↑ Up

LisaST---0.9.THM-CRf.s

View TPTP
Problem
Process solution in
SystemOnTSTP
Download .tgz
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : LisaST---0.9
% Problem  : SWV235+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p

% Computer : n005.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Sep 27 09:01:42 AM UTC 2026

% Result   : Theorem 200.91s 29.46s
% Output   : CNFRefutation 200.91s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :   23
%            Number of leaves      :   15
% Syntax   : Number of formulae    :   65 (  29 unt;   0 def)
%            Number of atoms       :  144 (  14 equ)
%            Maximal formula atoms :    5 (   2 avg)
%            Number of connectives :  148 (  69   ~;  66   |;   8   &)
%                                         (   0 <=>;   5  =>;   0  <=;   0 <~>)
%            Maximal formula depth :   11 (   3 avg)
%            Maximal term depth    :    4 (   1 avg)
%            Number of predicates  :    3 (   1 usr;   1 prp; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of functors    :   10 (  10 usr;   7 con; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of variables   :  117 (  16 sgn  24   !;   0   ?)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(xor_commutative,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1] : xor(X0,X1) = xor(X1,X0) ).

fof(xor_associative,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1,X2] : xor(X0,xor(X1,X2)) = xor(xor(X0,X1),X2) ).

fof(encryption_decryption_cancellation,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1] : decrypt(X0,crypt(X0,X1)) = X1 ).

fof(xor_rules_1,axiom,
    ! [X0] : xor(X0,id) = X0 ).

fof(xor_rules_2,axiom,
    ! [X0] : xor(X0,X0) = id ).

fof(key_part_import___part_1,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1] :
      ( ( p(X1)
        & p(X0) )
     => p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X1)),X0)) ) ).

fof(key_part_import___part_3,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1,X2] :
      ( ( p(X1)
        & p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X1,kp)),X2))
        & p(X0) )
     => p(crypt(xor(km,X1),xor(X2,X0))) ) ).

fof(key_translate,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4,X5] :
      ( ( p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X4))
        & p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X3))
        & p(X2)
        & p(crypt(X0,X1)) )
     => p(crypt(xor(X4,X5),decrypt(xor(X2,X3),crypt(X0,X1)))) ) ).

fof(combine_with_XOR,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1] :
      ( ( p(X1)
        & p(X0) )
     => p(xor(X0,X1)) ) ).

fof(encrypt_knowledge,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1] :
      ( ( p(X0)
        & p(X1) )
     => p(crypt(X0,X1)) ) ).

fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_2,axiom,
    p(imp) ).

fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_4,axiom,
    p(id) ).

fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_11,axiom,
    p(exp) ).

fof(an_account_number,axiom,
    p(a) ).

fof(find_pin,conjecture,
    p(crypt(pp,a)) ).

fof(negated_conjecture,negated_conjecture,
    ~ p(crypt(pp,a)),
    inference(negate_conjecture,[status(cth)],[find_pin]) ).

cnf(c0,plain,
    xor(X0,X1) = xor(X1,X0),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[xor_commutative]) ).

cnf(c1,plain,
    xor(xor(X0,X1),X2) = xor(X0,xor(X1,X2)),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[xor_associative]) ).

cnf(c2,plain,
    decrypt(X0,crypt(X0,X1)) = X1,
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[encryption_decryption_cancellation]) ).

cnf(c3,plain,
    xor(X0,id) = X0,
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[xor_rules_1]) ).

cnf(c4,plain,
    xor(X0,X0) = id,
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[xor_rules_2]) ).

cnf(c7,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X0)),X1))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[key_part_import___part_1]) ).

cnf(c9,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(km,X0),xor(X1,X2)))
    | ~ p(X2)
    | ~ p(X0)
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X0,kp)),X1)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[key_part_import___part_3]) ).

cnf(c12,plain,
    ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X3))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X0))
    | ~ p(crypt(X4,X5))
    | ~ p(X2)
    | p(crypt(xor(X0,X1),decrypt(xor(X2,X3),crypt(X4,X5)))) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[key_translate]) ).

cnf(c13,plain,
    ( p(xor(X1,X0))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[combine_with_XOR]) ).

cnf(c15,plain,
    ( p(crypt(X0,X1))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[encrypt_knowledge]) ).

cnf(c17,plain,
    p(imp),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_2]) ).

cnf(c19,plain,
    p(id),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_4]) ).

cnf(c26,plain,
    p(exp),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_11]) ).

cnf(c27,plain,
    p(a),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[an_account_number]) ).

cnf(c28,plain,
    ~ p(crypt(pp,a)),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[negated_conjecture]) ).

cnf(d0,plain,
    xor(id,X0) = X0,
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c3,c0]) ).

cnf(d1,plain,
    xor(X2,xor(X0,X1)) = xor(X0,xor(X1,X2)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c1,c0]) ).

cnf(d2,plain,
    ( ~ p(xor(X1,X2))
    | ~ p(X0)
    | p(xor(X2,xor(X0,X1))) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d1,c13]) ).

cnf(d3,plain,
    X0 = xor(id,X0),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c3,c0]) ).

cnf(d4,plain,
    ( ~ p(xor(X0,X1))
    | ~ p(id)
    | p(xor(X1,X0)) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d3,d2]) ).

cnf(d5,plain,
    ( ~ p(xor(X1,X0))
    | p(xor(X0,X1)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c19,d4]) ).

cnf(d6,plain,
    X0 = xor(X0,id),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d0,c0]) ).

cnf(d7,plain,
    ( p(xor(id,X0))
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d6,d5]) ).

cnf(d8,plain,
    ( p(X0)
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d7,d0]) ).

cnf(d9,plain,
    ( ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X0)
    | p(crypt(X0,X1)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,c15]) ).

cnf(d10,plain,
    ( ~ p(X0)
    | ~ p(X1)
    | p(crypt(X0,X1)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,d9]) ).

cnf(d11,plain,
    ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),id))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(X3,X4))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | p(crypt(X0,decrypt(xor(X1,X2),crypt(X3,X4)))) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d3,c12]) ).

cnf(d12,plain,
    ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),id))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),id))
    | ~ p(crypt(X2,X3))
    | ~ p(X0)
    | p(crypt(X1,decrypt(X0,crypt(X2,X3)))) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d6,d11]) ).

cnf(d13,plain,
    ( ~ p(X0)
    | ~ p(X1)
    | p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X0,kp)),X1)) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c0,c7]) ).

cnf(d14,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(km,X1),xor(X0,X2)))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X2)
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d13,c9]) ).

cnf(d15,plain,
    ( ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X0)
    | ~ p(X2)
    | p(crypt(xor(km,X0),xor(X1,X2))) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,d14]) ).

cnf(d16,plain,
    ( ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X0)
    | ~ p(X0)
    | p(crypt(xor(km,X1),id)) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c4,d15]) ).

cnf(d17,plain,
    ( ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X0)
    | p(crypt(xor(km,X0),id)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,d16]) ).

cnf(d18,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(km,exp),id))
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d17,c26]) ).

cnf(d19,plain,
    ( ~ p(X0)
    | p(crypt(xor(km,exp),id)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,d18]) ).

cnf(d20,plain,
    p(crypt(xor(km,exp),id)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d19,c19]) ).

cnf(d21,plain,
    ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),id))
    | p(crypt(X3,decrypt(X0,crypt(X1,X2))))
    | ~ p(crypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d20,d12]) ).

cnf(d22,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(km,imp),id))
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d17,c17]) ).

cnf(d23,plain,
    ( ~ p(X0)
    | p(crypt(xor(km,imp),id)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,d22]) ).

cnf(d24,plain,
    p(crypt(xor(km,imp),id)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d23,c19]) ).

cnf(d25,plain,
    ( ~ p(crypt(X2,X3))
    | p(crypt(X1,decrypt(X0,crypt(X2,X3))))
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d24,d21]) ).

cnf(d26,plain,
    ( ~ p(crypt(X2,X3))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | p(crypt(X0,decrypt(X1,crypt(X2,X3)))) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,d25]) ).

cnf(d27,plain,
    ( ~ p(crypt(X0,X1))
    | ~ p(X0)
    | p(crypt(X2,X1)) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c2,d26]) ).

cnf(d28,plain,
    ( ~ p(crypt(X2,X1))
    | ~ p(X2)
    | p(crypt(X0,X1)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,d27]) ).

cnf(d29,plain,
    ( ~ p(X0)
    | ~ p(X2)
    | p(crypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d28,d10]) ).

cnf(d30,plain,
    ( p(crypt(X1,X0))
    | ~ p(X0) ),
    inference(factoring,[status(thm)],[d29]) ).

cnf(d31,plain,
    ( ~ p(X1)
    | p(crypt(X0,X1)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,d30]) ).

cnf(d32,plain,
    ~ p(a),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d31,c28]) ).

cnf(d33,plain,
    $false,
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c27,d32]) ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.04  % Problem  : SWV235+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v3.2.0.
% 0.00/0.06  % Command  : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.14/0.40  % Computer : n005.cluster.edu
% 0.14/0.40  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.14/0.40  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.14/0.40  % Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% 0.14/0.40  % OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.14/0.40  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.14/0.40  % WCLimit  : 300
% 0.14/0.40  % DateTime : Sat Sep 26 13:21:01 UTC 2026
% 0.18/0.40  % CPUTime  : 
% 0.18/0.40  Running casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 200.91/29.46  % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 200.91/29.46  % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------