%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File : iProver---3.9.4
% Problem : SWW960+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v7.4.0.
% Transfm : none
% Format : tptp:raw
% Command : run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% Computer : n008.cluster.edu
% Model : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory : 8046.5625MB
% OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit : 300s
% DateTime : Fri Sep 25 03:30:35 PM UTC 2026
% Result : Theorem 4.55s 6.32s
% Output : CNFRefutation 4.55s
% Verified :
% SZS Type : Refutation
% Derivation depth : 22
% Number of leaves : 24
% Syntax : Number of formulae : 133 ( 32 unt; 0 def)
% Number of atoms : 353 ( 31 equ)
% Maximal formula atoms : 7 ( 2 avg)
% Number of connectives : 410 ( 190 ~; 189 |; 15 &)
% ( 0 <=>; 16 =>; 0 <=; 0 <~>)
% Maximal formula depth : 12 ( 5 avg)
% Maximal term depth : 6 ( 2 avg)
% Number of types : 1 ( 0 usr)
% Number of type conns : 0 ( 0 >; 0 *; 0 +; 0 <<)
% Number of predicates : 5 ( 3 usr; 1 prp; 0-2 aty)
% Number of functors : 26 ( 26 usr; 6 con; 0-2 aty)
% Number of variables : 234 ( 0 sgn 233 !; 1 ?; 108 :)
% Comments :
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f54,axiom,
name_A != name_objective,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax53) ).
fof(f60,axiom,
name_B != name_objective,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax59) ).
fof(f79,axiom,
! [X0,X1] : constr_adec(constr_aenc(X1,constr_pkey(X0)),X0) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax78) ).
fof(f82,axiom,
! [X0,X1] : constr_checksign(constr_sign(X1,X0),constr_pkey(X0)) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax81) ).
fof(f83,axiom,
! [X0,X1] : constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(tuple_2(X0,X1)) = X1,
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax82) ).
fof(f87,axiom,
! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax86) ).
fof(f94,axiom,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X0)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax93) ).
fof(f102,axiom,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax101) ).
fof(f103,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(X1)
& pred_attacker(X0) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax102) ).
fof(f106,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(X1)
& pred_attacker(X0) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax105) ).
fof(f114,axiom,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax113) ).
fof(f116,axiom,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0))
=> pred_attacker(X0) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax115) ).
fof(f120,axiom,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax119) ).
fof(f122,axiom,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax121) ).
fof(f124,axiom,
! [X0] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax123) ).
fof(f139,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(X1)
& pred_attacker(X0) )
=> pred_attacker(constr_adec(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax138) ).
fof(f145,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(X1)
& pred_attacker(X0) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax144) ).
fof(f147,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1))
=> pred_attacker(X1) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax146) ).
fof(f153,axiom,
pred_attacker(name_A),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax152) ).
fof(f165,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X1,name_skB))) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X0)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax164) ).
fof(f166,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)))
& pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
& pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_adec(X2,name_skB)) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax165) ).
fof(f167,axiom,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X2,X0))
& pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) )
=> pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS))) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax166) ).
fof(f168,axiom,
! [X0,X1] :
( ( pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
& X0 != name_A
& X0 != name_B )
=> pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax167) ).
fof(f169,conjecture,
! [X0] : pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(X0),name_objective)),
file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co0) ).
fof(f170,negated_conjecture,
~ ! [X0] : pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(X0),name_objective)),
inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f169]) ).
fof(f171,plain,
? [X0] : ~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(X0),name_objective)),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f170]) ).
fof(f172,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1))
| pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f147]) ).
fof(f174,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f145]) ).
fof(f175,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f174]) ).
fof(f176,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_adec(X2,name_skB))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f166]) ).
fof(f177,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_adec(X2,name_skB))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f176]) ).
fof(f178,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X0)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f165]) ).
fof(f179,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X0)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f178]) ).
fof(f180,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f94]) ).
fof(f181,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_adec(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f139]) ).
fof(f182,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_adec(X0,X1)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f181]) ).
fof(f187,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f114]) ).
fof(f190,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f120]) ).
fof(f192,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f122]) ).
fof(f194,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f124]) ).
fof(f199,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f116]) ).
fof(f201,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X2,X0))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1))
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS))) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f167]) ).
fof(f202,plain,
! [X0,X1,X2] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X2,X0))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1))
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS))) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f201]) ).
fof(f205,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| name_A = X0
| name_B = X0
| pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f168]) ).
fof(f206,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| name_A = X0
| name_B = X0
| pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f205]) ).
fof(f207,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f102]) ).
fof(f211,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f103]) ).
fof(f212,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f211]) ).
fof(f215,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f106]) ).
fof(f216,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
inference(flattening,[],[f215]) ).
fof(f217,plain,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(sK0),name_objective)),
inference(skolemize,[status(esa),new_symbols(skolem,[sK0]),skolemize(X0,sK0)],[f171]) ).
fof(f218,plain,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(sK0),name_objective)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f217]) ).
fof(f224,plain,
name_B != name_objective,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f60]) ).
fof(f225,plain,
name_A != name_objective,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f54]) ).
fof(f231,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1))
| pred_attacker(X1) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f172]) ).
fof(f233,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f175]) ).
fof(f234,plain,
! [X2,X3,X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_adec(X2,name_skB))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f177]) ).
fof(f235,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)))
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X0)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X2,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f179]) ).
fof(f290,plain,
pred_attacker(name_A),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f153]) ).
fof(f311,plain,
! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f87]) ).
fof(f312,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f180]) ).
fof(f313,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(constr_adec(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f182]) ).
fof(f314,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_adec(constr_aenc(X1,constr_pkey(X0)),X0) = X1,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f79]) ).
fof(f316,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_checksign(constr_sign(X1,X0),constr_pkey(X0)) = X1,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f82]) ).
fof(f321,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f187]) ).
fof(f324,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f190]) ).
fof(f326,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f192]) ).
fof(f328,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f194]) ).
fof(f331,plain,
! [X0,X1] : constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(tuple_2(X0,X1)) = X1,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f83]) ).
fof(f334,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f199]) ).
fof(f336,plain,
! [X2,X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X2,X0))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1))
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f202]) ).
fof(f338,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1))
| name_A = X0
| name_B = X0
| pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f206]) ).
fof(f341,plain,
! [X0] :
( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X0))
| pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f207]) ).
fof(f345,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f212]) ).
fof(f348,plain,
! [X0,X1] :
( ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f216]) ).
tcf(c_49,negated_conjecture,
~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(name_Nb(sK0),name_objective)),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f218]) ).
tcf(c_55,plain,
name_objective != name_B,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f224]) ).
tcf(c_56,plain,
name_objective != name_A,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f225]) ).
tcf(c_62,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_2(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f231]) ).
tcf(c_64,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(X1,X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f233]) ).
tcf(c_65,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X3,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X1),constr_adec(X2,name_skB))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS)))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f234]) ).
tcf(c_66,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS)))) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f235]) ).
tcf(c_121,plain,
pred_attacker(name_A),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f290]) ).
tcf(c_142,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f311]) ).
tcf(c_143,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f312]) ).
tcf(c_144,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_attacker(constr_adec(X1,X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f313]) ).
tcf(c_145,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] : constr_adec(constr_aenc(X0,constr_pkey(X1)),X1) = X0,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f314]) ).
tcf(c_147,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] : constr_checksign(constr_sign(X0,X1),constr_pkey(X1)) = X0,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f316]) ).
tcf(c_152,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f321]) ).
tcf(c_155,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f324]) ).
tcf(c_157,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f326]) ).
tcf(c_159,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f328]) ).
tcf(c_162,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] : constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(tuple_2(X0,X1)) = X1,
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f331]) ).
tcf(c_165,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f334]) ).
tcf(c_167,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X1,X2),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f336]) ).
tcf(c_169,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1))
| ( X0 = name_A )
| ( X0 = name_B )
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X0,X1)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f338]) ).
tcf(c_172,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(X0)) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f341]) ).
tcf(c_176,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_in_1(X1,X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f345]) ).
tcf(c_179,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_register_server_in_1(X1,X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f348]) ).
tcf(c_186,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(name_A))
| ~ pred_attacker(name_A) ),
inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_157]) ).
tcf(c_187,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(name_A))
| ~ pred_attacker(name_A) ),
inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_155]) ).
tcf(c_215,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_159]) ).
tcf(c_431,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X3))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X3,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X1),constr_adec(X2,name_skB))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS)))) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_65,c_215]) ).
tcf(c_432,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS)))) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_66,c_215]) ).
tcf(c_455,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(X3)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X2))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X2,name_skB)))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_adec(X1,name_skB)) ),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_431,c_142]) ).
tcf(c_456,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X0,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_adec(X0,name_skB))) ),
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_432,c_142]) ).
tcf(c_785,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X0,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_456,c_142]) ).
tcf(c_802,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_455,c_142,c_142]) ).
tcf(c_803,plain,
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
| ~ pred_attacker(name_A)
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(name_A))
| ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(name_A)) ),
inference(instantiation,[status(thm)],[c_802]) ).
tcf(c_804,plain,
pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_802,c_121,c_186,c_187,c_803]) ).
tcf(c_1038,plain,
! [X0: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_157]) ).
tcf(c_1250,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X0,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS))))))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_785,c_1038]) ).
tcf(c_3308,plain,
pred_attacker(name_objective),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_804,c_152]) ).
tcf(c_3360,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X0,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(constr_checksign(X1,constr_pkey(name_skS)))))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_1250,c_165]) ).
tcf(c_3414,plain,
( ~ pred_attacker(name_objective)
| ~ pred_attacker(name_Nb(sK0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_64,c_49]) ).
tcf(c_3417,plain,
~ pred_attacker(name_Nb(sK0)),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3414,c_3308]) ).
tcf(c_3424,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_aenc(X0,constr_pkey(X1))) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_145,c_144]) ).
tcf(c_3493,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_176,c_167]) ).
tcf(c_3521,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_table(tuple_keys(X1,X0))
| ( X1 = name_A )
| ( X1 = name_B )
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_179,c_169]) ).
tcf(c_3563,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_key_retrieval_server_out_2(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_3308,c_3493]) ).
tcf(c_3578,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_3563,c_172]) ).
tcf(c_3651,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),constr_tuple_2_get_1_bitstring(X0)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_sign(X0,name_skS)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_147,c_3360]) ).
tcf(c_3684,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X2,name_skB)),name_Nb(X3)),X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_sign(tuple_2(X0,X1),name_skS)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_162,c_3651]) ).
tcf(c_3729,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X2,name_skB)),name_Nb(X3)),X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_table(tuple_keys(X0,X1)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_3578,c_3684]) ).
tcf(c_3852,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X2,name_skB)),name_Nb(X3)),X0))
| ( X1 = name_A )
| ( X1 = name_B )
| ~ pred_attacker(X2)
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_3521,c_3729]) ).
tcf(c_6207,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),X0))
| ( name_objective = name_A )
| ( name_objective = name_B )
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_3308,c_3852]) ).
tcf(c_6258,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(constr_aenc(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)),X0))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6207,c_56,c_55]) ).
tcf(c_6273,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0)
| ~ pred_attacker(constr_pkey(X0)) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6258,c_3424]) ).
tcf(c_6555,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X1,name_skB)),name_Nb(X2)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X1)
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_6273,c_143,c_6273]) ).
tcf(c_6592,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_attacker(tuple_2(constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_adec(X0,name_skB)),name_Nb(X1)))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_3308,c_6555]) ).
tcf(c_6665,plain,
! [X0: $i,X1: $i] :
( pred_attacker(name_Nb(X1))
| ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6592,c_62]) ).
tcf(c_6712,plain,
! [X0: $i] : pred_attacker(name_Nb(X0)),
inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_3308,c_6665]) ).
tcf(c_6767,plain,
$false,
inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_3417,c_6712]) ).
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.03 % Problem : SWW960+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v7.4.0.
% 0.00/0.04 % Command : run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% 0.13/5.39 % Computer : n008.cluster.edu
% 0.13/5.39 % Model : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.13/5.39 % CPU : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.13/5.39 % Memory : 8046.5625MB
% 0.13/5.39 % OS : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.13/5.39 % CPULimit : 300
% 0.13/5.39 % WCLimit : 300
% 0.13/5.39 % DateTime : Thu Sep 24 23:17:03 UTC 2026
% 0.13/5.40 % CPUTime :
% 0.15/5.40 Running run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% 0.15/5.43 Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.15/5.43 Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/iproveropt-multi-core.sh -d -n -l tptp -s fof_schedule -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.15/5.45
% 0.15/5.45 % ======== iProver multi-core TPTP/SMT =========
% 0.15/5.45
% 0.15/5.45 % Detected problem language: tptp
% 0.15/5.46 % Proving...
% 4.55/6.32 % SZS status Started for theBenchmark.p
% 4.55/6.32 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 %---------------- iProver v3.9.4 (pre CASC 2026/SMT-COMP 2026) ----------------%
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % ------ iProver source info
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % git: date: 2026-07-19 20:42:38 +0200
% 4.55/6.32 % git: sha1: 804e7d636a263075307957e923b7a22a4035de61
% 4.55/6.32 % git: non_committed_changes: false
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % ------ Parsing...
% 4.55/6.32 % ------ Clausification by vclausify_rel & Parsing by iProver...%
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % ------ Preprocessing... sup_sim: 0 sf_s rm: 2 0s sf_e pe_s pe_e sup_sim: 0 sf_s rm: 1 0s sf_e pe_s pe_e %
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % ------ Preprocessing... gs_s sp: 0 0s gs_e snvd_s sp: 0 0s snvd_e %
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % ------ Preprocessing... sf_s rm: 1 0s sf_e sf_s rm: 0 0s sf_e
% 4.55/6.32 % ------ Proving...
% 4.55/6.32 % ------ Problem Properties
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 %
% 4.55/6.32 % clauses 130
% 4.55/6.32 % conjectures 1
% 4.55/6.32 % EPR 87
% 4.55/6.32 % Horn 129
% 4.55/6.32 % unary 97
% 4.55/6.32 % binary 23
% 4.55/6.32 % lits 174
% 4.55/6.32 % lits eq 86
% 4.55/6.32 % fd_pure 0
% 4.55/6.32 % fd_pseudo 0
% 4.55/6.32 % fd_cond 1
% 4.55/6.32 % fd_pseudo_cond 0
% 4.55/6.32 % AC symbols 0
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % ------ Schedule dynamic 5 is on
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % ------ Input Options "--resolution_flag false --inst_lit_sel_side none" Time Limit: 10.
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % ------
% 4.55/6.32 % Current options:
% 4.55/6.32 % ------
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 %
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % ------ Proving...
% 4.55/6.32 %
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 4.55/6.32
% 4.55/6.32 % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
% 4.55/6.33
% 4.55/6.33
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------