%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : LisaST---0.9
% Problem : SWV754-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v4.1.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% Computer : n008.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Sep 27 09:04:39 AM UTC 2026
% Result : Unsatisfiable 4.98s 27.82s
% Output : CNFRefutation 4.98s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 16
% Number of leaves : 24
% Syntax : Number of clauses : 99 ( 38 unt; 23 nHn; 41 RR)
% Number of literals : 175 ( 58 equ; 70 neg)
% Maximal clause size : 3 ( 1 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 4 ( 2 usr; 1 prp; 0-3 aty)
% Number of functors : 26 ( 26 usr; 10 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 225 ( 109 sgn)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(cls_used__Notes_0,axiom,
'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X0,X1),X2,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')) = 'c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X2),'tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')) ).
cnf(cls_singletonE_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X2))
| X0 = X1 ) ).
cnf(cls_bot1E_0,axiom,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X0,'tc$ubool')),X1)) ).
cnf(cls_insert__commute_0,axiom,
'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X2,X3),X3) = 'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3) ).
cnf(cls_keymode_Osimps_I1_J_0,axiom,
'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ).
cnf(cls_keymode_Oinduct_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(cls_insert__code_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X2,X0,X3),X1))
| X2 = X1
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(cls_sup1CI_1,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X3))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'(X0,X1,'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X3)) ) ).
cnf(cls_insert__code_1,axiom,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X0)) ).
cnf(cls_insert__code_2,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X3))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X3)) ) ).
cnf(cls_insert__iff_1,axiom,
hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X2)) ).
cnf(cls_predicate1D_0,axiom,
( ~ 'c$ulessequals'(X2,X0,'tc$ufun'(X3,'tc$ubool'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X2,X1))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(cls_initState__subset__knows_0,axiom,
'c$ulessequals'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uEvent$uOknows'(X0,X1),'tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')) ).
cnf(cls_Nonce__supply1_0,axiom,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_Crypt__notin__initState_0,axiom,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_Nonce__notin__initState_0,axiom,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_shrK__in__initState_0,axiom,
hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_parts_OInj_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_analz_OInj_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_msg_Osimps_I43_J_0,axiom,
'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1) != hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X2) ).
cnf(cls_mem__def_1,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ) ).
cnf(cls_mem__def_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X1,X0,X2))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(cls_not__parts__not__analz_0,axiom,
( hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_conjecture_1,negated_conjecture,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK'),'c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(c1,plain,
'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X0,X1),X2,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')) = 'c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X2),'tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_used__Notes_0]) ).
cnf(c24,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X2))
| X0 = X1 ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_singletonE_0]) ).
cnf(c38,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X0,'tc$ubool')),X1)),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_bot1E_0]) ).
cnf(c94,plain,
'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X2,X3),X3) = 'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__commute_0]) ).
cnf(c96,plain,
'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_keymode_Osimps_I1_J_0]) ).
cnf(c113,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_keymode_Oinduct_0]) ).
cnf(c133,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X2,X0,X3),X1))
| X2 = X1
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_0]) ).
cnf(c145,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X3))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'(X0,X1,'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X3)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_sup1CI_1]) ).
cnf(c183,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X0)),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_1]) ).
cnf(c190,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X3))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X3)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_2]) ).
cnf(c242,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X2)),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__iff_1]) ).
cnf(c308,plain,
( ~ 'c$ulessequals'(X2,X0,'tc$ufun'(X3,'tc$ubool'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X2,X1))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_predicate1D_0]) ).
cnf(c382,plain,
'c$ulessequals'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uEvent$uOknows'(X0,X1),'tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_initState__subset__knows_0]) ).
cnf(c429,plain,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Nonce__supply1_0]) ).
cnf(c455,plain,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Crypt__notin__initState_0]) ).
cnf(c553,plain,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Nonce__notin__initState_0]) ).
cnf(c555,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_shrK__in__initState_0]) ).
cnf(c601,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_parts_OInj_0]) ).
cnf(c602,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_analz_OInj_0]) ).
cnf(c606,plain,
'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1) != hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X2),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_msg_Osimps_I43_J_0]) ).
cnf(c633,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_mem__def_1]) ).
cnf(c634,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X1,X0,X2))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_mem__def_0]) ).
cnf(c650,plain,
( hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_not__parts__not__analz_0]) ).
cnf(c654,plain,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK'),'c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_1]) ).
cnf(d0,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c633,c429]) ).
cnf(d1,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c650,c633]) ).
cnf(d2,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0)),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d1,c553]) ).
cnf(d3,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
| ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c602,c634]) ).
cnf(d4,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X0),X1)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d3,c633]) ).
cnf(d5,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),X2)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c113,c183]) ).
cnf(d6,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),X2)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d5,c190]) ).
cnf(d7,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X1
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d6,c133]) ).
cnf(d8,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d7,d4]) ).
cnf(d9,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,d2]) ).
cnf(d10,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c555,c634]) ).
cnf(d11,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X3)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c113,c190]) ).
cnf(d12,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',X0,X1),X2))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d11,c183]) ).
cnf(d13,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X1
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d12,c133]) ).
cnf(d14,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d13,d4]) ).
cnf(d15,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d14,d2]) ).
cnf(d16,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3),X0)),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c94,c183]) ).
cnf(d17,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature','c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',X0,X1),X1),X2)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d5,d16]) ).
cnf(d18,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption','c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),X1),X2)),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d17,c94]) ).
cnf(d19,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X1,X2),X0))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d18,c133]) ).
cnf(d20,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d19,c133]) ).
cnf(d21,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d20,c38]) ).
cnf(d22,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X2)
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d21,d15]) ).
cnf(d23,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d22,d10]) ).
cnf(d24,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d23,d10]) ).
cnf(d25,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d24,d9]) ).
cnf(d26,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d25,d0]) ).
cnf(d27,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),X0))
| ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c601,c634]) ).
cnf(d28,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),X0)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d27,c242]) ).
cnf(d29,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),X3))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X2,X0),X1,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),X3)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c1,c145]) ).
cnf(d30,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X0,X1),X2,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),X1)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d29,d28]) ).
cnf(d31,plain,
'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d30,d26]) ).
cnf(d32,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0)),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X1,X2))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d1,c455]) ).
cnf(d33,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d14,d32]) ).
cnf(d34,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X0))
| X0 = X1 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c24,c633]) ).
cnf(d35,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d19,d34]) ).
cnf(d36,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X2)
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d35,d9]) ).
cnf(d37,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)) = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d36,d10]) ).
cnf(d38,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d37,d10]) ).
cnf(d39,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X1,X2)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d38,d33]) ).
cnf(d40,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X3)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X2) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d39,c606]) ).
cnf(d41,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),X2))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOknows'(X0,X1),X2)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c308,c382]) ).
cnf(d42,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK'))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c654,c633]) ).
cnf(d43,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs'),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK') ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d14,d42]) ).
cnf(d44,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy'),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK') ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d43,d41]) ).
cnf(d45,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK')
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d38,d44]) ).
cnf(d46,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d45,d40]) ).
cnf(d47,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(equality_resolution,[status(thm)],[d46]) ).
cnf(d48,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d47,d31]) ).
cnf(d49,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d48,d31]) ).
cnf(d50,plain,
$false,
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c96,d49]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.02 % Problem : SWV754-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v4.1.0.
% 0.00/0.03 % Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.08/0.35 % Computer : n008.cluster.edu
% 0.08/0.35 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.08/0.35 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.08/0.35 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.08/0.35 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.08/0.35 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.08/0.35 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.08/0.35 % DateTime : Sat Sep 26 14:54:54 UTC 2026
% 0.08/0.35 % CPUTime :
% 0.08/0.35 Running casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 4.98/27.82 % SZS status Unsatisfiable for theBenchmark.p
% 4.98/27.82 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------