%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : LisaST---0.9
% Problem : SWV236+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% Computer : n019.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Sep 27 09:01:42 AM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 19.99s 5.35s
% Output : CNFRefutation 19.99s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 18
% Number of leaves : 15
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 50 ( 21 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 124 ( 11 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 150 ( 76 ~; 59 |; 10 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 5 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 9 ( 3 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 5 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 3 ( 1 usr; 1 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 8 ( 8 usr; 5 con; 0-2 aty)
% Number of variables : 97 ( 8 sgn 24 !; 2 ?)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(xor_commutative,axiom,
! [X0,X1] : xor(X0,X1) = xor(X1,X0) ).
fof(xor_associative,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] : xor(X0,xor(X1,X2)) = xor(xor(X0,X1),X2) ).
fof(encryption_decryption_cancellation,axiom,
! [X0,X1] : decrypt(X0,crypt(X0,X1)) = X1 ).
fof(xor_rules_1,axiom,
! [X0] : xor(X0,id) = X0 ).
fof(xor_rules_2,axiom,
! [X0] : xor(X0,X0) = id ).
fof(key_import,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
( ( p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X4))
& p(X3)
& p(crypt(xor(X0,X1),X2)) )
=> p(crypt(xor(km,X3),decrypt(xor(X4,X3),crypt(xor(X0,X1),X2)))) ) ).
fof(key_part_import___part_1,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( p(X1)
& p(X0) )
=> p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X1)),X0)) ) ).
fof(key_part_import___part_2,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( p(X1)
& p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X1)),X2))
& p(X0) )
=> p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X1,kp)),xor(X0,X2))) ) ).
fof(key_part_import___part_3,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( p(X1)
& p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X1,kp)),X2))
& p(X0) )
=> p(crypt(xor(km,X1),xor(X2,X0))) ) ).
fof(encrypt_knowledge,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( p(X0)
& p(X1) )
=> p(crypt(X0,X1)) ) ).
fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_1,axiom,
p(kp) ).
fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_2,axiom,
p(imp) ).
fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_4,axiom,
p(id) ).
fof(initial_knowledge_of_intruder_9,axiom,
p(exp) ).
fof(find_known_exporter,conjecture,
? [X0] :
( p(X0)
& p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X0)) ) ).
fof(negated_conjecture,negated_conjecture,
~ ? [X0] :
( p(X0)
& p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X0)) ),
inference(negate_conjecture,[status(cth)],[find_known_exporter]) ).
cnf(c0,plain,
xor(X0,X1) = xor(X1,X0),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[xor_commutative]) ).
cnf(c1,plain,
xor(X0,xor(X1,X2)) = xor(xor(X0,X1),X2),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[xor_associative]) ).
cnf(c2,plain,
decrypt(X0,crypt(X0,X1)) = X1,
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[encryption_decryption_cancellation]) ).
cnf(c3,plain,
xor(X0,id) = X0,
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[xor_rules_1]) ).
cnf(c4,plain,
xor(X0,X0) = id,
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[xor_rules_2]) ).
cnf(c5,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,X3),decrypt(xor(X4,X3),crypt(xor(X0,X1),X2))))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X4))
| ~ p(X3)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(X0,X1),X2)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[key_import]) ).
cnf(c7,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X1)),X0))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[key_part_import___part_1]) ).
cnf(c8,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X1,kp)),xor(X0,X2)))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X1)),X2))
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[key_part_import___part_2]) ).
cnf(c9,plain,
( p(crypt(xor(km,X1),xor(X2,X0)))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(X1,kp)),X2))
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[key_part_import___part_3]) ).
cnf(c15,plain,
( p(crypt(X1,X0))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[encrypt_knowledge]) ).
cnf(c17,plain,
p(kp),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_1]) ).
cnf(c18,plain,
p(imp),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_2]) ).
cnf(c20,plain,
p(id),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_4]) ).
cnf(c25,plain,
p(exp),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[initial_knowledge_of_intruder_9]) ).
cnf(c27,plain,
( ~ p(X0)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,exp),X0)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[negated_conjecture]) ).
cnf(d0,plain,
( ~ p(decrypt(xor(X3,exp),crypt(xor(X0,X1),X2)))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X3))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(X0,X1),X2))
| ~ p(exp) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c5,c27]) ).
cnf(d1,plain,
( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X0))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(X1,X2),X3))
| ~ p(decrypt(xor(X0,exp),crypt(xor(X1,X2),X3))) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c25,d0]) ).
cnf(d2,plain,
( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X1))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(X0,id),X2))
| ~ p(decrypt(xor(X1,exp),crypt(X0,X2))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c3,d1]) ).
cnf(d3,plain,
( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X1))
| ~ p(crypt(X0,X2))
| ~ p(decrypt(xor(X1,exp),crypt(X0,X2))) ),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d2,c3]) ).
cnf(d4,plain,
( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X0))
| ~ p(crypt(X1,X2))
| ~ p(decrypt(xor(exp,X0),crypt(X1,X2))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c0,d3]) ).
cnf(d5,plain,
( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),X0))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(exp,X0),X1))
| ~ p(X1) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c2,d4]) ).
cnf(d6,plain,
xor(X0,xor(X1,xor(X0,X1))) = id,
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c4,c1]) ).
cnf(d7,plain,
( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,imp),xor(X0,xor(exp,X0))))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(crypt(id,X1)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d6,d5]) ).
cnf(d8,plain,
( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X1)),X3))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X2)
| p(crypt(xor(km,X1),xor(xor(X2,X3),X0)))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c9,c8]) ).
cnf(d9,plain,
( ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,X3)),X1))
| p(crypt(xor(km,X3),xor(X0,xor(X1,X2))))
| ~ p(X2)
| ~ p(X3)
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d8,c1]) ).
cnf(d10,plain,
( ~ p(crypt(id,X1))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,imp)),exp))
| ~ p(X0)
| ~ p(imp)
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d9,d7]) ).
cnf(d11,plain,
( ~ p(crypt(id,X0))
| ~ p(crypt(xor(km,xor(kp,imp)),exp))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c18,d10]) ).
cnf(d12,plain,
( ~ p(imp)
| ~ p(exp)
| ~ p(crypt(id,X1))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d11,c7]) ).
cnf(d13,plain,
( ~ p(exp)
| ~ p(crypt(id,X0))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c18,d12]) ).
cnf(d14,plain,
( ~ p(crypt(id,X1))
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c25,d13]) ).
cnf(d15,plain,
( ~ p(X0)
| ~ p(id)
| ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d14,c15]) ).
cnf(d16,plain,
( ~ p(X1)
| ~ p(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c20,d15]) ).
cnf(d17,plain,
~ p(X0),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d16,c20]) ).
cnf(d18,plain,
$false,
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d17,c17]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.05 % Problem : SWV236+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v3.2.0.
% 0.00/0.06 % Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.18/0.43 % Computer : n019.cluster.edu
% 0.18/0.43 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.18/0.43 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.18/0.43 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.18/0.43 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.18/0.43 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.18/0.43 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.18/0.43 % DateTime : Sat Sep 26 13:21:18 UTC 2026
% 0.18/0.44 % CPUTime :
% 0.18/0.44 Running casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 19.99/5.35 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 19.99/5.35 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------