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iProver---3.9.4.THM-CRf.s

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%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% File     : iProver---3.9.4
% Problem  : SWW967+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v7.4.0.
% Transfm  : none
% Format   : tptp:raw
% Command  : run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM

% Computer : n012.cluster.edu
% Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 2.10GHz
% Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% CPULimit : 300s
% WCLimit  : 300s
% DateTime : Fri Sep 25 03:30:36 PM UTC 2026

% Result   : Theorem 0.17s 0.97s
% Output   : CNFRefutation 0.17s
% Verified : 
% SZS Type : Refutation
%            Derivation depth      :   14
%            Number of leaves      :   10
% Syntax   : Number of formulae    :   58 (  21 unt;   0 def)
%            Number of atoms       :  151 (   0 equ)
%            Maximal formula atoms :    9 (   2 avg)
%            Number of connectives :  183 (  90   ~;  80   |;   7   &)
%                                         (   0 <=>;   6  =>;   0  <=;   0 <~>)
%            Maximal formula depth :   15 (   5 avg)
%            Maximal term depth    :    4 (   2 avg)
%            Number of types       :    1 (   0 usr)
%            Number of type conns  :    0 (   0   >;   0   *;   0   +;   0  <<)
%            Number of predicates  :    6 (   5 usr;   4 prp; 0-2 aty)
%            Number of functors    :   21 (  21 usr;   6 con; 0-3 aty)
%            Number of variables   :   76 (   0 sgn  76   !;   0   ?;  37   :)

% Comments : 
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
fof(f84,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax83) ).

fof(f91,axiom,
    pred_attacker(tuple_true),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax90) ).

fof(f110,axiom,
    ! [X0] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0))
     => pred_attacker(X0) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax109) ).

fof(f121,axiom,
    ! [X0] :
      ( pred_attacker(X0)
     => pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax120) ).

fof(f123,axiom,
    ! [X0] :
      ( pred_attacker(X0)
     => pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax122) ).

fof(f125,axiom,
    ! [X0] :
      ( pred_attacker(X0)
     => pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax124) ).

fof(f127,axiom,
    ! [X0] :
      ( pred_attacker(X0)
     => pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax126) ).

fof(f143,axiom,
    pred_attacker(constr_CONST_4),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax142) ).

fof(f172,axiom,
    ! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
      ( ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
        & pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
        & pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
        & pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
        & pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
        & pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
        & pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
        & pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))) )
     => pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',ax171) ).

fof(f175,conjecture,
    pred_attacker(name_objective),
    file('/export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p',co0) ).

fof(f176,negated_conjecture,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    inference(negated_conjecture,[status(cth)],[f175]) ).

fof(f177,plain,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    inference(flattening,[],[f176]) ).

fof(f205,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0))
      | pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f110]) ).

fof(f217,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0)) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f121]) ).

fof(f219,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0)) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f123]) ).

fof(f221,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0)) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f125]) ).

fof(f223,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0)) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f127]) ).

fof(f272,plain,
    ! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas))))
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
    inference(ennf_transformation,[],[f172]) ).

fof(f273,plain,
    ! [X0,X1,X2,X3,X4] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas))))
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
    inference(flattening,[],[f272]) ).

fof(f360,plain,
    ! [X0,X1] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f84]) ).

fof(f367,plain,
    pred_attacker(tuple_true),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f91]) ).

fof(f386,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0))
      | pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f205]) ).

fof(f397,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f217]) ).

fof(f399,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f219]) ).

fof(f401,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f221]) ).

fof(f403,plain,
    ! [X0] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f223]) ).

fof(f419,plain,
    pred_attacker(constr_CONST_4),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f143]) ).

fof(f447,plain,
    ! [X2,X3,X0,X1,X4] :
      ( ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X2,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X3))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X4))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X3,X2,X0)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X4,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X1,name_Kas))))
      | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f273]) ).

fof(f450,plain,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f177]) ).

tcf(c_132,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i] : pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(X0,X1),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f360]) ).

tcf(c_139,plain,
    pred_attacker(tuple_true),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f367]) ).

tcf(c_158,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(X0)
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(X0)) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f386]) ).

tcf(c_169,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f397]) ).

tcf(c_171,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f399]) ).

tcf(c_173,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f401]) ).

tcf(c_175,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f403]) ).

tcf(c_191,plain,
    pred_attacker(constr_CONST_4),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f419]) ).

tcf(c_219,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i,X4: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X4))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X2),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X0,X1,X2)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X3,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas)))) ),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f447]) ).

tcf(c_222,negated_conjecture,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    inference(cnf_transformation,[],[f450]) ).

tcf(c_354,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_4(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_173]) ).

tcf(c_684,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i,X4: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0)
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X4))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X2),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(tuple_succ(name_Na0x27(X0,X1,X2)),constr_cbc_dec_1(X3,constr_tuple_2_get_0x30_bitstring(constr_cbc_dec_2(X4,name_Kas)))) ),
    inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_219,c_354]) ).

tcf(c_714,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i,X4: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X4)
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X2))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X3))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_B,constr_tuple_4_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_A,constr_tuple_2_get_1(constr_cbc_dec_2(X2,name_Kas)))
      | ~ pred_eq_bitstring_bitstring(name_Na(X0),constr_tuple_4_get_0x30(constr_cbc_dec_4(X1,name_Kas))) ),
    inference(backward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_684,c_132]) ).

tcf(c_1292,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X3)
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X2))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X1))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0)) ),
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_714,c_132,c_132,c_132]) ).

tcf(c_1751,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_8(X0))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(prop_impl_just,[status(thm)],[c_169]) ).

tcf(c_2087,plain,
    ! [X0: $i,X1: $i,X2: $i,X3: $i] :
      ( pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective))
      | ~ pred_attacker(X3)
      | ~ pred_attacker(X2)
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X1))
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0)) ),
    inference(bin_hyper_res,[status(thm)],[c_1292,c_1751]) ).

tcf(c_3036,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( ~ iPr_def_10
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_10])],[c_2087]) ).

tcf(c_3037,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( ~ iPr_def_11
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_2(X0)) ),
    inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_11])],[c_2087]) ).

tcf(c_3038,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( ~ iPr_def_12
      | ~ pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_in_6(X0)) ),
    inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[iPr_def_12])],[c_2087]) ).

tcf(c_3039,plain,
    ( iPr_def_12
    | iPr_def_11
    | iPr_def_10
    | pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)) ),
    inference(splitting,[splitting(split),new_symbols(definition,[])],[c_2087]) ).

tcf(c_3040,negated_conjecture,
    ~ pred_attacker(name_objective),
    inference(demodulation,[status(thm)],[c_222]) ).

tcf(c_5566,plain,
    ~ iPr_def_10,
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_139,c_3036]) ).

tcf(c_5785,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( ~ iPr_def_11
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_175,c_3037]) ).

tcf(c_5842,plain,
    ~ iPr_def_11,
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_191,c_5785]) ).

tcf(c_5861,plain,
    ! [X0: $i] :
      ( ~ iPr_def_12
      | ~ pred_attacker(X0) ),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_171,c_3038]) ).

tcf(c_5897,plain,
    ~ iPr_def_12,
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_191,c_5861]) ).

tcf(c_5912,plain,
    pred_attacker(tuple_client_A_out_9(name_objective)),
    inference(global_subsumption_just,[status(thm)],[c_3039,c_3039,c_5566,c_5842,c_5897]) ).

tcf(c_5914,plain,
    pred_attacker(name_objective),
    inference(superposition,[status(thm)],[c_5912,c_158]) ).

tcf(c_5915,plain,
    $false,
    inference(forward_subsumption_resolution,[status(thm)],[c_5914,c_3040]) ).


%------------------------------------------------------------------------------
%----ORIGINAL SYSTEM OUTPUT
% 0.00/0.01  % Problem  : SWW967+1 : TPTP v9.3.1. Released v7.4.0.
% 0.00/0.02  % Command  : run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% 0.03/0.31  % Computer : n012.cluster.edu
% 0.03/0.31  % Model    : x86_64 x86_64
% 0.03/0.31  % CPU      : Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v4 @ 2.10GHz
% 0.03/0.31  % Memory   : 8046.5625MB
% 0.03/0.31  % OS       : Linux 6.8.0-71-generic
% 0.03/0.31  % CPULimit : 300
% 0.03/0.31  % WCLimit  : 300
% 0.03/0.31  % DateTime : Thu Sep 24 23:17:20 UTC 2026
% 0.03/0.31  % CPUTime  : 
% 0.03/0.31  Running run_iprover 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p THM
% 0.03/0.33  Running first-order theorem proving
% 0.03/0.33  Running: /export/starexec/sandbox2/solver/bin/iproveropt-multi-core.sh -d -n -l tptp -s fof_schedule -t 300 /export/starexec/sandbox2/benchmark/theBenchmark.p
% 0.03/0.34  
% 0.03/0.34  % ======== iProver multi-core TPTP/SMT =========
% 0.03/0.34  
% 0.03/0.34  % Detected problem language: tptp
% 0.07/0.34  % Proving...
% 0.17/0.97  % SZS status Started for theBenchmark.p
% 0.17/0.97  % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  %---------------- iProver v3.9.4 (pre CASC 2026/SMT-COMP 2026) ----------------%
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % ------  iProver source info
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % git: date: 2026-07-19 20:42:38 +0200
% 0.17/0.97  % git: sha1: 804e7d636a263075307957e923b7a22a4035de61
% 0.17/0.97  % git: non_committed_changes: false
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ Parsing...
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ Clausification by vclausify_rel  & Parsing by iProver...% 
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ Preprocessing... sup_sim: 0  sf_s  rm: 2 0s  sf_e  pe_s  pe:1:0s pe_e  sup_sim: 0  sf_s  rm: 1 0s  sf_e  pe_s  pe_e % 
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ Preprocessing... gs_s  sp: 4 0s  gs_e  snvd_s sp: 0 0s snvd_e % 
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ Preprocessing... sf_s  rm: 1 0s  sf_e  sf_s  rm: 0 0s  sf_e 
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ Proving...
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ Problem Properties 
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % 
% 0.17/0.97  % clauses                               174
% 0.17/0.97  % conjectures                           1
% 0.17/0.97  % EPR                                   79
% 0.17/0.97  % Horn                                  173
% 0.17/0.97  % unary                                 97
% 0.17/0.97  % binary                                59
% 0.17/0.97  % lits                                  282
% 0.17/0.97  % lits eq                               83
% 0.17/0.97  % fd_pure                               0
% 0.17/0.97  % fd_pseudo                             0
% 0.17/0.97  % fd_cond                               0
% 0.17/0.97  % fd_pseudo_cond                        0
% 0.17/0.97  % AC symbols                            0
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ Schedule dynamic 5 is on 
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ Input Options "--resolution_flag false --inst_lit_sel_side none" Time Limit: 10.
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ 
% 0.17/0.97  % Current options:
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ 
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % 
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % ------ Proving...
% 0.17/0.97  % 
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % SZS status Theorem for theBenchmark.p
% 0.17/0.97  
% 0.17/0.97  % SZS output start CNFRefutation for theBenchmark.p
% See solution above
% 0.17/0.97  
%------------------------------------------------------------------------------