1)),inverse(X0)), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d24,c19])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d26, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | knows(s) | ~knows(concatenate(X2,concatenate(X1,X3))) | ~knows(inverse(X1)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d25,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d27, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(inverse(X0)) | knows(s) | ~'Ts6'(X2,concatenate(X0,X3)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d26,c4])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d28, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(inverse(X1)) | knows(s) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(concatenate(X1,X3)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d27,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d29, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X1)) | knows(s) | ~'Ts6'(X1,X3), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d28,c4])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d30, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X1)) | knows(s) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X3), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d29,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d31, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows('k$ua') | ~knows(X2) | knows(s), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d30,c27])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d32, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | knows(s), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c28,d31])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d33, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | knows(s), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d32,d13])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d34, plain, ~knows(X0) | knows(s), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d33,d13])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d35, plain, knows(s), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d34,d13])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d36, plain, knows(head(X1)) | ~knows(concatenate(X0,X1)), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [d14,d1])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d37, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(second(X1)) | ~'Ts6'(X1,inverse(second(X1))) | knows(head(concatenate('k$us',eol))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d20,d36])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d38, plain, ~knows(X0) | knows('k$us') | ~knows(second(X1)) | ~'Ts6'(X1,inverse(second(X1))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d37,c19])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d39, plain, ~'Ts6'(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse(head(X1))) | ~knows(X2) | knows('k$us') | ~knows(second(concatenate(X0,X1))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [d14,d38])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d40, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(head(X1)) | knows('k$us') | ~'Ts6'(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse(head(X1))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d39,d14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d41, plain, ~'Ts6'(concatenate(X2,concatenate(X0,X1)),inverse(X0)) | ~knows(X3) | ~knows(head(concatenate(X0,X1))) | knows('k$us'), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c19,d40])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d42, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(X0) | knows('k$us') | ~'Ts6'(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X0,X1)),inverse(X0)), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d41,c19])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d43, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | knows('k$us') | ~knows(concatenate(X2,concatenate(X1,X3))) | ~knows(inverse(X1)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d42,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d44, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(inverse(X0)) | knows('k$us') | ~'Ts6'(X2,concatenate(X0,X3)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d43,c4])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d45, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(inverse(X1)) | knows('k$us') | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(concatenate(X1,X3)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d44,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d46, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X1)) | knows('k$us') | ~'Ts6'(X1,X3), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d45,c4])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d47, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X1)) | knows('k$us') | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X3), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d46,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d48, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows('k$ua') | ~knows(X2) | knows('k$us'), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d47,c27])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d49, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | knows('k$us'), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c28,d48])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d50, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | knows('k$us'), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d49,d35])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d51, plain, ~knows(X0) | knows('k$us'), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d50,d35])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d52, plain, knows('k$us'), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d51,d35])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d53, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(sign(X1,inverse(second(X1)))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | knows(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(second(X1)),concatenate(X0,eol)),inverse('k$us')),second(X1))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d16,c11])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d54, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(sign(X1,inverse(second(X1)))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | knows(sign(concatenate(kgen(second(X1)),concatenate(X0,eol)),inverse('k$us'))) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d53,c0])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d55, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))) | ~knows(sign(X1,inverse(second(X1)))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | ~knows('k$us') | knows(concatenate(kgen(second(X1)),concatenate(X0,eol))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d54,c2])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d56, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))) | ~knows(sign(X1,inverse(second(X1)))) | knows(concatenate(kgen(second(X1)),concatenate(X0,eol))) | ~knows(second(X1)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d52,d55])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d57, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))) | ~knows(sign(X1,inverse(second(X1)))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | knows(kgen(second(X1))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d56,c11])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d58, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | knows(kgen(second(X1))) | ~'Ts6'(X1,inverse(second(X1))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d57,c10])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d59, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | knows(kgen(second(X1))) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d58,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d60, plain, ~knows(inverse(head(X1))) | ~knows(concatenate(X0,X1)) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(second(concatenate(X0,X1))) | knows(kgen(second(concatenate(X0,X1)))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [d14,d59])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d61, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(head(X1))) | ~knows(concatenate(X0,X1)) | ~knows(head(X1)) | knows(kgen(second(concatenate(X0,X1)))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d60,d14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d62, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(head(X1))) | ~knows(concatenate(X0,X1)) | ~knows(head(X1)) | knows(kgen(head(X1))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d61,d14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d63, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(head(X1))) | ~knows(head(X1)) | knows(kgen(head(X1))) | ~'Ts6'(X2,X1), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d62,c4])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d64, plain, ~knows(inverse(X0)) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(head(concatenate(X0,X1))) | knows(kgen(head(concatenate(X0,X1)))) | ~'Ts6'(X3,concatenate(X0,X1)), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c19,d63])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d65, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X0)) | ~knows(X0) | knows(kgen(head(concatenate(X0,X1)))) | ~'Ts6'(X3,concatenate(X0,X1)), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d64,c19])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d66, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X0)) | ~knows(X0) | knows(kgen(X0)) | ~'Ts6'(X3,concatenate(X0,X1)), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d65,c19])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d67, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(X1)) | ~knows(X1) | knows(kgen(X1)) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(concatenate(X1,X3)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d66,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d68, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X1)) | knows(kgen(X1)) | ~'Ts6'(X1,X3), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d67,c4])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d69, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X1)) | knows(kgen(X1)) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X3), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d68,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d70, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows('k$ua') | ~knows(X2) | knows(kgen('k$ua')), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d69,c27])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d71, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | knows(kgen('k$ua')), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c28,d70])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d72, plain, knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse('k$us')),second(concatenate(X0,X1))),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca')))) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse(second(concatenate(X0,X1))))) | ~knows(second(concatenate(X0,X1))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [d14,d16])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d73, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse(head(X1)))) | knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse('k$us')),second(concatenate(X0,X1))),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca')))) | ~knows(second(concatenate(X0,X1))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d72,d14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d74, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse(head(X1)))) | knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse('k$us')),head(X1)),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca')))) | ~knows(second(concatenate(X0,X1))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d73,d14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d75, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse(head(X1)))) | knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(head(X1)),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse('k$us')),head(X1)),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca')))) | ~knows(head(X1)), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d74,d14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d76, plain, knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X0),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse('k$us')),head(concatenate(X0,X1))),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca')))) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X0,X1)),inverse(head(concatenate(X0,X1))))) | ~knows(head(concatenate(X0,X1))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c19,d75])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d77, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X0,X1)),inverse(X0))) | knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X0),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse('k$us')),head(concatenate(X0,X1))),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca')))) | ~knows(head(concatenate(X0,X1))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d76,c19])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d78, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X0,X1)),inverse(X0))) | knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X0),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse('k$us')),X0),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca')))) | ~knows(head(concatenate(X0,X1))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d77,c19])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d79, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X0,X1)),inverse(X0))) | knows(concatenate(encrypt(sign(concatenate(kgen(X0),concatenate(X2,eol)),inverse('k$us')),X0),sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca')))) | ~knows(X0), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d78,c19])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d80, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X1,concatenate(X2,X3)),inverse(X2))) | ~knows(X2) | knows(sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca'))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d79,c12])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d81, plain, ~knows('k$uc') | ~knows(X0) | knows(sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca'))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d80,d8])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d82, plain, ~knows(X0) | knows(sign(concatenate(s,concatenate('k$us',eol)),inverse('k$uca'))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d10,d81])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d83, plain, head(extract(X0,'k$uca')) != s | second(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse('k$uc')),second(extract(X0,'k$uca')))) != n | ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,first(extract(decrypt(X1,inverse('k$uc')),second(extract(X0,'k$uca')))))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [c30,c21])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d84, plain, head(extract(X1,'k$uca')) != s | second(extract(decrypt(X0,inverse('k$uc')),second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))) != n | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X0) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,head(extract(decrypt(X0,inverse('k$uc')),second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d83,c21])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d85, plain, second(extract(X0,second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))) != n | head(extract(X1,'k$uca')) != s | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(encrypt(X0,'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,head(extract(decrypt(encrypt(X0,'k$uc'),inverse('k$uc')),second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c16,d84])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d86, plain, head(extract(X1,'k$uca')) != s | second(extract(X0,second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))) != n | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(encrypt(X0,'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,head(extract(X0,second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d85,c16])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d87, plain, second(X0) != n | head(extract(X1,'k$uca')) != s | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(encrypt(sign(X0,inverse(second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))),'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,head(extract(sign(X0,inverse(second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))),second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c18,d86])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d88, plain, head(extract(X1,'k$uca')) != s | second(X0) != n | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(encrypt(sign(X0,inverse(second(extract(X1,'k$uca')))),'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,head(X0))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d87,c18])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d89, plain, head(X0) != s | second(X1) != n | ~knows(sign(X0,inverse('k$uca'))) | ~knows(encrypt(sign(X1,inverse(second(extract(sign(X0,inverse('k$uca')),'k$uca')))),'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,head(X1))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c18,d88])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d90, plain, head(X0) != s | second(X1) != n | ~knows(encrypt(sign(X1,inverse(second(X0))),'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,head(X1))) | ~knows(sign(X0,inverse('k$uca'))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d89,c18])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d91, plain, head(X1) != n | head(X2) != s | ~knows(encrypt(sign(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse(second(X2))),'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,head(concatenate(X0,X1)))) | ~knows(sign(X2,inverse('k$uca'))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [d14,d90])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d92, plain, head(X2) != s | head(X1) != n | ~knows(encrypt(sign(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse(second(X2))),'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,X0)) | ~knows(sign(X2,inverse('k$uca'))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d91,c19])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d93, plain, X0 != n | head(X2) != s | ~knows(encrypt(sign(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X0,X1)),inverse(second(X2))),'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,X3)) | ~knows(sign(X2,inverse('k$uca'))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c19,d92])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d94, plain, X0 != s | X2 != n | ~knows(encrypt(sign(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X2,X4)),inverse(second(concatenate(X0,X1)))),'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,X3)) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse('k$uca'))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c19,d93])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d95, plain, X2 != n | X0 != s | ~knows(encrypt(sign(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X2,X4)),inverse(head(X1))),'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,X3)) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X0,X1),inverse('k$uca'))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d94,d14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d96, plain, X0 != n | ~knows(encrypt(sign(concatenate(X1,concatenate(X0,X2)),inverse(head(X3))),'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,X1)) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(s,X3),inverse('k$uca'))), inference(equality_resolution, [status(thm)], [d95])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d97, plain, ~knows(encrypt(sign(concatenate(X0,concatenate(n,X1)),inverse(head(X2))),'k$uc')) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,X0)) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(s,X2),inverse('k$uca'))), inference(equality_resolution, [status(thm)], [d96])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d98, plain, knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,X0)) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(s,X1),inverse('k$uca'))) | ~'Ts6'(sign(concatenate(X0,concatenate(n,X2)),inverse(head(X1))),'k$uc'), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d97,c5])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d99, plain, knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,X0)) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(s,X1),inverse('k$uca'))) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X0,concatenate(n,X2)),inverse(head(X1)))) | ~knows('k$uc'), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d98,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d100, plain, knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,X0)) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X0,concatenate(n,X1)),inverse(head(X2)))) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(s,X2),inverse('k$uca'))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d10,d99])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d101, plain, ~knows(sign(concatenate(X2,concatenate(n,X3)),inverse(X0))) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,X2)) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(s,concatenate(X0,X1)),inverse('k$uca'))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c19,d100])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d102, plain, knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,X0)) | ~knows(sign(concatenate(X0,concatenate(n,X1)),inverse('k$us'))) | ~knows(X2), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d101,d82])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d103, plain, ~knows(X0) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,kgen(second(X1)))) | ~knows(n) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))) | ~knows(sign(X1,inverse(second(X1)))) | ~knows(second(X1)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d102,d54])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d104, plain, knows(n), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c29,c11])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d105, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,kgen(second(X1)))) | ~knows(sign(X1,inverse(second(X1)))) | ~knows(second(X1)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d104,d103])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d106, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))) | knows('symmetric$uencrypt'(secret,kgen(second(X1)))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | ~'Ts6'(X1,inverse(second(X1))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d105,c10])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d107, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | ~'Ts6'(X1,inverse(second(X1))) | ~knows(kgen(second(X1))) | knows(secret), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d106,c1])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d108, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | ~knows(kgen(second(X1))) | ~'Ts6'(X1,inverse(second(X1))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c32,d107])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d109, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))) | ~knows(second(X1)) | ~knows(kgen(second(X1))) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(inverse(second(X1))), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d108,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d110, plain, ~knows(kgen(head(X1))) | ~knows(concatenate(X0,X1)) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(second(concatenate(X0,X1)))) | ~knows(second(concatenate(X0,X1))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [d14,d109])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d111, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(head(X1))) | ~knows(concatenate(X0,X1)) | ~knows(second(concatenate(X0,X1))) | ~knows(kgen(head(X1))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d110,d14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d112, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(head(X1))) | ~knows(concatenate(X0,X1)) | ~knows(head(X1)) | ~knows(kgen(head(X1))), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d111,d14])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d113, plain, ~knows(kgen(X0)) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(head(concatenate(X0,X1)))) | ~knows(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X0,X1))) | ~knows(head(concatenate(X0,X1))), inference(superposition, [status(thm)], [c19,d112])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d114, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X0)) | ~knows(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X0,X1))) | ~knows(head(concatenate(X0,X1))) | ~knows(kgen(X0)), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d113,c19])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d115, plain, ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X0)) | ~knows(concatenate(X3,concatenate(X0,X1))) | ~knows(X0) | ~knows(kgen(X0)), inference(demodulation, [status(thm)], [d114,c19])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d116, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(inverse(X1)) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(kgen(X1)) | ~'Ts6'(X2,concatenate(X1,X3)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d115,c4])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d117, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(inverse(X0)) | ~knows(kgen(X0)) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(concatenate(X0,X3)), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d116,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d118, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X2)) | ~knows(kgen(X2)) | ~'Ts6'(X2,X3), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d117,c4])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d119, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(inverse(X0)) | ~knows(kgen(X0)) | ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X3), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d118,c3])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d120, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows('k$ua') | ~knows(inverse('k$ua')) | ~knows(X3) | ~knows(X4) | ~knows(X5), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d119,d71])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d121, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(X3) | ~knows(X4) | ~knows(X5) | ~knows(inverse('k$ua')), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c28,d120])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d122, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(X3) | ~knows(X4) | ~knows(X5), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [c27,d121])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d123, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(X3) | ~knows(X4), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d122,d35])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d124, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2) | ~knows(X3), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d123,d35])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d125, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1) | ~knows(X2), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d124,d35])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d126, plain, ~knows(X0) | ~knows(X1), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d125,d35])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d127, plain, ~knows(X0), inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d126,d35])).
% 35.03/8.32 cnf(d128, plain, $false, inference(resolution, [status(thm)], [d127,d52])).
% 35.03/8.32 % SZS output end CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------