%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : LisaST---0.9
% Problem : SWV749-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v4.1.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% Computer : n015.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Sep 27 09:04:39 AM UTC 2026
% Result : Unsatisfiable 165.00s 42.81s
% Output : CNFRefutation 165.00s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 18
% Number of leaves : 21
% Syntax : Number of clauses : 84 ( 46 unt; 14 nHn; 62 RR)
% Number of literals : 130 ( 47 equ; 48 neg)
% Maximal clause size : 3 ( 1 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 10 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 3 ( 1 usr; 1 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 35 ( 35 usr; 18 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 142 ( 69 sgn)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(cls_singletonE_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X2))
| X0 = X1 ) ).
cnf(cls_bot1E_0,axiom,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X0,'tc$ubool')),X1)) ).
cnf(cls_insert__commute_0,axiom,
'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X2,X3),X3) = 'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3) ).
cnf(cls_keymode_Oinduct_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(cls_insert__code_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X2,X0,X3),X1))
| X2 = X1
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(cls_insert__code_1,axiom,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X0)) ).
cnf(cls_Nonce__supply1_0,axiom,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_analz__conj__parts_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_usedI_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy',X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_Crypt__notin__initState_0,axiom,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_parts_OInj_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_shrK__in__initState_0,axiom,
hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_NS3__msg__in__parts__spies_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'(X2,X3,'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X4,'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(X5,'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(X6,'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(X7,X0))))),'c$uList$uOset'(X1,'tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy',X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_msg_Osimps_I31_J_0,axiom,
hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X0) != 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1) ).
cnf(cls_msg_Osimps_I30_J_0,axiom,
'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) != hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X1) ).
cnf(cls_mem__def_1,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ) ).
cnf(cls_mem__def_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X1,X0,X2))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(cls_conjecture_4,negated_conjecture,
hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'('v$uS','v$uAa','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uKa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uKa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uAa')))))))),'c$uList$uOset'('v$uevs3','tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent')) ).
cnf(cls_conjecture_7,negated_conjecture,
'v$uX' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uKa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uAa'))) ).
cnf(cls_conjecture_10,negated_conjecture,
hBOOL('c$uin'('v$uBa','c$uEvent$uObad','tc$uMessage$uOagent')) ).
cnf(cls_conjecture_11,negated_conjecture,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('v$uBa','c$uEvent$uObad','tc$uMessage$uOagent'))
| 'v$uK' = 'v$uKa' ) ).
cnf(c24,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X2))
| X0 = X1 ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_singletonE_0]) ).
cnf(c38,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X0,'tc$ubool')),X1)),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_bot1E_0]) ).
cnf(c90,plain,
'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X2,X3),X3) = 'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__commute_0]) ).
cnf(c111,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_keymode_Oinduct_0]) ).
cnf(c132,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X2,X0,X3),X1))
| X2 = X1
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_0]) ).
cnf(c183,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X0)),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_1]) ).
cnf(c426,plain,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Nonce__supply1_0]) ).
cnf(c468,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_analz__conj__parts_0]) ).
cnf(c484,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy',X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_usedI_0]) ).
cnf(c502,plain,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Crypt__notin__initState_0]) ).
cnf(c506,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_parts_OInj_0]) ).
cnf(c553,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_shrK__in__initState_0]) ).
cnf(c578,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'(X2,X3,'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X4,'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(X5,'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(X6,'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(X7,X0))))),'c$uList$uOset'(X1,'tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy',X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_NS3__msg__in__parts__spies_0]) ).
cnf(c593,plain,
hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X0) != 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_msg_Osimps_I31_J_0]) ).
cnf(c603,plain,
'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) != hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X1),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_msg_Osimps_I30_J_0]) ).
cnf(c629,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_mem__def_1]) ).
cnf(c630,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X1,X0,X2))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_mem__def_0]) ).
cnf(c654,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'('v$uS','v$uAa','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uKa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uKa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uAa')))))))),'c$uList$uOset'('v$uevs3','tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_4]) ).
cnf(c657,plain,
'v$uX' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uKa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uAa'))),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_7]) ).
cnf(c660,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'('v$uBa','c$uEvent$uObad','tc$uMessage$uOagent')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_10]) ).
cnf(c661,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('v$uBa','c$uEvent$uObad','tc$uMessage$uOagent'))
| 'v$uK' = 'v$uKa' ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_11]) ).
cnf(d0,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c629,c426]) ).
cnf(d1,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c553,c630]) ).
cnf(d2,plain,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c506,c502]) ).
cnf(d3,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X1,X2))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d2,c629]) ).
cnf(d4,plain,
'v$uK' = 'v$uKa',
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c660,c661]) ).
cnf(d5,plain,
'v$uX' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uAa'))),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c657,d4]) ).
cnf(d6,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'v$uX')),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d5,d3]) ).
cnf(d7,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c468,c629]) ).
cnf(d8,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0)),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X1,X2))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d7,c502]) ).
cnf(d9,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0)),'v$uX')),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d5,d8]) ).
cnf(d10,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3),X0)),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c90,c183]) ).
cnf(d11,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X1,X2),X2),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X1,X2),X2),X3)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c111,d10]) ).
cnf(d12,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption','c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),X1),X2)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d11,c183]) ).
cnf(d13,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X1,X2),X0))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d12,c132]) ).
cnf(d14,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d13,c132]) ).
cnf(d15,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uX'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX' ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d14,d9]) ).
cnf(d16,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX'
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d15,d6]) ).
cnf(d17,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d14,c38]) ).
cnf(d18,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX'
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d17,d16]) ).
cnf(d19,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d18,d1]) ).
cnf(d20,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d19,c593]) ).
cnf(d21,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'('v$uS','v$uAa','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uKa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uAa')))))))),'c$uList$uOset'('v$uevs3','tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c654,d4]) ).
cnf(d22,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'('v$uS','v$uAa','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uAa')))))))),'c$uList$uOset'('v$uevs3','tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d21,d4]) ).
cnf(d23,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'('v$uS','v$uAa','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK'),'v$uX'))))),'c$uList$uOset'('v$uevs3','tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d22,d5]) ).
cnf(d24,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'('v$uX','c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs3')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d23,c578]) ).
cnf(d25,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'('v$uX','c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs3'),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d24,c484]) ).
cnf(d26,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs3'),'v$uX')),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d25,c630]) ).
cnf(d27,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX'
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs3'),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d15,d26]) ).
cnf(d28,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX'
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs3'),X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d17,d27]) ).
cnf(d29,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'('v$uevs3')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d28,d0]) ).
cnf(d30,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d29,d20]) ).
cnf(d31,plain,
'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX',
inference(equality_resolution,[status(thm)],[d30]) ).
cnf(d32,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs3'),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d26,d31]) ).
cnf(d33,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X0))
| X0 = X1 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c24,c629]) ).
cnf(d34,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d13,d33]) ).
cnf(d35,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs3'),X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d34,d32]) ).
cnf(d36,plain,
'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'('v$uevs3')) = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d35,d0]) ).
cnf(d37,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d6,d31]) ).
cnf(d38,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d34,d37]) ).
cnf(d39,plain,
hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)) = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d38,d1]) ).
cnf(d40,plain,
'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1) != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d39,c603]) ).
cnf(d41,plain,
$false,
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d40,d36]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03 % Problem : SWV749-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v4.1.0.
% 0.00/0.04 % Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.09/0.36 % Computer : n015.cluster.edu
% 0.09/0.36 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.09/0.36 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.09/0.36 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.09/0.36 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.09/0.36 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.09/0.36 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.09/0.36 % DateTime : Sat Sep 26 14:57:14 UTC 2026
% 0.09/0.37 % CPUTime :
% 0.09/0.37 Running casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 165.00/42.81 % SZS status Unsatisfiable for theBenchmark.p
% 165.00/42.81 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------