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LisaST---0.9.UNS-CRf.s

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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : LisaST---0.9
% Problem  : SWV756-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v4.1.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p

% Computer : n019.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Sep 27 09:04:39 AM UTC 2026

% Result   : Unsatisfiable 122.89s 16.09s
% Output   : CNFRefutation 122.89s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :   16
%            Number of leaves      :   23
% Syntax   : Number of clauses     :   95 (  57 unt;  15 nHn;  74 RR)
%            Number of literals    :  142 (  55 equ;  59 neg)
%            Maximal clause size   :    3 (   1 avg)
%            Maximal term depth    :    6 (   2 avg)
%            Number of predicates  :    4 (   2 usr;   1 prp; 0-3 aty)
%            Number of functors    :   33 (  33 usr;  17 con; 0-3 aty)
%            Number of variables   :  147 (  79 sgn)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(cls_keymode_Oinduct_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).

cnf(cls_singletonE_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X2))
    | X0 = X1 ) ).

cnf(cls_Crypt__notin__initState_0,axiom,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(cls_Nonce__notin__initState_0,axiom,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(cls_shrK__in__initState_0,axiom,
    hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(cls_Crypt__notin__used__empty_0,axiom,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uONil'('tc$uEvent$uOevent')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(cls_Nonce__supply1_0,axiom,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(cls_Nonce__notin__used__empty_0,axiom,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uONil'('tc$uEvent$uOevent')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(cls_insert__subset_0,axiom,
    ( ~ 'c$ulessequals'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X3,X2),X1,'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ) ).

cnf(cls_insert__code_1,axiom,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X0)) ).

cnf(cls_subset__insertI_0,axiom,
    'c$ulessequals'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X0,X2),'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')) ).

cnf(cls_insert__code_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X2,X0,X3),X1))
    | X2 = X1
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).

cnf(cls_MPair__used_1,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(X2,X0),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).

cnf(cls_msg_Osimps_I37_J_0,axiom,
    'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1) != 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X2) ).

cnf(cls_msg_Osimps_I31_J_0,axiom,
    hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X0) != 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1) ).

cnf(cls_parts_OInj_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).

cnf(cls_Says__imp__used_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'(X2,X3,X0),'c$uList$uOset'(X1,'tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).

cnf(cls_mem__def_1,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ) ).

cnf(cls_mem__def_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X1,X0,X2))
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).

cnf(cls_conjecture_3,negated_conjecture,
    hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'('v$uA$uH','c$uMessage$uOagent$uOServer','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNAa')))),'c$uList$uOset'('v$uevs2','tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent')) ).

cnf(cls_conjecture_5,negated_conjecture,
    'v$uA' = 'v$uAa' ).

cnf(cls_conjecture_6,negated_conjecture,
    'v$uNA' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNAa') ).

cnf(cls_conjecture_9,negated_conjecture,
    'v$uX' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uKAB'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uAa'))) ).

cnf(c30,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_keymode_Oinduct_0]) ).

cnf(c62,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X2))
    | X0 = X1 ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_singletonE_0]) ).

cnf(c140,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Crypt__notin__initState_0]) ).

cnf(c256,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Nonce__notin__initState_0]) ).

cnf(c260,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_shrK__in__initState_0]) ).

cnf(c263,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uONil'('tc$uEvent$uOevent')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Crypt__notin__used__empty_0]) ).

cnf(c264,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Nonce__supply1_0]) ).

cnf(c265,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uONil'('tc$uEvent$uOevent')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Nonce__notin__used__empty_0]) ).

cnf(c323,plain,
    ( ~ 'c$ulessequals'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X3,X2),X1,'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__subset_0]) ).

cnf(c329,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X0)),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_1]) ).

cnf(c331,plain,
    'c$ulessequals'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X0,X2),'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_subset__insertI_0]) ).

cnf(c332,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X2,X0,X3),X1))
    | X2 = X1
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_0]) ).

cnf(c483,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(X2,X0),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_MPair__used_1]) ).

cnf(c485,plain,
    'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1) != 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X2),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_msg_Osimps_I37_J_0]) ).

cnf(c487,plain,
    hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X0) != 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_msg_Osimps_I31_J_0]) ).

cnf(c492,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_parts_OInj_0]) ).

cnf(c517,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'(X2,X3,X0),'c$uList$uOset'(X1,'tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Says__imp__used_0]) ).

cnf(c526,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_mem__def_1]) ).

cnf(c527,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X1,X0,X2))
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_mem__def_0]) ).

cnf(c551,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'('v$uA$uH','c$uMessage$uOagent$uOServer','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uAa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNAa')))),'c$uList$uOset'('v$uevs2','tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_3]) ).

cnf(c553,plain,
    'v$uA' = 'v$uAa',
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_5]) ).

cnf(c554,plain,
    'v$uNA' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNAa'),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_6]) ).

cnf(c557,plain,
    'v$uX' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uKAB'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uAa'))),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_9]) ).

cnf(d0,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c260,c527]) ).

cnf(d1,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c492,c140]) ).

cnf(d2,plain,
    ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X1,X2))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d1,c526]) ).

cnf(d3,plain,
    'v$uX' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK','v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uKAB'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uA'))),
    inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c557,c553]) ).

cnf(d4,plain,
    ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'v$uX')),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d3,d2]) ).

cnf(d5,plain,
    ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uONil'('tc$uEvent$uOevent')),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c526,c263]) ).

cnf(d6,plain,
    ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uONil'('tc$uEvent$uOevent')),'v$uX')),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d3,d5]) ).

cnf(d7,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3),X3)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c323,c331]) ).

cnf(d8,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X2,X3),X3),X1)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d7,c527]) ).

cnf(d9,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',X0,X1),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',X0,X1),X2)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c30,c329]) ).

cnf(d10,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption','c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),X1),X2)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d9,d8]) ).

cnf(d11,plain,
    ( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X1,X2),X0))
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d10,c332]) ).

cnf(d12,plain,
    ( hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d11,c332]) ).

cnf(d13,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uX'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uX' ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d12,d6]) ).

cnf(d14,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uX'
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d13,d4]) ).

cnf(d15,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X0))
    | X0 = X1 ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c62,c526]) ).

cnf(d16,plain,
    ( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d11,d15]) ).

cnf(d17,plain,
    ( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uX'
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),X0)) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d16,d14]) ).

cnf(d18,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uX'
    | hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)) = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d17,d0]) ).

cnf(d19,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uX'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' != 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d18,c487]) ).

cnf(d20,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uX'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' != 'v$uNA' ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c554,d19]) ).

cnf(d21,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('v$uNA','c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c554,c256]) ).

cnf(d22,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('v$uNA','c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c492,d21]) ).

cnf(d23,plain,
    ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'v$uNA')),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d22,c526]) ).

cnf(d24,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('v$uNA','c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uONil'('tc$uEvent$uOevent')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c554,c265]) ).

cnf(d25,plain,
    ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uONil'('tc$uEvent$uOevent')),'v$uNA')),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c526,d24]) ).

cnf(d26,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'v$uNA'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uNA' ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d12,d25]) ).

cnf(d27,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uNA'
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d26,d23]) ).

cnf(d28,plain,
    ( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uNA'
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),X0)) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d16,d27]) ).

cnf(d29,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uNA'
    | hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)) = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d28,d0]) ).

cnf(d30,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uNA'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' != 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d29,c487]) ).

cnf(d31,plain,
    ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c526,c264]) ).

cnf(d32,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'('v$uA$uH','c$uMessage$uOagent$uOServer','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uA'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uBa'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNAa')))),'c$uList$uOset'('v$uevs2','tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),
    inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c551,c553]) ).

cnf(d33,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uOSays'('v$uA$uH','c$uMessage$uOagent$uOServer','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uA'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uBa'),'v$uNA'))),'c$uList$uOset'('v$uevs2','tc$uEvent$uOevent'),'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),
    inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d32,c554]) ).

cnf(d34,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uA'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uBa'),'v$uNA')),'c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs2'),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d33,c517]) ).

cnf(d35,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOAgent'('v$uBa'),'v$uNA'),'c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs2'),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d34,c483]) ).

cnf(d36,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'('v$uNA','c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs2'),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d35,c483]) ).

cnf(d37,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs2'),'v$uNA')),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d36,c527]) ).

cnf(d38,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uNA'
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs2'),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d26,d37]) ).

cnf(d39,plain,
    ( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uNA'
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs2'),X0)) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d16,d38]) ).

cnf(d40,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uNA'
    | 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'('v$uevs2')) = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d39,d31]) ).

cnf(d41,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uNA'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uNA'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d40,d30]) ).

cnf(d42,plain,
    'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uNA',
    inference(equality_resolution,[status(thm)],[d41]) ).

cnf(d43,plain,
    'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'v$uX',
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d42,d20]) ).

cnf(d44,plain,
    'v$uX' != 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d3,c485]) ).

cnf(d45,plain,
    'v$uX' != 'v$uNA',
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c554,d44]) ).

cnf(d46,plain,
    'v$uX' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',
    inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d45,d42]) ).

cnf(d47,plain,
    'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',
    inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d46,d43]) ).

cnf(d48,plain,
    $false,
    inference(equality_resolution,[status(thm)],[d47]) ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03  % Problem  : SWV756-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v4.1.0.
% 0.00/0.04  % Command  : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.11/0.36  % Computer : n019.cluster.edu
% 0.11/0.36  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.11/0.36  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.11/0.36  % Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% 0.11/0.36  % OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.11/0.36  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.11/0.36  % WCLimit  : 300
% 0.11/0.36  % DateTime : Sat Sep 26 14:54:33 UTC 2026
% 0.11/0.36  % CPUTime  : 
% 0.11/0.36  Running casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 122.89/16.09  % SZS status Unsatisfiable for theBenchmark.p
% 122.89/16.09  % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------