%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : LisaST---0.9
% Problem : SWV795-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v4.1.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% Computer : n007.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Sun Sep 27 09:04:43 AM UTC 2026
% Result : Unsatisfiable 115.23s 23.09s
% Output : CNFRefutation 115.23s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 20
% Number of leaves : 30
% Syntax : Number of clauses : 122 ( 47 unt; 27 nHn; 57 RR)
% Number of literals : 212 ( 70 equ; 81 neg)
% Maximal clause size : 3 ( 1 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of predicates : 4 ( 2 usr; 1 prp; 0-3 aty)
% Number of functors : 28 ( 28 usr; 11 con; 0-3 aty)
% Number of variables : 265 ( 121 sgn)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cnf(cls_used__Notes_0,axiom,
'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X0,X1),X2,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')) = 'c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X2),'tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')) ).
cnf(cls_singletonE_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X2))
| X0 = X1 ) ).
cnf(cls_keymode_Osimps_I2_J_0,axiom,
'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' ).
cnf(cls_keymode_Oinduct_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(cls_keymode_Osimps_I1_J_0,axiom,
'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ).
cnf(cls_initState__subset__knows_0,axiom,
'c$ulessequals'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uEvent$uOknows'(X0,X1),'tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')) ).
cnf(cls_subset__insertI_0,axiom,
'c$ulessequals'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X0,X2),'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')) ).
cnf(cls_sup1CI_1,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X3))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'(X0,X1,'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X3)) ) ).
cnf(cls_insert__subset_0,axiom,
( ~ 'c$ulessequals'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X3,X2),X1,'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ) ).
cnf(cls_Crypt__notin__initState_0,axiom,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_predicate1D_0,axiom,
( ~ 'c$ulessequals'(X2,X0,'tc$ufun'(X3,'tc$ubool'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X2,X1))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(cls_Nonce__notin__initState_0,axiom,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_shrK__in__initState_0,axiom,
hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_Nonce__supply1_0,axiom,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_insert__code_1,axiom,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X0)) ).
cnf(cls_insert__code_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X2,X0,X3),X1))
| X2 = X1
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(cls_insert__commute_0,axiom,
'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X2,X3),X3) = 'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3) ).
cnf(cls_insert__code_2,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X3))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X3)) ) ).
cnf(cls_insert__iff_1,axiom,
hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X2)) ).
cnf(cls_usedI_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy',X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_parts_OFst_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(X0,X2),'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_parts_OInj_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_analz_OInj_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_msg_Osimps_I43_J_0,axiom,
'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1) != hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X2) ).
cnf(cls_parts_OBody_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X2,X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_mem__def_1,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ) ).
cnf(cls_mem__def_0,axiom,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X1,X0,X2))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ) ).
cnf(cls_not__parts__not__analz_0,axiom,
( hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ) ).
cnf(cls_conjecture_0,negated_conjecture,
hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'('v$uK','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB'))),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(cls_conjecture_2,negated_conjecture,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK'),'c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ).
cnf(c1,plain,
'c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X0,X1),X2,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')) = 'c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X2),'tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_used__Notes_0]) ).
cnf(c24,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X2))
| X0 = X1 ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_singletonE_0]) ).
cnf(c56,plain,
'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_keymode_Osimps_I2_J_0]) ).
cnf(c57,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_keymode_Oinduct_0]) ).
cnf(c58,plain,
'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_keymode_Osimps_I1_J_0]) ).
cnf(c75,plain,
'c$ulessequals'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uEvent$uOknows'(X0,X1),'tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_initState__subset__knows_0]) ).
cnf(c81,plain,
'c$ulessequals'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X0,X2),'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_subset__insertI_0]) ).
cnf(c87,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X3))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uLattices$uOupper$u$usemilattice$u$uclass$uOsup'(X0,X1,'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X3)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_sup1CI_1]) ).
cnf(c123,plain,
( ~ 'c$ulessequals'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X3,X2),X1,'tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__subset_0]) ).
cnf(c186,plain,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Crypt__notin__initState_0]) ).
cnf(c238,plain,
( ~ 'c$ulessequals'(X2,X0,'tc$ufun'(X3,'tc$ubool'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X2,X1))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_predicate1D_0]) ).
cnf(c292,plain,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Nonce__notin__initState_0]) ).
cnf(c298,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)),'c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_shrK__in__initState_0]) ).
cnf(c303,plain,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)),'c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_Nonce__supply1_0]) ).
cnf(c370,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X0)),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_1]) ).
cnf(c373,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X2,X0,X3),X1))
| X2 = X1
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_0]) ).
cnf(c376,plain,
'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X2,X3),X3) = 'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__commute_0]) ).
cnf(c378,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X3))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X3)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__code_2]) ).
cnf(c384,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X2)),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_insert__iff_1]) ).
cnf(c495,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy',X1)),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uEvent$uOused'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_usedI_0]) ).
cnf(c532,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'(X0,X2),'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_parts_OFst_0]) ).
cnf(c539,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_parts_OInj_0]) ).
cnf(c540,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_analz_OInj_0]) ).
cnf(c545,plain,
'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1) != hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X2),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_msg_Osimps_I43_J_0]) ).
cnf(c551,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X2,X0),'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_parts_OBody_0]) ).
cnf(c571,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,X0))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,X2)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_mem__def_1]) ).
cnf(c572,plain,
( ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X1,X0,X2))
| hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1)) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_mem__def_0]) ).
cnf(c587,plain,
( hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg'))
| ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_not__parts__not__analz_0]) ).
cnf(c590,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'('v$uK','c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB'))),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_0]) ).
cnf(c592,plain,
~ hBOOL('c$uin'(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK'),'c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(clausification,[status(esa)],[cls_conjecture_2]) ).
cnf(d0,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('c$uPublic$uOsko$u$uPublic$u$uXNonce$u$usupply1$u$u1$u$u1'(X0)))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c571,c303]) ).
cnf(d1,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOMPair'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB')),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c590,c551]) ).
cnf(d2,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB'),'c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d1,c532]) ).
cnf(d3,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB'),'c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs'),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d2,c495]) ).
cnf(d4,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs'),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'('v$uNB'))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d3,c572]) ).
cnf(d5,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
| hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c587,c571]) ).
cnf(d6,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0)),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d5,c292]) ).
cnf(d7,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
| ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c540,c572]) ).
cnf(d8,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X0),X1)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d7,c571]) ).
cnf(d9,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),X2)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c57,c370]) ).
cnf(d10,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),X2)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d9,c378]) ).
cnf(d11,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X1
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d10,c373]) ).
cnf(d12,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d11,d8]) ).
cnf(d13,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d12,d6]) ).
cnf(d14,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c298,c572]) ).
cnf(d15,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,X2),X3)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c57,c378]) ).
cnf(d16,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',X0,X1),X2))
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d15,c370]) ).
cnf(d17,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP(X0,X1))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X1
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X0,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d16,c373]) ).
cnf(d18,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP(X1,'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'(X1),X0))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d17,d8]) ).
cnf(d19,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d18,d6]) ).
cnf(d20,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'(X2,'tc$ubool')),X2),X0))
| X0 = X1 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c24,c571]) ).
cnf(d21,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',X1,X2),X0))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d11,c370]) ).
cnf(d22,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d21,d20]) ).
cnf(d23,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != X0 ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d22,c56]) ).
cnf(d24,plain,
hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X2,X3),X3),X3)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c123,c81]) ).
cnf(d25,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uSet$uOinsert'(X1,X2,X3),X3),X1)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d24,c572]) ).
cnf(d26,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature','c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption',X0,X1),X1),X2)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d9,d25]) ).
cnf(d27,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption','c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X0,X1),X1),X2)),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d26,c376]) ).
cnf(d28,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uSet$uOinsert'('c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature',X1,X2),X0))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d27,c373]) ).
cnf(d29,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = X0 ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d28,d20]) ).
cnf(d30,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
| X1 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'
| X0 != X1 ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d29,d23]) ).
cnf(d31,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
| X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ),
inference(equality_resolution,[status(thm)],[d30]) ).
cnf(d32,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X2)
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d31,d19]) ).
cnf(d33,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)) = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d32,d14]) ).
cnf(d34,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d33,d14]) ).
cnf(d35,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d34,d13]) ).
cnf(d36,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0)
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('v$uevs'),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d35,d4]) ).
cnf(d37,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d35,d0]) ).
cnf(d38,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d37,d36]) ).
cnf(d39,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption')) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d38,d0]) ).
cnf(d40,plain,
( hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOparts'(X1),X0))
| ~ hBOOL('c$uin'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c539,c572]) ).
cnf(d41,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,X1,'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),X0)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d40,c384]) ).
cnf(d42,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOparts'('c$uSet$uOinsert'(X0,'c$uOrderings$uObot$u$uclass$uObot'('tc$ufun'('tc$uMessage$uOmsg','tc$ubool')),'tc$uMessage$uOmsg')),X3))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X2,X0),X1,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),X3)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c1,c87]) ).
cnf(d43,plain,
hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOused'('c$uList$uOlist$uOCons'('c$uEvent$uOevent$uONotes'(X0,X1),X2,'tc$uEvent$uOevent')),X1)),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d42,d41]) ).
cnf(d44,plain,
'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d43,d39]) ).
cnf(d45,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0)),'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X1,X2))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d5,c186]) ).
cnf(d46,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X2),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X0,X1) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d18,d45]) ).
cnf(d47,plain,
( X0 = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X2)
| ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X1),X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d29,d13]) ).
cnf(d48,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',hAPP('c$uPublic$uOshrK',X0)) = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d47,d14]) ).
cnf(d49,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature')) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d48,d14]) ).
cnf(d50,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOCrypt'(X1,X2)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d49,d46]) ).
cnf(d51,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X3)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey',X2) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d50,c545]) ).
cnf(d52,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'(X0),X2))
| hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOknows'(X0,X1),X2)) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c238,c75]) ).
cnf(d53,plain,
~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uMessage$uOanalz'('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs')),hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK'))),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c592,c571]) ).
cnf(d54,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOknows'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy','v$uevs'),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK') ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d18,d53]) ).
cnf(d55,plain,
( ~ hBOOL(hAPP('c$uEvent$uOinitState'('c$uMessage$uOagent$uOSpy'),'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature'))
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK') ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d54,d52]) ).
cnf(d56,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' = hAPP('c$uMessage$uOmsg$uOKey','v$uK')
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[d49,d55]) ).
cnf(d57,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' != 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[d56,d51]) ).
cnf(d58,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X0) ),
inference(equality_resolution,[status(thm)],[d57]) ).
cnf(d59,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uMessage$uOmsg$uONonce'(X1)
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d58,d44]) ).
cnf(d60,plain,
( 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption'
| 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOSignature' = 'c$uPublic$uOkeymode$uOEncryption' ),
inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[d59,d44]) ).
cnf(d61,plain,
$false,
inference(resolution,[status(thm)],[c58,d60]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.05 % Problem : SWV795-1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v4.1.0.
% 0.00/0.07 % Command : casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.17/0.43 % Computer : n007.cluster.edu
% 0.17/0.43 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.17/0.43 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.17/0.43 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.17/0.43 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.17/0.43 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.17/0.43 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.17/0.43 % DateTime : Sat Sep 26 14:56:25 UTC 2026
% 0.17/0.43 % CPUTime :
% 0.17/0.43 Running casc-portfolio.sh -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 115.23/23.09 % SZS status Unsatisfiable for theBenchmark.p
% 115.23/23.09 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------