↑ Up

CSE_E---1.7.THM-CRf.s

View TPTP
Problem
Process solution in
SystemOnTSTP
Download .tgz
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : CSE_E---1.7
% Problem  : SWV236+1 : TPTP v9.2.1. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lemma_parallel_prover %s --lemma-prover /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/cse --final-prover /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/eprover --proof-time %d --global-time-limit %d

% Computer : n009.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Tue May  5 05:21:08 PM UTC 2026

% Result   : Theorem 1.28s 1.74s
% Output   : CNFRefutation 1.28s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :    6
%            Number of leaves      :    9
% Syntax   : Number of formulae    :   33 (  15 unt;   0 def)
%            Number of atoms       :   62 (   6 equ)
%            Maximal formula atoms :    4 (   1 avg)
%            Number of connectives :   54 (  25   ~;  21   |;   5   &)
%                                         (   0 <=>;   3  =>;   0  <=;   0 <~>)
%            Maximal formula depth :    8 (   3 avg)
%            Maximal term depth    :    3 (   1 avg)
%            Number of predicates  :    3 (   1 usr;   1 prp; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of functors    :    8 (   8 usr;   5 con; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of variables   :   41 (   0 sgn  21   !;   2   ?)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(decrypt_data,axiom,
    ! [X1,X6] :
      ( ( p(X1)
        & p(crypt(xor(km,data),X6)) )
     => p(decrypt(X6,X1)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',decrypt_data) ).

fof(encryption_decryption_cancellation,axiom,
    ! [X1,X2] : decrypt(X1,crypt(X1,X2)) = X2,
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',encryption_decryption_cancellation) ).

fof(key_export,axiom,
    ! [X9,X6,X4] :
      ( ( p(crypt(xor(km,X9),X6))
        & p(X9)
        & p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X4)) )
     => p(crypt(xor(X4,X9),X6)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',key_export) ).

fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_7,axiom,
    p(crypt(xor(km,exp),eurk)),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_7) ).

fof(xor_rules_1,axiom,
    ! [X1] : xor(X1,id) = X1,
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',xor_rules_1) ).

fof(find_known_exporter,conjecture,
    ? [X12] :
      ( p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X12))
      & p(X12) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',find_known_exporter) ).

fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_8,axiom,
    p(crypt(xor(km,data),eurk)),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_8) ).

fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_4,axiom,
    p(id),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',initial_knowledge_of_intruder_4) ).

fof(data_cv_is_known_to_be_zero,axiom,
    ! [X1,X2] :
      ( p(crypt(xor(X1,data),X2))
     => p(crypt(X1,X2)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',data_cv_is_known_to_be_zero) ).

fof(c_0_9,plain,
    ! [X84,X85] :
      ( ~ p(X84)
      | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,data),X85))
      | p(decrypt(X85,X84)) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[decrypt_data])]) ).

fof(c_0_10,plain,
    ! [X62,X63] : decrypt(X62,crypt(X62,X63)) = X63,
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[encryption_decryption_cancellation]) ).

fof(c_0_11,plain,
    ! [X71,X72,X73] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X71),X72))
      | ~ p(X71)
      | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X73))
      | p(crypt(xor(X73,X71),X72)) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[key_export])]) ).

cnf(c_0_12,plain,
    ( p(decrypt(X2,X1))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,data),X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_9]) ).

cnf(c_0_13,plain,
    decrypt(X1,crypt(X1,X2)) = X2,
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_10]) ).

cnf(c_0_14,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(X3,X1),X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X1),X2))
    | ~ p(X1)
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X3)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_11]) ).

cnf(c_0_15,plain,
    p(crypt(xor(km,exp),eurk)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_7]) ).

fof(c_0_16,plain,
    ! [X64] : xor(X64,id) = X64,
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[xor_rules_1]) ).

fof(c_0_17,negated_conjecture,
    ~ ? [X12] :
        ( p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X12))
        & p(X12) ),
    inference(assume_negation,[status(cth)],[find_known_exporter]) ).

cnf(c_0_18,plain,
    ( p(X1)
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,data),X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(X2,X1)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_12,c_0_13]) ).

cnf(c_0_19,plain,
    p(crypt(xor(km,data),eurk)),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_8]) ).

cnf(c_0_20,plain,
    ( p(crypt(xor(eurk,X1),X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(km,X1),X2))
    | ~ p(X1) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_14,c_0_15]) ).

cnf(c_0_21,plain,
    xor(X1,id) = X1,
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_16]) ).

cnf(c_0_22,plain,
    p(id),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_4]) ).

fof(c_0_23,plain,
    ! [X98,X99] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(xor(X98,data),X99))
      | p(crypt(X98,X99)) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[data_cv_is_known_to_be_zero])]) ).

fof(c_0_24,negated_conjecture,
    ! [X100] :
      ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X100))
      | ~ p(X100) ),
    inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[c_0_17])]) ).

cnf(c_0_25,plain,
    ( p(X1)
    | ~ p(crypt(eurk,X1)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_18,c_0_19]) ).

cnf(c_0_26,plain,
    ( p(crypt(eurk,X1))
    | ~ p(crypt(km,X1)) ),
    inference(cn,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(rw,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_20,c_0_21]),c_0_21]),c_0_22])]) ).

cnf(c_0_27,plain,
    ( p(crypt(X1,X2))
    | ~ p(crypt(xor(X1,data),X2)) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_23]) ).

cnf(c_0_28,negated_conjecture,
    ( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X1))
    | ~ p(X1) ),
    inference(split_conjunct,[status(thm)],[c_0_24]) ).

cnf(c_0_29,plain,
    ( p(X1)
    | ~ p(crypt(km,X1)) ),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_25,c_0_26]) ).

cnf(c_0_30,plain,
    p(crypt(km,eurk)),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_27,c_0_19]) ).

cnf(c_0_31,negated_conjecture,
    ~ p(eurk),
    inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_28,c_0_15]) ).

cnf(c_0_32,plain,
    $false,
    inference(sr,[status(thm)],[inference(spm,[status(thm)],[c_0_29,c_0_30]),c_0_31]),
    [proof] ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.12  % Problem    : SWV236+1 : TPTP v9.2.1. Released v3.2.0.
% 0.00/0.12  % Command    : /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/lemma_parallel_prover %s --lemma-prover /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/cse --final-prover /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/eprover --proof-time %d --global-time-limit %d
% 0.15/0.33  % Computer : n009.cluster.edu
% 0.15/0.33  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.15/0.33  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.15/0.33  % Memory   : 8042.1875MB
% 0.15/0.33  % OS       : Linux 3.10.0-693.el7.x86_64
% 0.15/0.33  % CPULimit   : 300
% 0.15/0.33  % WCLimit    : 300
% 0.15/0.33  % DateTime   : Tue May  5 04:58:11 EDT 2026
% 0.15/0.34  % CPUTime    : 
% 0.15/0.35  % start to proof: theBenchmark
% 1.28/1.74  % Version  : CSE_E---1.7
% 1.28/1.74  % Problem  : theBenchmark.p
% 1.28/1.74  % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 1.28/1.74  % SZS output start CNFRefutation
% See solution above
% 1.28/1.74  % Total time : 1.372s
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------