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SInE---0.4.THM-CRf.s

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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : SInE---0.4
% Problem  : SWV235+1 : TPTP v5.0.0. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : Source/sine.py -e eprover -t %d %s

% Computer : art09.cs.miami.edu
% Model    : i686 i686
% CPU      : Intel(R) Pentium(R) 4 CPU 2.80GHz @ 2793MHz
% Memory   : 2018MB
% OS       : Linux 2.6.26.8-57.fc8
% CPULimit : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Dec 26 12:26:15 EST 2010

% Result   : Theorem 0.48s
% Output   : CNFRefutation 0.48s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :   19
%            Number of leaves      :   14
% Syntax   : Number of formulae    :   63 (  29 unt;   0 def)
%            Number of atoms       :  136 (  10 equ)
%            Maximal formula atoms :    4 (   2 avg)
%            Number of connectives :  136 (  63   ~;  61   |;   7   &)
%                                         (   0 <=>;   5  =>;   0  <=;   0 <~>)
%            Maximal formula depth :    8 (   3 avg)
%            Maximal term depth    :    4 (   1 avg)
%            Number of predicates  :    3 (   1 usr;   1 prp; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of functors    :   11 (  11 usr;   9 con; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of variables   :   77 (   1 sgn  44   !;   0   ?)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(2,axiom,
    p(a),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',an_account_number) ).

fof(6,axiom,
    ! [X1,X2] :
      ( ( p(crypt(X1,X2))
        & p(X1) )
     => p(X2) ),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',decrypt_knowledge) ).

fof(10,axiom,
    p(pin),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_5) ).

fof(11,axiom,
    ! [X8,X9] :
      ( ( p(X8)
        & p(X9) )
     => p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X9)),X8)) ),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',key_part_import___part_1) ).

fof(13,axiom,
    ! [X5,X9,X10] :
      ( ( p(X5)
        & p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X9,kp)),X10))
        & p(X9) )
     => p(crypt(xor(km,X9),xor(X10,X5))) ),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',key_part_import___part_3) ).

fof(15,axiom,
    p(crypt(xor(km,imp),rand)),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_8) ).

fof(16,axiom,
    ! [X1,X2] : xor(X1,X2) = xor(X2,X1),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',xor_commutative) ).

fof(18,conjecture,
    p(crypt(pp,a)),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',find_pin) ).

fof(20,axiom,
    p(crypt(xor(km,pin),pp)),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_6) ).

fof(21,axiom,
    ! [X1] : xor(X1,id) = X1,
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',xor_rules_1) ).

fof(23,axiom,
    ! [X1] : xor(X1,X1) = id,
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',xor_rules_2) ).

fof(24,axiom,
    p(exp),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_11) ).

fof(28,axiom,
    ! [X1,X2] :
      ( ( p(X2)
        & p(X1) )
     => p(crypt(X1,X2)) ),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',encrypt_knowledge) ).

fof(29,axiom,
    ! [X9,X5,X3] :
      ( ( p(crypt(xor(km,X9),X5))
        & p(X9)
        & p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X3)) )
     => p(crypt(xor(X3,X9),X5)) ),
    file('/tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1',key_export) ).

fof(30,negated_conjecture,
    ~ p(crypt(pp,a)),
    inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[18]) ).

fof(31,negated_conjecture,
    ~ p(crypt(pp,a)),
    inference(fof_simplification,[status(thm)],[30,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(34,plain,
    p(a),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[2]) ).

fof(44,plain,
    ! [X1,X2] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(X1,X2))
      | ~ p(X1)
      | p(X2) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[6]) ).

fof(45,plain,
    ! [X3,X4] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(X3,X4))
      | ~ p(X3)
      | p(X4) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[44]) ).

cnf(46,plain,
    ( p(X1)
    | ~ p(X2)
    | ~ p(crypt(X2,X1)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[45]) ).

cnf(50,plain,
    p(pin),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[10]) ).

fof(51,plain,
    ! [X8,X9] :
      ( ~ p(X8)
      | ~ p(X9)
      | p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X9)),X8)) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[11]) ).

fof(52,plain,
    ! [X10,X11] :
      ( ~ p(X10)
      | ~ p(X11)
      | p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X11)),X10)) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[51]) ).

cnf(53,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X1)),X2))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[52]) ).

fof(57,plain,
    ! [X5,X9,X10] :
      ( ~ p(X5)
      | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X9,kp)),X10))
      | ~ p(X9)
      | p(crypt(xor(km,X9),xor(X10,X5))) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[13]) ).

fof(58,plain,
    ! [X11,X12,X13] :
      ( ~ p(X11)
      | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X12,kp)),X13))
      | ~ p(X12)
      | p(crypt(xor(km,X12),xor(X13,X11))) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[57]) ).

cnf(59,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(km,X1),xor(X2,X3)))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X1,kp)),X2))
    | ~ p(X3) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[58]) ).

cnf(62,plain,
    p(crypt(xor(km,imp),rand)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[15]) ).

fof(63,plain,
    ! [X3,X4] : xor(X3,X4) = xor(X4,X3),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[16]) ).

cnf(64,plain,
    xor(X1,X2) = xor(X2,X1),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[63]) ).

cnf(66,negated_conjecture,
    ~ p(crypt(pp,a)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[31]) ).

cnf(68,plain,
    p(crypt(xor(km,pin),pp)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[20]) ).

fof(69,plain,
    ! [X2] : xor(X2,id) = X2,
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[21]) ).

cnf(70,plain,
    xor(X1,id) = X1,
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[69]) ).

fof(72,plain,
    ! [X2] : xor(X2,X2) = id,
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[23]) ).

cnf(73,plain,
    xor(X1,X1) = id,
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[72]) ).

cnf(74,plain,
    p(exp),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[24]) ).

fof(82,plain,
    ! [X1,X2] :
      ( ~ p(X2)
      | ~ p(X1)
      | p(crypt(X1,X2)) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[28]) ).

fof(83,plain,
    ! [X3,X4] :
      ( ~ p(X4)
      | ~ p(X3)
      | p(crypt(X3,X4)) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[82]) ).

cnf(84,plain,
    ( p(crypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X2) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[83]) ).

fof(85,plain,
    ! [X9,X5,X3] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X9),X5))
      | ~ p(X9)
      | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X3))
      | p(crypt(xor(X3,X9),X5)) ),
    inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[29]) ).

fof(86,plain,
    ! [X10,X11,X12] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X10),X11))
      | ~ p(X10)
      | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X12))
      | p(crypt(xor(X12,X10),X11)) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[85]) ).

cnf(87,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(X1,X2),X3))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X1))
    | ~ p(X2)
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X2),X3)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[86]) ).

cnf(88,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ p(a)
    | ~ p(pp) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[66,84,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(90,negated_conjecture,
    ( $false
    | ~ p(pp) ),
    inference(rw,[status(thm)],[88,34,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(91,negated_conjecture,
    ~ p(pp),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[90,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(100,plain,
    xor(id,X1) = X1,
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[70,64,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(129,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X1,kp)),X2))
    | ~ p(X2)
    | ~ p(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[53,64,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(649,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(km,X1),xor(X2,X3)))
    | ~ p(X3)
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(X2) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[59,129,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(6226,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(km,X1),id))
    | ~ p(X2)
    | ~ p(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[649,73,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(6331,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(km,X1),id))
    | ~ p(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[6226,62,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(6518,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(id,X1),X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X1),X2))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(exp) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[87,6331,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(6553,plain,
    ( p(crypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X1),X2))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(exp) ),
    inference(rw,[status(thm)],[6518,100,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(6554,plain,
    ( p(crypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X1),X2))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | $false ),
    inference(rw,[status(thm)],[6553,74,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(6555,plain,
    ( p(crypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X1),X2))
    | ~ p(X1) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[6554,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(7014,plain,
    ( p(crypt(pin,pp))
    | ~ p(pin) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[6555,68,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(7049,plain,
    ( p(crypt(pin,pp))
    | $false ),
    inference(rw,[status(thm)],[7014,50,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(7050,plain,
    p(crypt(pin,pp)),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[7049,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(7103,plain,
    ( p(pp)
    | ~ p(pin) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[46,7050,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(7105,plain,
    ( p(pp)
    | $false ),
    inference(rw,[status(thm)],[7103,50,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(7106,plain,
    p(pp),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[7105,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(7107,plain,
    $false,
    inference(sr,[status(thm)],[7106,91,theory(equality)]) ).

cnf(7108,plain,
    $false,
    7107,
    [proof] ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% % SZS status Started for /home/graph/tptp/TPTP/Problems/SWV/SWV235+1.p
% --creating new selector for []
% -running prover on /tmp/tmpxQCInf/sel_SWV235+1.p_1 with time limit 29
% -prover status Theorem
% Problem SWV235+1.p solved in phase 0.
% % SZS status Theorem for /home/graph/tptp/TPTP/Problems/SWV/SWV235+1.p
% % SZS status Ended for /home/graph/tptp/TPTP/Problems/SWV/SWV235+1.p
% Solved 1 out of 1.
% # Problem is unsatisfiable (or provable), constructing proof object
% # SZS status Theorem
% # SZS output start CNFRefutation.
% See solution above
% # SZS output end CNFRefutation
% 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------