%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : ConnectPP---0.7.2
% Problem : SWV237+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v3.2.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/connect++ --verbosity 1 --no-colour --tptp-proof --schedule default --timeout 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Thu Sep 24 09:03:02 AM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 16.77s 22.07s
% Output : Proof 16.93s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : ERROR: Analysing output (MakeTreeStats fails)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(enc_dec_cancel,axiom,
! [U,V] : enc(i(U),enc(U,V)) = V,
file('theBenchmark.p',enc_dec_cancel) ).
fof(dec_enc_cancel,axiom,
! [U,V] : enc(U,enc(i(U),V)) = V,
file('theBenchmark.p',dec_enc_cancel) ).
fof(double_inverse_cancel,axiom,
! [U] : i(i(U)) = U,
file('theBenchmark.p',double_inverse_cancel) ).
fof(keys_are_symmetric,axiom,
! [U] :
( p(U)
=> p(i(U)) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',keys_are_symmetric) ).
fof(key_translate_from_ZCMK_to_TMK,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(tmk,enc(i(enc(i(zcmk),V)),U))) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',key_translate_from_ZCMK_to_TMK) ).
fof(key_translate_from_TMK_to_ZCMK,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(i(enc(i(zcmk),V)),enc(i(tmk),U))) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',key_translate_from_TMK_to_ZCMK) ).
fof(receive_working_key_from_switch,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(wk,enc(i(tmk),U))) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',receive_working_key_from_switch) ).
fof(encrypt_a_PIN_derivation_key_under_a_TMK,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(enc(i(tmk),V),enc(i(tmk),U))) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',encrypt_a_PIN_derivation_key_under_a_TMK) ).
fof(encrypt_a_stored_comms_key,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(enc(i(tmk),V),enc(i(tc),U))) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',encrypt_a_stored_comms_key) ).
fof(encrypt_clear_key_as_Tcomms_key,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(tc,U)) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',encrypt_clear_key_as_Tcomms_key) ).
fof(data_encrypt,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(enc(i(tc),U),V)) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',data_encrypt) ).
fof(data_decrypt,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(i(enc(i(tc),U)),V)) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',data_decrypt) ).
fof(data_translate_PIN_from_local_to_interchange_key,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(enc(i(wk),W),enc(i(enc(i(tmk),V)),U))) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',data_translate_PIN_from_local_to_interchange_key) ).
fof(data_translate_between_interchange_keys,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(enc(i(wk),W),enc(i(enc(i(wk),V)),U))) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',data_translate_between_interchange_keys) ).
fof(data_translate_PIN_from_local_storage_to_interchange_key,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(enc(i(wk),V),enc(i(lp),U))) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',data_translate_PIN_from_local_storage_to_interchange_key) ).
fof(attacker_can_encrypt,axiom,
! [U,V,W] :
( ( p(W)
& p(V)
& p(U) )
=> p(enc(U,V)) ),
file('theBenchmark.p',attacker_can_encrypt) ).
fof(intruder_knows_1,axiom,
p(enc(tmk,pp)),
file('theBenchmark.p',intruder_knows_1) ).
fof(intruder_knows_2,axiom,
p(enc(wk,w)),
file('theBenchmark.p',intruder_knows_2) ).
fof(intruder_knows_3,axiom,
p(enc(w,t1)),
file('theBenchmark.p',intruder_knows_3) ).
fof(intruder_knows_4,axiom,
p(enc(lp,t2)),
file('theBenchmark.p',intruder_knows_4) ).
fof(intruder_knows_5,axiom,
p(enc(tc,k)),
file('theBenchmark.p',intruder_knows_5) ).
fof(intruder_knows_6,axiom,
p(kk),
file('theBenchmark.p',intruder_knows_6) ).
fof(intruder_knows_7,axiom,
p(i(kk)),
file('theBenchmark.p',intruder_knows_7) ).
fof(intruder_knows_8,axiom,
p(a),
file('theBenchmark.p',intruder_knows_8) ).
fof(co1,conjecture,
p(enc(pp,a)),
file('theBenchmark.p',co1) ).
fof(f_1_1,plain,
! [U,V] : enc(i(U),enc(U,V)) = V,
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[enc_dec_cancel]) ).
fof(f_1_2,plain,
! [U_1,U_0] : enc(i(U_1),enc(U_1,U_0)) = U_0,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_1_1]) ).
cnf(f_1_3,plain,
enc(i(U_1),enc(U_1,U_0)) = U_0,
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_1_2]) ).
fof(f_2_1,plain,
! [U,V] : enc(U,enc(i(U),V)) = V,
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[dec_enc_cancel]) ).
fof(f_2_2,plain,
! [U_3,U_2] : enc(U_3,enc(i(U_3),U_2)) = U_2,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_2_1]) ).
cnf(f_2_3,plain,
enc(U_3,enc(i(U_3),U_2)) = U_2,
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_2_2]) ).
fof(f_3_1,plain,
! [U] : i(i(U)) = U,
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[double_inverse_cancel]) ).
fof(f_3_2,plain,
! [U_4] : i(i(U_4)) = U_4,
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_3_1]) ).
cnf(f_3_3,plain,
i(i(U_4)) = U_4,
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_3_2]) ).
fof(f_4_1,plain,
! [U] :
( p(i(U))
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[keys_are_symmetric]) ).
fof(f_4_2,plain,
! [U_5] :
( p(i(U_5))
| ~ p(U_5) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_4_1]) ).
cnf(f_4_3,plain,
( p(i(U_5))
| ~ p(U_5) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_4_2]) ).
fof(f_5_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(tmk,enc(i(enc(i(zcmk),V)),U)))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[key_translate_from_ZCMK_to_TMK]) ).
fof(f_5_2,plain,
! [U_8,U_7,U_6] :
( p(enc(tmk,enc(i(enc(i(zcmk),U_7)),U_8)))
| ~ p(U_6)
| ~ p(U_7)
| ~ p(U_8) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_5_1]) ).
fof(f_5_3,plain,
! [U_8,U_7] :
( ! [U_6] : ~ p(U_6)
| ~ p(U_7)
| ~ p(U_8)
| p(enc(tmk,enc(i(enc(i(zcmk),U_7)),U_8))) ),
inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_5_2]) ).
cnf(f_5_4,plain,
( ~ p(U_6)
| ~ p(U_7)
| ~ p(U_8)
| p(enc(tmk,enc(i(enc(i(zcmk),U_7)),U_8))) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_5_3]) ).
fof(f_6_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(i(enc(i(zcmk),V)),enc(i(tmk),U)))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[key_translate_from_TMK_to_ZCMK]) ).
fof(f_6_2,plain,
! [U_11,U_10,U_9] :
( p(enc(i(enc(i(zcmk),U_10)),enc(i(tmk),U_11)))
| ~ p(U_9)
| ~ p(U_10)
| ~ p(U_11) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_6_1]) ).
fof(f_6_3,plain,
! [U_11,U_10] :
( ! [U_9] : ~ p(U_9)
| ~ p(U_10)
| ~ p(U_11)
| p(enc(i(enc(i(zcmk),U_10)),enc(i(tmk),U_11))) ),
inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_6_2]) ).
cnf(f_6_4,plain,
( ~ p(U_9)
| ~ p(U_10)
| ~ p(U_11)
| p(enc(i(enc(i(zcmk),U_10)),enc(i(tmk),U_11))) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_6_3]) ).
fof(f_7_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(wk,enc(i(tmk),U)))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[receive_working_key_from_switch]) ).
fof(f_7_2,plain,
! [U_14,U_13,U_12] :
( p(enc(wk,enc(i(tmk),U_14)))
| ~ p(U_12)
| ~ p(U_13)
| ~ p(U_14) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_7_1]) ).
fof(f_7_3,plain,
! [U_14] :
( ! [U_13] : ~ p(U_13)
| ! [U_12] : ~ p(U_12)
| ~ p(U_14)
| p(enc(wk,enc(i(tmk),U_14))) ),
inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_7_2]) ).
cnf(f_7_4,plain,
( ~ p(U_13)
| ~ p(U_12)
| ~ p(U_14)
| p(enc(wk,enc(i(tmk),U_14))) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_7_3]) ).
fof(f_8_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(enc(i(tmk),V),enc(i(tmk),U)))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[encrypt_a_PIN_derivation_key_under_a_TMK]) ).
fof(f_8_2,plain,
! [U_17,U_16,U_15] :
( p(enc(enc(i(tmk),U_16),enc(i(tmk),U_17)))
| ~ p(U_15)
| ~ p(U_16)
| ~ p(U_17) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_8_1]) ).
fof(f_8_3,plain,
! [U_17,U_16] :
( ! [U_15] : ~ p(U_15)
| ~ p(U_16)
| ~ p(U_17)
| p(enc(enc(i(tmk),U_16),enc(i(tmk),U_17))) ),
inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_8_2]) ).
cnf(f_8_4,plain,
( ~ p(U_15)
| ~ p(U_16)
| ~ p(U_17)
| p(enc(enc(i(tmk),U_16),enc(i(tmk),U_17))) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_8_3]) ).
fof(f_9_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(enc(i(tmk),V),enc(i(tc),U)))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[encrypt_a_stored_comms_key]) ).
fof(f_9_2,plain,
! [U_20,U_19,U_18] :
( p(enc(enc(i(tmk),U_19),enc(i(tc),U_20)))
| ~ p(U_18)
| ~ p(U_19)
| ~ p(U_20) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_9_1]) ).
fof(f_9_3,plain,
! [U_20,U_19] :
( ! [U_18] : ~ p(U_18)
| ~ p(U_19)
| ~ p(U_20)
| p(enc(enc(i(tmk),U_19),enc(i(tc),U_20))) ),
inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_9_2]) ).
cnf(f_9_4,plain,
( ~ p(U_18)
| ~ p(U_19)
| ~ p(U_20)
| p(enc(enc(i(tmk),U_19),enc(i(tc),U_20))) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_9_3]) ).
fof(f_10_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(tc,U))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[encrypt_clear_key_as_Tcomms_key]) ).
fof(f_10_2,plain,
! [U_23,U_22,U_21] :
( p(enc(tc,U_23))
| ~ p(U_21)
| ~ p(U_22)
| ~ p(U_23) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_10_1]) ).
fof(f_10_3,plain,
! [U_23] :
( ! [U_22] : ~ p(U_22)
| ! [U_21] : ~ p(U_21)
| ~ p(U_23)
| p(enc(tc,U_23)) ),
inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_10_2]) ).
cnf(f_10_4,plain,
( ~ p(U_22)
| ~ p(U_21)
| ~ p(U_23)
| p(enc(tc,U_23)) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_10_3]) ).
fof(f_11_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(enc(i(tc),U),V))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[data_encrypt]) ).
fof(f_11_2,plain,
! [U_26,U_25,U_24] :
( p(enc(enc(i(tc),U_26),U_25))
| ~ p(U_24)
| ~ p(U_25)
| ~ p(U_26) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_11_1]) ).
fof(f_11_3,plain,
! [U_26,U_25] :
( ! [U_24] : ~ p(U_24)
| ~ p(U_25)
| ~ p(U_26)
| p(enc(enc(i(tc),U_26),U_25)) ),
inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_11_2]) ).
cnf(f_11_4,plain,
( ~ p(U_24)
| ~ p(U_25)
| ~ p(U_26)
| p(enc(enc(i(tc),U_26),U_25)) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_11_3]) ).
fof(f_12_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(i(enc(i(tc),U)),V))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[data_decrypt]) ).
fof(f_12_2,plain,
! [U_29,U_28,U_27] :
( p(enc(i(enc(i(tc),U_29)),U_28))
| ~ p(U_27)
| ~ p(U_28)
| ~ p(U_29) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_12_1]) ).
fof(f_12_3,plain,
! [U_29,U_28] :
( ! [U_27] : ~ p(U_27)
| ~ p(U_28)
| ~ p(U_29)
| p(enc(i(enc(i(tc),U_29)),U_28)) ),
inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_12_2]) ).
cnf(f_12_4,plain,
( ~ p(U_27)
| ~ p(U_28)
| ~ p(U_29)
| p(enc(i(enc(i(tc),U_29)),U_28)) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_12_3]) ).
fof(f_13_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(enc(i(wk),W),enc(i(enc(i(tmk),V)),U)))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[data_translate_PIN_from_local_to_interchange_key]) ).
fof(f_13_2,plain,
! [U_32,U_31,U_30] :
( p(enc(enc(i(wk),U_30),enc(i(enc(i(tmk),U_31)),U_32)))
| ~ p(U_30)
| ~ p(U_31)
| ~ p(U_32) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_13_1]) ).
cnf(f_13_3,plain,
( p(enc(enc(i(wk),U_30),enc(i(enc(i(tmk),U_31)),U_32)))
| ~ p(U_30)
| ~ p(U_31)
| ~ p(U_32) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_13_2]) ).
fof(f_14_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(enc(i(wk),W),enc(i(enc(i(wk),V)),U)))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[data_translate_between_interchange_keys]) ).
fof(f_14_2,plain,
! [U_35,U_34,U_33] :
( p(enc(enc(i(wk),U_33),enc(i(enc(i(wk),U_34)),U_35)))
| ~ p(U_33)
| ~ p(U_34)
| ~ p(U_35) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_14_1]) ).
cnf(f_14_3,plain,
( p(enc(enc(i(wk),U_33),enc(i(enc(i(wk),U_34)),U_35)))
| ~ p(U_33)
| ~ p(U_34)
| ~ p(U_35) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_14_2]) ).
fof(f_15_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(enc(i(wk),V),enc(i(lp),U)))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[data_translate_PIN_from_local_storage_to_interchange_key]) ).
fof(f_15_2,plain,
! [U_38,U_37,U_36] :
( p(enc(enc(i(wk),U_37),enc(i(lp),U_38)))
| ~ p(U_36)
| ~ p(U_37)
| ~ p(U_38) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_15_1]) ).
fof(f_15_3,plain,
! [U_38,U_37] :
( ! [U_36] : ~ p(U_36)
| ~ p(U_37)
| ~ p(U_38)
| p(enc(enc(i(wk),U_37),enc(i(lp),U_38))) ),
inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_15_2]) ).
cnf(f_15_4,plain,
( ~ p(U_36)
| ~ p(U_37)
| ~ p(U_38)
| p(enc(enc(i(wk),U_37),enc(i(lp),U_38))) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_15_3]) ).
fof(f_16_1,plain,
! [U,V,W] :
( p(enc(U,V))
| ~ p(W)
| ~ p(V)
| ~ p(U) ),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[attacker_can_encrypt]) ).
fof(f_16_2,plain,
! [U_41,U_40,U_39] :
( p(enc(U_41,U_40))
| ~ p(U_39)
| ~ p(U_40)
| ~ p(U_41) ),
inference(variable_rename,[status(thm)],[f_16_1]) ).
fof(f_16_3,plain,
! [U_41,U_40] :
( ! [U_39] : ~ p(U_39)
| ~ p(U_40)
| ~ p(U_41)
| p(enc(U_41,U_40)) ),
inference(miniscope,[status(thm)],[f_16_2]) ).
cnf(f_16_4,plain,
( ~ p(U_39)
| ~ p(U_40)
| ~ p(U_41)
| p(enc(U_41,U_40)) ),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_16_3]) ).
fof(f_17_1,plain,
p(enc(tmk,pp)),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_knows_1]) ).
cnf(f_17_2,plain,
p(enc(tmk,pp)),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_17_1]) ).
fof(f_18_1,plain,
p(enc(wk,w)),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_knows_2]) ).
cnf(f_18_2,plain,
p(enc(wk,w)),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_18_1]) ).
fof(f_19_1,plain,
p(enc(w,t1)),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_knows_3]) ).
cnf(f_19_2,plain,
p(enc(w,t1)),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_19_1]) ).
fof(f_20_1,plain,
p(enc(lp,t2)),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_knows_4]) ).
cnf(f_20_2,plain,
p(enc(lp,t2)),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_20_1]) ).
fof(f_21_1,plain,
p(enc(tc,k)),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_knows_5]) ).
cnf(f_21_2,plain,
p(enc(tc,k)),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_21_1]) ).
fof(f_22_1,plain,
p(kk),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_knows_6]) ).
cnf(f_22_2,plain,
p(kk),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_22_1]) ).
fof(f_23_1,plain,
p(i(kk)),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_knows_7]) ).
cnf(f_23_2,plain,
p(i(kk)),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_23_1]) ).
fof(f_24_1,plain,
p(a),
inference(fof_nnf,[status(thm)],[intruder_knows_8]) ).
cnf(f_24_2,plain,
p(a),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_24_1]) ).
fof(f_25_1,negated_conjecture,
~ p(enc(pp,a)),
inference(negate,[status(cth)],[co1]) ).
fof(f_25_2,negated_conjecture,
~ p(enc(pp,a)),
inference(definitional_conversion,[status(esa)],[f_25_1]) ).
cnf(f_25_3,negated_conjecture,
~ p(enc(pp,a)),
inference(clausify,[status(thm)],[f_25_2]) ).
cnf(equality_1,axiom,
Eq_x_0 = Eq_x_0,
theory(equality,[reflexivity]) ).
cnf(equality_2,axiom,
( Eq_x_1 = Eq_x_0
| Eq_x_0 != Eq_x_1 ),
theory(equality,[symmetry]) ).
cnf(equality_3,axiom,
( Eq_x_0 = Eq_x_2
| Eq_x_1 != Eq_x_2
| Eq_x_0 != Eq_x_1 ),
theory(equality,[transitivity]) ).
cnf(equality_4,axiom,
( i(Eq_x_0) = i(Eq_y_0)
| Eq_x_0 != Eq_y_0 ),
theory(equality,[substitution_functions]) ).
cnf(equality_5,axiom,
( enc(Eq_x_0,Eq_x_1) = enc(Eq_y_0,Eq_y_1)
| Eq_x_1 != Eq_y_1
| Eq_x_0 != Eq_y_0 ),
theory(equality,[substitution_functions]) ).
cnf(equality_6,axiom,
( p(Eq_y_0)
| ~ p(Eq_x_0)
| Eq_x_0 != Eq_y_0 ),
theory(equality,[substitution_predicates]) ).
cnf(sat_proved,plain,
$false,
inference(cadical,[status(thm)],[]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03 % Problem : SWV237+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v3.2.0.
% 0.00/0.03 This is a FOF_THM_RFO_SEQ problem
% 0.00/0.04 % Command : /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/connect++ --verbosity 1 --no-colour --tptp-proof --schedule default --timeout 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.07/5.37 % Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% 0.07/5.37 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.07/5.37 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.07/5.37 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.07/5.37 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.07/5.37 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.07/5.37 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.07/5.37 % DateTime : Sun Sep 20 03:15:44 UTC 2026
% 0.07/5.38 % CPUTime :
% 16.77/22.07 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark
% 16.77/22.07 % SZS output start Proof for theBenchmark
% See solution above
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------