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LisaST---0.9.UNS-CRf.s

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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : LisaST---0.9
% Problem  : SWV758-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v4.1.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p

% Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Sep 27 09:04:40 AM UTC 2026

% Result   : Unsatisfiable 33.29s 28.88s
% Output   : CNFRefutation 33.29s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :   16
%            Number of leaves      :   23
% Syntax   : Number of clauses     :   97 (  37 unt;  23 nHn;  41 RR)
%            Number of literals    :  169 (  52 equ;  59 neg)
%            Maximal clause size   :    3 (   1 avg)
%            Maximal term depth    :    6 (   2 avg)
%            Number of predicates  :    3 (   1 usr;   1 prp; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of functors    :   28 (  28 usr;  11 con; 0-3 aty)
%            Number of variables   :  207 (  89 sgn)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(cls_used__Notes_0,axiom,
    'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X0,X1),X2,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')) = 'c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X2),'tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')) ).

cnf(cls_singletonE_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X2))
    | X0 = X1 ) ).

cnf(cls_insert__commute_0,axiom,
    'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X2,X3),X3) = 'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3) ).

cnf(cls_keymode_Oinduct_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).

cnf(cls_insert__code_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X2,X0,X3),X1))
    | X2 = X1
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).

cnf(cls_sup1CI_1,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X3))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'(X0,X1,'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X3)) ) ).

cnf(cls_keymode_Osimps_I2_J_0,axiom,
    'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' ).

cnf(cls_insert__code_1,axiom,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X0)) ).

cnf(cls_insert__code_2,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X3))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X3)) ) ).

cnf(cls_insert__iff_1,axiom,
    hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X2)) ).

cnf(cls_Nonce__supply1_0,axiom,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(cls_Nonce__notin__used__empty_0,axiom,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uONil'('tc$uEvent$uOevent')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(cls_analz__conj__parts_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).

cnf(cls_analz_OInj_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).

cnf(cls_Nonce__notin__initState_0,axiom,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(cls_shrK__in__initState_0,axiom,
    hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(cls_shrK__in__used_0,axiom,
    hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(cls_usedI_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy',X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).

cnf(cls_parts_OInj_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).

cnf(cls_parts_OBody_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X2,X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).

cnf(cls_mem__def_1,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ) ).

cnf(cls_mem__def_0,axiom,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X1,X0,X2))
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).

cnf(cls_conjecture_0,negated_conjecture,
    hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'('v$uK','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB')),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).

cnf(c1,plain,
    'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X0,X1),X2,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')) = 'c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X2),'tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_used__Notes_0]) ).

cnf(c23,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X2))
    | X0 = X1 ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_singletonE_0]) ).

cnf(c86,plain,
    'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X2,X3),X3) = 'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__commute_0]) ).

cnf(c105,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_keymode_Oinduct_0]) ).

cnf(c125,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X2,X0,X3),X1))
    | X2 = X1
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_0]) ).

cnf(c137,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X3))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'(X0,X1,'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X3)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_sup1CI_1]) ).

cnf(c142,plain,
    'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_keymode_Osimps_I2_J_0]) ).

cnf(c178,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X0)),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_1]) ).

cnf(c200,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X3))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X3)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_2]) ).

cnf(c251,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X2)),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__iff_1]) ).

cnf(c432,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Nonce__supply1_0]) ).

cnf(c433,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uONil'('tc$uEvent$uOevent')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Nonce__notin__used__empty_0]) ).

cnf(c470,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_analz__conj__parts_0]) ).

cnf(c514,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_analz_OInj_0]) ).

cnf(c563,plain,
    ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Nonce__notin__initState_0]) ).

cnf(c565,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_shrK__in__initState_0]) ).

cnf(c566,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_shrK__in__used_0]) ).

cnf(c575,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy',X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_usedI_0]) ).

cnf(c611,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_parts_OInj_0]) ).

cnf(c624,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X2,X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_parts_OBody_0]) ).

cnf(c640,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_mem__def_1]) ).

cnf(c641,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X1,X0,X2))
    | hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_mem__def_0]) ).

cnf(c656,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'('v$uK','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB')),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_0]) ).

cnf(d0,plain,
    ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c640,c432]) ).

cnf(d1,plain,
    ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uONil'('tc$uEvent$uOevent')),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c640,c433]) ).

cnf(d2,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X1)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c566,c641]) ).

cnf(d3,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c565,c641]) ).

cnf(d4,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
    | hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c470,c640]) ).

cnf(d5,plain,
    ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0)),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d4,c563]) ).

cnf(d6,plain,
    ( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
    | ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c514,c641]) ).

cnf(d7,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X0),X1)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d6,c640]) ).

cnf(d8,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),X2)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c105,c178]) ).

cnf(d9,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),X2)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,c200]) ).

cnf(d10,plain,
    ( hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1))
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X1
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d9,c125]) ).

cnf(d11,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0 ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d10,d7]) ).

cnf(d12,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d11,d5]) ).

cnf(d13,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X0))
    | X0 = X1 ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c23,c640]) ).

cnf(d14,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3),X0)),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c86,c178]) ).

cnf(d15,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature','c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',X0,X1),X1),X2)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d8,d14]) ).

cnf(d16,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption','c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),X1),X2)),
    inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d15,c86]) ).

cnf(d17,plain,
    ( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X1,X2),X0))
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d16,c125]) ).

cnf(d18,plain,
    ( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d17,d13]) ).

cnf(d19,plain,
    ( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X2)
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),X0)) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d18,d12]) ).

cnf(d20,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
    | hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)) = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d19,d3]) ).

cnf(d21,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X2)
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d20,d2]) ).

cnf(d22,plain,
    ( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',X1,X2),X0))
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0 ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d10,c178]) ).

cnf(d23,plain,
    ( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0 ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d22,d13]) ).

cnf(d24,plain,
    ( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != X0 ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d23,c142]) ).

cnf(d25,plain,
    ( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
    | X1 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'
    | X0 != X1 ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d18,d24]) ).

cnf(d26,plain,
    ( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
    | X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ),
    inference(equality_resolution,[status(thm)],[d25]) ).

cnf(d27,plain,
    ( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X2)
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),X0)) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d26,d21]) ).

cnf(d28,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
    | 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d27,d1]) ).

cnf(d29,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d28,d0]) ).

cnf(d30,plain,
    ( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),X0))
    | ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c611,c641]) ).

cnf(d31,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),X0)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d30,c251]) ).

cnf(d32,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),X3))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X2,X0),X1,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),X3)) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c1,c137]) ).

cnf(d33,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X0,X1),X2,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),X1)),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d32,d31]) ).

cnf(d34,plain,
    'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d33,d29]) ).

cnf(d35,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X3)) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c105,c200]) ).

cnf(d36,plain,
    ( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',X0,X1),X2))
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d35,c178]) ).

cnf(d37,plain,
    ( hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1))
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X1
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d36,c125]) ).

cnf(d38,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d37,d7]) ).

cnf(d39,plain,
    ( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d38,d5]) ).

cnf(d40,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d20,d3]) ).

cnf(d41,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d40,d39]) ).

cnf(d42,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
    | ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d41,d0]) ).

cnf(d43,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB'),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c624,c656]) ).

cnf(d44,plain,
    hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB'),'c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs'),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d43,c575]) ).

cnf(d45,plain,
    hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB'))),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d44,c641]) ).

cnf(d46,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0)
    | hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs'),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d41,d45]) ).

cnf(d47,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d46,d42]) ).

cnf(d48,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' ),
    inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d47,d34]) ).

cnf(d49,plain,
    ( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
    | 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' ),
    inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d48,d34]) ).

cnf(d50,plain,
    $false,
    inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c142,d49]) ).

%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03  % Problem  : SWV758-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v4.1.0.
% 0.00/0.04  % Command  : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.10/0.37  % Computer : n016.cluster.edu
% 0.10/0.37  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.10/0.37  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.10/0.37  % Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% 0.10/0.37  % OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.10/0.37  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.10/0.37  % WCLimit  : 300
% 0.10/0.37  % DateTime : Sat Sep 26 14:59:47 UTC 2026
% 0.10/0.37  % CPUTime  : 
% 0.10/0.37  Running casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 33.29/28.88  % SZS status Unsatisfiable for theBenchmark.p
% 33.29/28.88  % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------