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iProver---3.9.4.THM-CRf.s

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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : iProver---3.9.4
% Problem  : SWW963+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v7.4.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM

% Computer : n002.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Fri Sep 25 03:30:35 PM UTC 2026

% Result   : Theorem 3.50s 6.49s
% Output   : CNFRefutation 3.50s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :   15
%            Number of leaves      :   10
% Syntax   : Number of formulae    :   56 (  19 unt;   0 def)
%            Number of atoms       :  132 (   0 equ)
%            Maximal formula atoms :    7 (   2 avg)
%            Number of connectives :  147 (  71   ~;  65   |;   5   &)
%                                         (   0 <=>;   6  =>;   0  <=;   0 <~>)
%            Maximal formula depth :   12 (   4 avg)
%            Maximal term depth    :    4 (   1 avg)
%            Number of types       :    1 (   0 usr)
%            Number of type conns  :    0 (   0   >;   0   *;   0   +;   0  <<)
%            Number of predicates  :    5 (   4 usr;   3 prp; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of functors    :   19 (  19 usr;   6 con; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of variables   :   66 (   0 sgn  66   !;   0   ?;  31   :)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f96,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax95) ).

fof(f104,axiom,
    pred_attacker(tuple_true),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax103) ).

fof(f134,axiom,
    ! [X0] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0))
     => pred_attacker(X0) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax133) ).

fof(f135,axiom,
    ! [X0] :
      ( pred_attacker(X0)
     => pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax134) ).

fof(f140,axiom,
    ! [X0] :
      ( pred_attacker(X0)
     => pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax139) ).

fof(f142,axiom,
    ! [X0] :
      ( pred_attacker(X0)
     => pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax141) ).

fof(f144,axiom,
    ! [X0] :
      ( pred_attacker(X0)
     => pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax143) ).

fof(f191,axiom,
    pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_1(name_B,name_A)),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax190) ).

fof(f193,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
      ( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
        & pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
        & pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
        & pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
        & pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
        & pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB)) )
     => pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax192) ).

fof(f196,conjecture,
    pred_attacker(name_objective),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co0) ).

fof(f197,negated_conjecture,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f196]) ).

fof(f198,plain,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    inference(flattening,[],[f197]) ).

fof(f248,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0))
      | pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f134]) ).

fof(f249,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0)) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f135]) ).

fof(f255,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f140]) ).

fof(f257,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f142]) ).

fof(f259,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f144]) ).

fof(f300,plain,
    ! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB))
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f193]) ).

fof(f301,plain,
    ! [X0,X1,X2,X3] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB))
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
    inference(flattening,[],[f300]) ).

fof(f401,plain,
    ! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f96]) ).

fof(f409,plain,
    pred_attacker(tuple_true),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f104]) ).

fof(f439,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0))
      | pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f248]) ).

fof(f440,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f249]) ).

fof(f445,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f255]) ).

fof(f447,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f257]) ).

fof(f449,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f259]) ).

fof(f495,plain,
    pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_1(name_B,name_A)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f191]) ).

fof(f497,plain,
    ! [X2,X3,X0,X1] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X3))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X3,constr_pkey(name_skS))))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X1,name_skB)))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB))
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f301]) ).

fof(f500,plain,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f198]) ).

tcf(c_141,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f401]) ).

tcf(c_149,plain,
    pred_attacker(tuple_true),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f409]) ).

tcf(c_179,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(X0)
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(X0)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f439]) ).

tcf(c_180,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_4(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f440]) ).

tcf(c_185,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f445]) ).

tcf(c_187,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f447]) ).

tcf(c_189,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f449]) ).

tcf(c_235,plain,
    pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_1(name_B,name_A)),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f495]) ).

tcf(c_237,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X3))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X3,name_skB)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X1),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS)))) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f497]) ).

tcf(c_240,negated_conjecture,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f500]) ).

tcf(c_359,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_2(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_189]) ).

tcf(c_716,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X3))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X2))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X3,name_skB)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X1),constr_ecb_dec_1(X2,name_skB))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30(constr_checksign(X0,constr_pkey(name_skS)))) ),
    inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_237,c_359]) ).

tcf(c_747,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X3)
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X2))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X1))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_ecb_dec_2(X2,name_skB)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Nb(X0),constr_ecb_dec_1(X1,name_skB)) ),
    inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_716,c_141]) ).

tcf(c_1349,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X2)
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X1))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0)) ),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_747,c_141,c_141]) ).

tcf(c_1881,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_5(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_185]) ).

tcf(c_2236,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X2)
      | ~ pred_attacker(X1)
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
    inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_1349,c_1881]) ).

tcf(c_3305,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( ~ iPr_def_10
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_10])],[c_2236]) ).

tcf(c_3306,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( ~ iPr_def_11
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_in_3(X0)) ),
    inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_11])],[c_2236]) ).

tcf(c_3307,plain,
    ( iPr_def_11
    | iPr_def_10
    | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
    inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[])],[c_2236]) ).

tcf(c_3308,negated_conjecture,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c_240]) ).

tcf(c_3468,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( ~ iPr_def_11
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_187,c_3306]) ).

tcf(c_5999,plain,
    ~ iPr_def_10,
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_235,c_3305]) ).

tcf(c_6002,plain,
    ( iPr_def_11
    | pred_attacker(tuple_client_B_out_6(name_objective)) ),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_3307,c_3307,c_5999]) ).

tcf(c_6092,plain,
    ( iPr_def_11
    | pred_attacker(name_objective) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_6002,c_179]) ).

tcf(c_6093,plain,
    iPr_def_11,
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_6092,c_3308]) ).

tcf(c_6098,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] : ~ pred_attacker(X0),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_180,c_3468,c_6093]) ).

tcf(c_6101,plain,
    $false,
    inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_149,c_6098]) ).


%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.02  % Problem  : SWW963+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v7.4.0.
% 0.00/0.04  % Command  : run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% 0.09/5.58  % Computer : n002.cluster.edu
% 0.09/5.58  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.09/5.58  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.09/5.58  % Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% 0.09/5.58  % OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.09/5.58  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.09/5.58  % WCLimit  : 300
% 0.09/5.58  % DateTime : Thu Sep 24 23:19:40 UTC 2026
% 0.09/5.58  % CPUTime  : 
% 0.09/5.58  Running run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% 0.13/5.62  Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.13/5.62  Running: /export/starexec/sandbox/solver/bin/iproveropt-multi-core.sh -d -n -l tptp -s fof_schedule -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.13/5.63  
% 0.13/5.63  % ======== iProver multi-core TPTP/SMT =========
% 0.13/5.63  
% 0.13/5.63  % Detected problem language: tptp
% 0.13/5.65  % Proving...
% 3.50/6.49  % SZS status Started for theBenchmark.p
% 3.50/6.49  % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 3.50/6.49  
% 3.50/6.49  %---------------- iProver v3.9.4 (pre CASC 2026/SMT-COMP 2026) ----------------%
% 3.50/6.49  
% 3.50/6.49  % ------  iProver source info
% 3.50/6.49  
% 3.50/6.49  % git: date: 2026-07-19 20:42:38 +0200
% 3.50/6.49  % git: sha1: 804e7d636a263075307957e923b7a22a4035de61
% 3.50/6.49  % git: non_committed_changes: false
% 3.50/6.49  
% 3.50/6.49  % ------ Parsing...
% 3.50/6.49  % ------ Clausification by vclausify_rel  & Parsing by iProver...% 
% 3.50/6.49  
% 3.50/6.49  % ------ Preprocessing... sup_sim: 0  sf_s  rm: 2 0s  sf_e  pe_s  pe:1:0s pe_e  sup_sim: 0  sf_s  rm: 1 0s  sf_e  pe_s  pe_e % 
% 3.50/6.49  
% 3.50/6.49  % ------ Preprocessing... gs_s  sp: 3 0s  gs_e  snvd_s sp: 0 0s snvd_e % 
% 3.50/6.49  
% 3.50/6.49  % ------ Preprocessing... sf_s  rm: 1 0s  sf_e  sf_s  rm: 0 0s  sf_e 
% 3.50/6.49  % ------ Proving...
% 3.50/6.49  % ------ Problem Properties 
% 3.50/6.49  
% 3.50/6.49  % 
% 3.50/6.49  % clauses                               191
% 3.50/6.49  % conjectures                           1
% 3.50/6.49  % EPR                                   91
% 3.50/6.49  % Horn                                  189
% 3.50/6.49  % unary                                 112
% 3.50/6.49  % binary                                55
% 3.50/6.49  % lits                                  304
% 3.50/6.50  % lits eq                               94
% 3.50/6.50  % fd_pure                               0
% 3.50/6.50  % fd_pseudo                             0
% 3.50/6.50  % fd_cond                               1
% 3.50/6.50  % fd_pseudo_cond                        0
% 3.50/6.50  % AC symbols                            0
% 3.50/6.50  
% 3.50/6.50  % ------ Schedule dynamic 5 is on 
% 3.50/6.50  
% 3.50/6.50  % ------ Input Options "--resolution_flag false --inst_lit_sel_side none" Time Limit: 10.
% 3.50/6.50  
% 3.50/6.50  
% 3.50/6.50  % ------ 
% 3.50/6.50  % Current options:
% 3.50/6.50  % ------ 
% 3.50/6.50  
% 3.50/6.50  
% 3.50/6.50  % 
% 3.50/6.50  
% 3.50/6.50  % ------ Proving...
% 3.50/6.50  % 
% 3.50/6.50  
% 3.50/6.50  % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 3.50/6.50  
% 3.50/6.50  % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
% 3.50/6.50  
% 3.50/6.50  
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------