%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : Vampire-SAT---5.0.1
% Problem : SWV803_5 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v6.0.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_vampire /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 SAT
% Computer : n026.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Tue Sep 29 01:26:27 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 0.21s 0.32s
% Output : Refutation 0.21s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 17
% Number of leaves : 16
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 82 ( 21 unt; 0 typ; 4 def)
% Number of atoms : 191 ( 38 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 7 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 188 ( 79 ~; 78 |; 15 &)
% ( 4 <=>; 12 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 17 ( 5 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 7 ( 2 avg)
% Number of types : 6 ( 5 usr)
% Number of type conns : 0 ( 0 >; 0 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of predicates : 10 ( 8 usr; 5 prp; 0-4 aty)
% Number of functors : 47 ( 47 usr; 22 con; 0-4 aty)
% Number of variables : 154 ( 0 sgn 154 !; 0 ?; 154 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
tff(type_def_5,type,
event: $tType ).
tff(type_def_6,type,
bool: $tType ).
tff(type_def_7,type,
list: $tType > $tType ).
tff(type_def_8,type,
agent1: $tType ).
tff(type_def_9,type,
msg: $tType ).
tff(type_def_10,type,
nat: $tType ).
tff(type_def_11,type,
fun: ( $tType * $tType ) > $tType ).
tff(func_def_0,type,
bad: fun(agent1,bool) ).
tff(func_def_1,type,
notes: ( agent1 * msg ) > event ).
tff(func_def_2,type,
says: ( agent1 * agent1 * msg ) > event ).
tff(func_def_3,type,
knows: ( agent1 * list(event) ) > fun(msg,bool) ).
tff(func_def_4,type,
used: list(event) > fun(msg,bool) ).
tff(func_def_5,type,
cons:
!>[X0: $tType] : ( ( X0 * list(X0) ) > list(X0) ) ).
tff(func_def_6,type,
set:
!>[X0: $tType] : ( list(X0) > fun(X0,bool) ) ).
tff(func_def_7,type,
server: agent1 ).
tff(func_def_8,type,
spy: agent1 ).
tff(func_def_9,type,
analz: fun(msg,bool) > fun(msg,bool) ).
tff(func_def_10,type,
agent: agent1 > msg ).
tff(func_def_11,type,
crypt: ( nat * msg ) > msg ).
tff(func_def_12,type,
key: nat > msg ).
tff(func_def_13,type,
mPair: ( msg * msg ) > msg ).
tff(func_def_14,type,
nonce: nat > msg ).
tff(func_def_15,type,
parts: fun(msg,bool) > fun(msg,bool) ).
tff(func_def_16,type,
symKeys: fun(nat,bool) ).
tff(func_def_17,type,
nS_Sha254967238shared: fun(list(event),bool) ).
tff(func_def_18,type,
shrK: agent1 > nat ).
tff(func_def_19,type,
aa1:
!>[X0: $tType,X1: $tType] : ( ( fun(X0,X1) * X0 ) > X1 ) ).
tff(func_def_20,type,
fFalse: bool ).
tff(func_def_21,type,
fTrue: bool ).
tff(func_def_22,type,
a: agent1 ).
tff(func_def_23,type,
aa: agent1 ).
tff(func_def_24,type,
b: agent1 ).
tff(func_def_25,type,
b1: agent1 ).
tff(func_def_26,type,
ba: agent1 ).
tff(func_def_27,type,
k: nat ).
tff(func_def_28,type,
ka: nat ).
tff(func_def_29,type,
na: nat ).
tff(func_def_30,type,
nAa: nat ).
tff(func_def_31,type,
nb: nat ).
tff(func_def_32,type,
nBa: nat ).
tff(func_def_33,type,
s: agent1 ).
tff(func_def_34,type,
x: msg ).
tff(func_def_35,type,
xa: msg ).
tff(func_def_36,type,
evs5: list(event) ).
tff(func_def_37,type,
sK0: ( list(event) * nat ) > msg ).
tff(func_def_38,type,
sK1: ( list(event) * nat ) > msg ).
tff(func_def_39,type,
sK2: ( msg * list(event) * nat ) > msg ).
tff(func_def_40,type,
sK3: ( msg * agent1 * list(event) ) > agent1 ).
tff(func_def_41,type,
sK4: ( list(event) * agent1 * nat * agent1 ) > msg ).
tff(func_def_42,type,
sK5:
!>[X0: $tType,X1: $tType] : ( ( fun(X1,X0) * fun(X1,X0) ) > X1 ) ).
tff(func_def_43,type,
sK6: ( list(event) * nat * msg ) > msg ).
tff(func_def_44,type,
sK7: ( list(event) * nat * msg ) > msg ).
tff(pred_def_1,type,
nS_Sha512322870Issues: ( agent1 * agent1 * msg * list(event) ) > $o ).
tff(pred_def_2,type,
nS_Sha993195050haredp: list(event) > $o ).
tff(pred_def_3,type,
member:
!>[X0: $tType] : ( ( X0 * fun(X0,bool) ) > $o ) ).
tff(pred_def_4,type,
pp: bool > $o ).
tff(f8,axiom,
! [X0: list(event),X1: msg,X2: agent1] :
( member(msg,crypt(shrK(X2),X1),analz(knows(spy,X0)))
=> ( member(agent1,X2,bad)
=> member(msg,X1,analz(knows(spy,X0))) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',fact_7_Crypt__Spy__analz__bad) ).
tff(f11,axiom,
! [X0: list(event),X1: msg,X2: agent1,X3: agent1] :
( member(event,says(X3,X2,X1),set(event,X0))
=> member(msg,X1,parts(knows(spy,X0))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',fact_10_Says__imp__parts__knows__Spy) ).
tff(f12,axiom,
! [X0: list(event),X1: msg,X2: agent1,X3: agent1] :
( member(event,says(X3,X2,X1),set(event,X0))
=> member(msg,X1,analz(knows(spy,X0))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',fact_11_Says__imp__analz__Spy) ).
tff(f33,axiom,
! [X0: fun(msg,bool),X1: msg,X2: msg] :
( member(msg,mPair(X2,X1),analz(X0))
=> member(msg,X1,analz(X0)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',fact_32_analz_OSnd) ).
tff(f34,axiom,
! [X0: fun(msg,bool),X1: msg,X2: msg] :
( member(msg,mPair(X2,X1),analz(X0))
=> member(msg,X2,analz(X0)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',fact_33_analz_OFst) ).
tff(f68,axiom,
! [X0: list(event),X1: msg,X2: nat,X3: agent1,X4: msg,X5: agent1] :
( member(msg,crypt(shrK(X5),mPair(X4,mPair(agent(X3),mPair(key(X2),X1)))),parts(knows(spy,X0)))
=> ( ~ member(agent1,X5,bad)
=> ( member(list(event),X0,nS_Sha254967238shared)
=> member(event,says(server,X5,crypt(shrK(X5),mPair(X4,mPair(agent(X3),mPair(key(X2),X1))))),set(event,X0)) ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',fact_67_A__trusts__NS2) ).
tff(f89,axiom,
! [X0: msg,X1: agent1,X2: msg,X3: agent1,X4: list(event),X5: msg,X6: nat,X7: agent1,X8: msg,X9: agent1] :
( member(event,says(server,X9,crypt(shrK(X9),mPair(X8,mPair(agent(X7),mPair(key(X6),X5))))),set(event,X4))
=> ( member(event,says(server,X3,crypt(shrK(X3),mPair(X2,mPair(agent(X1),mPair(key(X6),X0))))),set(event,X4))
=> ( member(list(event),X4,nS_Sha254967238shared)
=> ( ( X9 = X3 )
& ( X8 = X2 )
& ( X7 = X1 )
& ( X5 = X0 ) ) ) ) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',fact_88_unique__session__keys) ).
tff(f103,axiom,
~ member(agent1,a,bad),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',conj_0) ).
tff(f105,axiom,
member(list(event),evs5,nS_Sha254967238shared),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',conj_2) ).
tff(f108,axiom,
member(event,says(s,aa,crypt(shrK(aa),mPair(nonce(nAa),mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(ka),xa))))),set(event,evs5)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',conj_5) ).
tff(f109,axiom,
~ member(msg,key(k),analz(knows(spy,evs5))),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',conj_6) ).
tff(f111,conjecture,
( ~ member(msg,crypt(shrK(a),mPair(nonce(na),mPair(agent(b),mPair(key(k),x)))),parts(knows(spy,evs5)))
| ( k != ka )
| ( nb != nBa )
| ( ( a = aa )
& ( b = ba ) )
| member(event,says(a,b,crypt(ka,mPair(nonce(nBa),nonce(nBa)))),set(event,evs5)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',conj_8) ).
tff(f112,negated_conjecture,
~ ( ~ member(msg,crypt(shrK(a),mPair(nonce(na),mPair(agent(b),mPair(key(k),x)))),parts(knows(spy,evs5)))
| ( k != ka )
| ( nb != nBa )
| ( ( a = aa )
& ( b = ba ) )
| member(event,says(a,b,crypt(ka,mPair(nonce(nBa),nonce(nBa)))),set(event,evs5)) ),
inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f111]) ).
tff(f120,plain,
! [X0: list(event),X1: msg,X2: agent1] :
( member(msg,X1,analz(knows(spy,X0)))
| ~ member(agent1,X2,bad)
| ~ member(msg,crypt(shrK(X2),X1),analz(knows(spy,X0))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f8]) ).
tff(f121,plain,
! [X0: list(event),X1: msg,X2: agent1] :
( member(msg,X1,analz(knows(spy,X0)))
| ~ member(agent1,X2,bad)
| ~ member(msg,crypt(shrK(X2),X1),analz(knows(spy,X0))) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f120]) ).
tff(f122,plain,
! [X0: list(event),X1: msg,X2: agent1,X3: agent1] :
( member(msg,X1,parts(knows(spy,X0)))
| ~ member(event,says(X3,X2,X1),set(event,X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f11]) ).
tff(f123,plain,
! [X0: list(event),X1: msg,X2: agent1,X3: agent1] :
( member(msg,X1,analz(knows(spy,X0)))
| ~ member(event,says(X3,X2,X1),set(event,X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f12]) ).
tff(f131,plain,
! [X0: fun(msg,bool),X1: msg,X2: msg] :
( member(msg,X1,analz(X0))
| ~ member(msg,mPair(X2,X1),analz(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f33]) ).
tff(f132,plain,
! [X0: fun(msg,bool),X1: msg,X2: msg] :
( member(msg,X2,analz(X0))
| ~ member(msg,mPair(X2,X1),analz(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f34]) ).
tff(f151,plain,
! [X0: list(event),X1: msg,X2: nat,X3: agent1,X4: msg,X5: agent1] :
( member(event,says(server,X5,crypt(shrK(X5),mPair(X4,mPair(agent(X3),mPair(key(X2),X1))))),set(event,X0))
| ~ member(list(event),X0,nS_Sha254967238shared)
| member(agent1,X5,bad)
| ~ member(msg,crypt(shrK(X5),mPair(X4,mPair(agent(X3),mPair(key(X2),X1)))),parts(knows(spy,X0))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f68]) ).
tff(f152,plain,
! [X0: list(event),X1: msg,X2: nat,X3: agent1,X4: msg,X5: agent1] :
( member(event,says(server,X5,crypt(shrK(X5),mPair(X4,mPair(agent(X3),mPair(key(X2),X1))))),set(event,X0))
| ~ member(list(event),X0,nS_Sha254967238shared)
| member(agent1,X5,bad)
| ~ member(msg,crypt(shrK(X5),mPair(X4,mPair(agent(X3),mPair(key(X2),X1)))),parts(knows(spy,X0))) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f151]) ).
tff(f174,plain,
! [X0: msg,X1: agent1,X2: msg,X3: agent1,X4: list(event),X5: msg,X6: nat,X7: agent1,X8: msg,X9: agent1] :
( ( ( X9 = X3 )
& ( X8 = X2 )
& ( X7 = X1 )
& ( X5 = X0 ) )
| ~ member(list(event),X4,nS_Sha254967238shared)
| ~ member(event,says(server,X3,crypt(shrK(X3),mPair(X2,mPair(agent(X1),mPair(key(X6),X0))))),set(event,X4))
| ~ member(event,says(server,X9,crypt(shrK(X9),mPair(X8,mPair(agent(X7),mPair(key(X6),X5))))),set(event,X4)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f89]) ).
tff(f175,plain,
! [X0: msg,X1: agent1,X2: msg,X3: agent1,X4: list(event),X5: msg,X6: nat,X7: agent1,X8: msg,X9: agent1] :
( ( ( X9 = X3 )
& ( X8 = X2 )
& ( X7 = X1 )
& ( X5 = X0 ) )
| ~ member(list(event),X4,nS_Sha254967238shared)
| ~ member(event,says(server,X3,crypt(shrK(X3),mPair(X2,mPair(agent(X1),mPair(key(X6),X0))))),set(event,X4))
| ~ member(event,says(server,X9,crypt(shrK(X9),mPair(X8,mPair(agent(X7),mPair(key(X6),X5))))),set(event,X4)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f174]) ).
tff(f194,plain,
( member(msg,crypt(shrK(a),mPair(nonce(na),mPair(agent(b),mPair(key(k),x)))),parts(knows(spy,evs5)))
& ( ka = k )
& ( nBa = nb )
& ( ( a != aa )
| ( b != ba ) )
& ~ member(event,says(a,b,crypt(ka,mPair(nonce(nBa),nonce(nBa)))),set(event,evs5)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f112]) ).
tff(f230,plain,
! [X2: agent1,X0: list(event),X1: msg] :
( ~ member(msg,crypt(shrK(X2),X1),analz(knows(spy,X0)))
| ~ member(agent1,X2,bad)
| member(msg,X1,analz(knows(spy,X0))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f121]) ).
tff(f233,plain,
! [X2: agent1,X3: agent1,X0: list(event),X1: msg] :
( ~ member(event,says(X3,X2,X1),set(event,X0))
| member(msg,X1,parts(knows(spy,X0))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f122]) ).
tff(f234,plain,
! [X2: agent1,X3: agent1,X0: list(event),X1: msg] :
( ~ member(event,says(X3,X2,X1),set(event,X0))
| member(msg,X1,analz(knows(spy,X0))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f123]) ).
tff(f273,plain,
! [X2: msg,X0: fun(msg,bool),X1: msg] :
( ~ member(msg,mPair(X2,X1),analz(X0))
| member(msg,X1,analz(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f131]) ).
tff(f274,plain,
! [X2: msg,X0: fun(msg,bool),X1: msg] :
( ~ member(msg,mPair(X2,X1),analz(X0))
| member(msg,X2,analz(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f132]) ).
tff(f309,plain,
! [X2: nat,X3: agent1,X0: list(event),X1: msg,X4: msg,X5: agent1] :
( ~ member(msg,crypt(shrK(X5),mPair(X4,mPair(agent(X3),mPair(key(X2),X1)))),parts(knows(spy,X0)))
| ~ member(list(event),X0,nS_Sha254967238shared)
| member(agent1,X5,bad)
| member(event,says(server,X5,crypt(shrK(X5),mPair(X4,mPair(agent(X3),mPair(key(X2),X1))))),set(event,X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f152]) ).
tff(f334,plain,
! [X2: msg,X3: agent1,X0: msg,X1: agent1,X8: msg,X6: nat,X9: agent1,X7: agent1,X4: list(event),X5: msg] :
( ~ member(list(event),X4,nS_Sha254967238shared)
| ( X1 = X7 )
| ~ member(event,says(server,X3,crypt(shrK(X3),mPair(X2,mPair(agent(X1),mPair(key(X6),X0))))),set(event,X4))
| ~ member(event,says(server,X9,crypt(shrK(X9),mPair(X8,mPair(agent(X7),mPair(key(X6),X5))))),set(event,X4)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f175]) ).
tff(f336,plain,
! [X2: msg,X3: agent1,X0: msg,X1: agent1,X8: msg,X6: nat,X9: agent1,X7: agent1,X4: list(event),X5: msg] :
( ~ member(list(event),X4,nS_Sha254967238shared)
| ( X3 = X9 )
| ~ member(event,says(server,X3,crypt(shrK(X3),mPair(X2,mPair(agent(X1),mPair(key(X6),X0))))),set(event,X4))
| ~ member(event,says(server,X9,crypt(shrK(X9),mPair(X8,mPair(agent(X7),mPair(key(X6),X5))))),set(event,X4)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f175]) ).
tff(f352,plain,
~ member(agent1,a,bad),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f103]) ).
tff(f354,plain,
member(list(event),evs5,nS_Sha254967238shared),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f105]) ).
tff(f357,plain,
member(event,says(s,aa,crypt(shrK(aa),mPair(nonce(nAa),mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(ka),xa))))),set(event,evs5)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f108]) ).
tff(f358,plain,
~ member(msg,key(k),analz(knows(spy,evs5))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f109]) ).
tff(f361,plain,
( ( a != aa )
| ( b != ba ) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f194]) ).
tff(f363,plain,
ka = k,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f194]) ).
tff(f364,plain,
member(msg,crypt(shrK(a),mPair(nonce(na),mPair(agent(b),mPair(key(k),x)))),parts(knows(spy,evs5))),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f194]) ).
tff(f367,plain,
member(event,says(s,aa,crypt(shrK(aa),mPair(nonce(nAa),mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(k),xa))))),set(event,evs5)),
inference(definition_unfolding,[],[f357,f363]) ).
tff(f370,definition,
( spl8_1
<=> ( b = ba ) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl8_1])],[avatar_definition]) ).
tff(f372,plain,
( ( b != ba )
| spl8_1 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f370]) ).
tff(f374,definition,
( spl8_2
<=> ( a = aa ) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl8_2])],[avatar_definition]) ).
tff(f377,plain,
( ~ spl8_1
| ~ spl8_2 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f361,f374,f370]) ).
tff(f526,plain,
member(msg,crypt(shrK(aa),mPair(nonce(nAa),mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(k),xa)))),parts(knows(spy,evs5))),
inference(resolution,[],[f233,f367]) ).
tff(f529,plain,
member(msg,crypt(shrK(aa),mPair(nonce(nAa),mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(k),xa)))),analz(knows(spy,evs5))),
inference(resolution,[],[f234,f367]) ).
tff(f620,plain,
( ~ member(list(event),evs5,nS_Sha254967238shared)
| member(agent1,a,bad)
| member(event,says(server,a,crypt(shrK(a),mPair(nonce(na),mPair(agent(b),mPair(key(k),x))))),set(event,evs5)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f309,f364]) ).
tff(f621,plain,
( member(agent1,a,bad)
| member(event,says(server,a,crypt(shrK(a),mPair(nonce(na),mPair(agent(b),mPair(key(k),x))))),set(event,evs5)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f620,f354]) ).
tff(f622,plain,
member(event,says(server,a,crypt(shrK(a),mPair(nonce(na),mPair(agent(b),mPair(key(k),x))))),set(event,evs5)),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f621,f352]) ).
tff(f631,plain,
! [X2: agent1,X3: msg,X0: agent1,X1: agent1,X8: msg,X6: agent1,X7: msg,X4: nat,X5: msg] :
( ~ member(event,says(server,X2,crypt(shrK(X2),mPair(X3,mPair(agent(X0),mPair(key(X4),X5))))),set(event,evs5))
| ( X0 = X1 )
| ~ member(event,says(server,X6,crypt(shrK(X6),mPair(X7,mPair(agent(X1),mPair(key(X4),X8))))),set(event,evs5)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f334,f354]) ).
tff(f635,plain,
! [X2: msg,X3: agent1,X0: agent1,X1: agent1,X8: msg,X6: msg,X7: agent1,X4: nat,X5: msg] :
( ~ member(event,says(server,X0,crypt(shrK(X0),mPair(X2,mPair(agent(X3),mPair(key(X4),X5))))),set(event,evs5))
| ( X0 = X1 )
| ~ member(event,says(server,X1,crypt(shrK(X1),mPair(X6,mPair(agent(X7),mPair(key(X4),X8))))),set(event,evs5)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f336,f354]) ).
tff(f729,plain,
( ~ member(list(event),evs5,nS_Sha254967238shared)
| member(agent1,aa,bad)
| member(event,says(server,aa,crypt(shrK(aa),mPair(nonce(nAa),mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(k),xa))))),set(event,evs5)) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f526,f309]) ).
tff(f737,plain,
( member(agent1,aa,bad)
| member(event,says(server,aa,crypt(shrK(aa),mPair(nonce(nAa),mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(k),xa))))),set(event,evs5)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f729,f354]) ).
tff(f740,definition,
( spl8_5
<=> member(event,says(server,aa,crypt(shrK(aa),mPair(nonce(nAa),mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(k),xa))))),set(event,evs5)) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl8_5])],[avatar_definition]) ).
tff(f742,plain,
( member(event,says(server,aa,crypt(shrK(aa),mPair(nonce(nAa),mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(k),xa))))),set(event,evs5))
| ~ spl8_5 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f740]) ).
tff(f744,definition,
( spl8_6
<=> member(agent1,aa,bad) ),
introduced(definition,[new_symbols(definition,[spl8_6])],[avatar_definition]) ).
tff(f746,plain,
( member(agent1,aa,bad)
| ~ spl8_6 ),
inference(avatar_component_clause,[],[f744]) ).
tff(f747,plain,
( spl8_5
| spl8_6 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f737,f744,f740]) ).
tff(f765,plain,
( ~ member(agent1,aa,bad)
| member(msg,mPair(nonce(nAa),mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(k),xa))),analz(knows(spy,evs5))) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f529,f230]) ).
tff(f774,plain,
( member(msg,mPair(nonce(nAa),mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(k),xa))),analz(knows(spy,evs5)))
| ~ spl8_6 ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f765,f746]) ).
tff(f841,plain,
! [X2: msg,X3: msg,X0: agent1,X1: agent1] :
( ~ member(event,says(server,X1,crypt(shrK(X1),mPair(X2,mPair(agent(X0),mPair(key(k),X3))))),set(event,evs5))
| ( b = X0 ) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f631,f622]) ).
tff(f847,plain,
! [X2: agent1,X3: msg,X0: agent1,X1: msg] :
( ~ member(event,says(server,X0,crypt(shrK(X0),mPair(X1,mPair(agent(X2),mPair(key(k),X3))))),set(event,evs5))
| ( a = X0 ) ),
inference(resolution,[],[f635,f622]) ).
tff(f875,plain,
( member(msg,mPair(agent(ba),mPair(key(k),xa)),analz(knows(spy,evs5)))
| ~ spl8_6 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f774,f273]) ).
tff(f1118,plain,
( member(msg,mPair(key(k),xa),analz(knows(spy,evs5)))
| ~ spl8_6 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f875,f273]) ).
tff(f1233,plain,
( member(msg,key(k),analz(knows(spy,evs5)))
| ~ spl8_6 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f1118,f274]) ).
tff(f1243,plain,
( $false
| ~ spl8_6 ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f1233,f358]) ).
tff(f1244,plain,
~ spl8_6,
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f1243]) ).
tff(f1247,plain,
( ( a = aa )
| ~ spl8_5 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f742,f847]) ).
tff(f1248,plain,
( ( b = ba )
| ~ spl8_5 ),
inference(resolution,[],[f742,f841]) ).
tff(f1263,plain,
( $false
| spl8_1
| ~ spl8_5 ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[],[f1248,f372]) ).
tff(f1264,plain,
( spl8_1
| ~ spl8_5 ),
inference(avatar_contradiction_clause,[],[f1263]) ).
tff(f1265,plain,
( spl8_2
| ~ spl8_5 ),
inference(avatar_split_clause,[],[f1247,f740,f374]) ).
cnf(s1,plain,
( ~ spl8_1
| ~ spl8_2 ),
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f377]) ).
cnf(s3,plain,
( spl8_5
| spl8_6 ),
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f747]) ).
cnf(s6,plain,
~ spl8_6,
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f1244]) ).
cnf(s7,plain,
( spl8_1
| ~ spl8_5 ),
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f1264]) ).
cnf(s8,plain,
( spl8_2
| ~ spl8_5 ),
inference(sat_conversion,[],[f1265]) ).
cnf(s10,plain,
spl8_5,
inference(rat,[],[s3,s6]) ).
cnf(s11,plain,
spl8_2,
inference(rat,[],[s8,s10]) ).
cnf(s12,plain,
spl8_1,
inference(rat,[],[s7,s10]) ).
cnf(s13,plain,
$false,
inference(rat,[],[s1,s11,s12]) ).
tff(f1266,plain,
$false,
inference(avatar_sat_refutation,[],[s13]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03 % Problem : SWV803_5 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v6.0.0.
% 0.00/0.06 % Command : run_vampire /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 SAT
% 0.09/0.19 % Computer : n026.cluster.edu
% 0.09/0.19 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.09/0.19 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.09/0.19 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.09/0.19 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.09/0.19 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.09/0.19 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.09/0.19 % DateTime : Mon Sep 28 12:38:27 UTC 2026
% 0.09/0.19 % CPUTime :
% 0.09/0.19 Running run_vampire /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p 300 SAT
% 0.09/0.23 Running first-order model finding
% 0.09/0.23 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/vampire-ho --input_syntax tptp --output_axiom_names on --mode casc --intent sat -m 16384 --cores 7 -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825663)Will run a generic schedule for satisfiability detection.
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825672)ott+31_1_sil=16000:lcm=predicate:bce=on:newcnf=on:random_seed=1791393325:i=116_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/116Mi)
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825669)% WARNING: option uhcvi not known.
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825668)fmb+10_1_sas=cadical:bce=on:rp=on:random_seed=2142792985_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/0Mi)
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825671)dis+10_1_sil=32000:sp=arity:random_seed=3579401300:i=103:fgj=on_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/103Mi)
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825669)dis+11_61:31_drc=ordering:lsd=5:bsr=unit_only:rp=on:newcnf=on:random_seed=2940856942:i=135531:add=off:rawr=on_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/135531Mi)
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825670)dis+10_161_sil=256000:plsq=on:plsqr=61199697,1048576:gs=on:alpa=true:sac=on:slsq=on:cn=on:random_seed=3243046013:i=88024:add=on:rawr=on_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/88024Mi)
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673)ott+1_1_to=lpo:sil=16000:sp=reverse_arity:erd=off:random_seed=4076861812:i=131_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/131Mi)
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825674)ott-3_16_to=lpo:sil=16000:sp=arity:fd=off:rp=on:random_seed=982792312:i=159:bs=unit_only:nicw=on:fsr=off:amm=off_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/159Mi)
% 0.21/0.32 % Exception at run slice level
% 0.21/0.32 User error: Finite model building is currently not compatible with polymorphism or higher-order constructs
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825682)fmb+10_1_fmbas=predicate:sil=64000:sas=cadical:random_seed=2420562897:i=714:nm=2_2999 on theBenchmark for (2999ds/714Mi)
% 0.21/0.32 % Exception at run slice level
% 0.21/0.32 User error: Finite model building is currently not compatible with polymorphism or higher-order constructs
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825672)Instruction limit reached!
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825672)------------------------------
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825672)Version: Vampire 5.0.1 (Release build, commit 5ef7c2677 on 2026-07-16 16:54:09 +0200)
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825672)Linked with Z3 4.14.0.0 3c47fd96cf5645d0c42b2c819d9e9a84380aa721 z3-4.8.4-9178-g3c47fd96c
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825672)CaDiCaL version: 2.1.3
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825672)Termination reason: Instruction limit
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825672)Termination phase: Saturation
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825672)Time elapsed: 0.038 s
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825672)Peak memory usage: 12 MB
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825672)Instructions burned: 117 (million)
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673) found proof, printing to "/export/starexec/sandbox2/tmp/vampire-proof-3825663-3825673"...
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673)...printing done.
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673)Refutation found. Thanks to Tanya!
% 0.21/0.32 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark
% 0.21/0.32 % SZS output start Proof for theBenchmark
% See solution above
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673)------------------------------
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673)Version: Vampire 5.0.1 (Release build, commit 5ef7c2677 on 2026-07-16 16:54:09 +0200)
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673)Linked with Z3 4.14.0.0 3c47fd96cf5645d0c42b2c819d9e9a84380aa721 z3-4.8.4-9178-g3c47fd96c
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673)CaDiCaL version: 2.1.3
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673)Termination reason: Refutation
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673)Time elapsed: 0.038 s
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673)Peak memory usage: 13 MB
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825673)Instructions burned: 62 (million)
% 0.21/0.32 % (3825663)Success in time 0.083 s
% 0.21/0.32 % Vampire exiting
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------